Page 68 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 68
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
phenomena related to them in order to assure greater accuracy and ample
analytical value. Considering the fact that the aforementioned research
papers stem from security studies rather than youth studies, they fail to
assure youth voices when constructing arguments on youth radicalisation.
As a result, this paper seeks to deconstruct the meaning behind radicalism
and put this originally Western European concept emerged within the
security studies paradigm (Borum, 2012), in the context of Croatia and
youth studies. More concretely, the goal of this paper is to analyse how
radicalism is understood by Croatian youth. We believe that by focusing
on youth radicalisation from the perspective of youth studies we could get
clearer and more substantial understanding of radicalism which can result
in more effective policies in that area.
Youth in Croatia
The situation regarding young people in Croatia is rather ambiguous. On
the one hand, the recent empirical studies on young people in Croatia
(Ilisin & Spajic-Vrkas, 2017; Kovacic & Horvat, 2016; Ilisin et al, 2013)
describe this generation of young people as “disillusioned”. Hence, they
show “overall deterioration of the social standing of young people com-
pared to that of young generations 10-15 years ago” (Ilisin & Spajic-Vrkas,
2017: p. 422), further weakening of youth’s trust in the social perspec-
tive, retraction into a private sphere, and distancing themselves from so-
cial and political matters (ibid), as well as a growing process of retradi-
tionalisation (Kovacic & Gvozdanovic, forthcoming). On the other hand,
there is a trend of diminishing gender differences, better understanding
of the importance of political participation, and growing personal opti-
mism (Kovacic & Horvat, 2016). When describing youth mainstream in
Croatia, authors claim that “young people are actually still predominant-
ly oriented on pragmatic adaptation to requirements of the environment
for the purpose of personal prosperity, by relying on individual and family
resources, without worrying too much about large topics and problems of
society” (Ilisin et al, 2013: p. 145). Still, in order to understand these find-
ings, they should be analysed within Croatian social and political reality.
Paradoxically, in the years after joining the European Union in 2013,
Croatia entered a politically and socially turbulent period. In less than
a year, the government changed three times, numerous independent po-
litical and public institutions were censured or pacified, public discourse
shifted towards neoconservative values, the sphere for progressive civil so-
ciety organisations shrunk, and several normative acts changed in order to
66
phenomena related to them in order to assure greater accuracy and ample
analytical value. Considering the fact that the aforementioned research
papers stem from security studies rather than youth studies, they fail to
assure youth voices when constructing arguments on youth radicalisation.
As a result, this paper seeks to deconstruct the meaning behind radicalism
and put this originally Western European concept emerged within the
security studies paradigm (Borum, 2012), in the context of Croatia and
youth studies. More concretely, the goal of this paper is to analyse how
radicalism is understood by Croatian youth. We believe that by focusing
on youth radicalisation from the perspective of youth studies we could get
clearer and more substantial understanding of radicalism which can result
in more effective policies in that area.
Youth in Croatia
The situation regarding young people in Croatia is rather ambiguous. On
the one hand, the recent empirical studies on young people in Croatia
(Ilisin & Spajic-Vrkas, 2017; Kovacic & Horvat, 2016; Ilisin et al, 2013)
describe this generation of young people as “disillusioned”. Hence, they
show “overall deterioration of the social standing of young people com-
pared to that of young generations 10-15 years ago” (Ilisin & Spajic-Vrkas,
2017: p. 422), further weakening of youth’s trust in the social perspec-
tive, retraction into a private sphere, and distancing themselves from so-
cial and political matters (ibid), as well as a growing process of retradi-
tionalisation (Kovacic & Gvozdanovic, forthcoming). On the other hand,
there is a trend of diminishing gender differences, better understanding
of the importance of political participation, and growing personal opti-
mism (Kovacic & Horvat, 2016). When describing youth mainstream in
Croatia, authors claim that “young people are actually still predominant-
ly oriented on pragmatic adaptation to requirements of the environment
for the purpose of personal prosperity, by relying on individual and family
resources, without worrying too much about large topics and problems of
society” (Ilisin et al, 2013: p. 145). Still, in order to understand these find-
ings, they should be analysed within Croatian social and political reality.
Paradoxically, in the years after joining the European Union in 2013,
Croatia entered a politically and socially turbulent period. In less than
a year, the government changed three times, numerous independent po-
litical and public institutions were censured or pacified, public discourse
shifted towards neoconservative values, the sphere for progressive civil so-
ciety organisations shrunk, and several normative acts changed in order to
66
