Page 65 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 65
k. bovan, m. kovačić, m. vučković ■ being mainstream, being radical ...
researchers have pointed out that radicalisation can be non-violent (e.g.
Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Kundnani, 2012; Schmid, 2013), and some use the
term “radicalisation to violent extremism” to distinguish between these
two types (Borum, 2014). Thus, we are left with a theoretically extreme-
ly contested term, and without any agreement even on its basic definition.
Due to its versatility and usage in various disciplines, radicalisation is in
fact something scholars in the field of humanities call – travelling con-
cepts. This basically means “they travel – between disciplines, between in-
dividual scholars, between historical periods, and between geographically
dispersed academic communities” (Bal, 2002: p. 2).
Unfortunately, when we move to the empirical findings the situa-
tion is even worse. First of all, there is a general paucity of empirical stud-
ies on the topic of radicalisation (see Borum, 2011b; Dalgaard-Nielsen,
2010). Second, studies that use empirical data usually do not study the
processes of radicalisation, even though the transformation to extrem-
ism or radicalism is the key aspect of the concept. Instead, for example,
they study the characteristics of individuals already identified as radicals
(Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Jaskoski et al., 2017), use a questionnaire to de-
termine the level of radicalisation within individuals (Al-Badayneh et al.,
2016; Chebotareva, 2014), identify determinants of radical beliefs (Doosje
et al., 2013; Doosje, van den Bos, Loseman, Feddes, & Mann, 2012), etc.
This by itself would not be a problem if not for the lack of studies dealing
with the processes of radicalisation, not just with the characteristics and
determinants of radicals2. Finally, the studies on radicalisation are geo-
graphically and sample-wise narrow – they almost exclusively deal with
Western democracies and Muslims3 (see Della Porta & LaFree, 2012).
Kundnani (2012: p. 5) captures these issues stating that research on rad-
icalisation is “in practice, limited to a much narrower question: why do
some individual Muslims support an extremist interpretation of Islam
that leads to violence?”
Finally, several authors have been critical of what could be dubbed
“the sociological background” of radicalisation studies. Since the begin-
ning of the surge in radicalisation studies, academia has been closely con-
nected with security and public policy experts. From one point of view
this is expected – the former can gain data, the latter insights that can be
used for de-radicalisation policies. On the other hand, Kundnani (2012:
2 Studies dealing with the processes use post-hoc accounts of radicals (mostly terrorists) or
close acquaintances which is of course subject to major rationalisation processes (see Pi-
soiu, 2013).
3 This is clear in the “symbolic purging of the NYPD radicalisation report” (Jenkins &
Daddario, 2016).
63
researchers have pointed out that radicalisation can be non-violent (e.g.
Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Kundnani, 2012; Schmid, 2013), and some use the
term “radicalisation to violent extremism” to distinguish between these
two types (Borum, 2014). Thus, we are left with a theoretically extreme-
ly contested term, and without any agreement even on its basic definition.
Due to its versatility and usage in various disciplines, radicalisation is in
fact something scholars in the field of humanities call – travelling con-
cepts. This basically means “they travel – between disciplines, between in-
dividual scholars, between historical periods, and between geographically
dispersed academic communities” (Bal, 2002: p. 2).
Unfortunately, when we move to the empirical findings the situa-
tion is even worse. First of all, there is a general paucity of empirical stud-
ies on the topic of radicalisation (see Borum, 2011b; Dalgaard-Nielsen,
2010). Second, studies that use empirical data usually do not study the
processes of radicalisation, even though the transformation to extrem-
ism or radicalism is the key aspect of the concept. Instead, for example,
they study the characteristics of individuals already identified as radicals
(Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Jaskoski et al., 2017), use a questionnaire to de-
termine the level of radicalisation within individuals (Al-Badayneh et al.,
2016; Chebotareva, 2014), identify determinants of radical beliefs (Doosje
et al., 2013; Doosje, van den Bos, Loseman, Feddes, & Mann, 2012), etc.
This by itself would not be a problem if not for the lack of studies dealing
with the processes of radicalisation, not just with the characteristics and
determinants of radicals2. Finally, the studies on radicalisation are geo-
graphically and sample-wise narrow – they almost exclusively deal with
Western democracies and Muslims3 (see Della Porta & LaFree, 2012).
Kundnani (2012: p. 5) captures these issues stating that research on rad-
icalisation is “in practice, limited to a much narrower question: why do
some individual Muslims support an extremist interpretation of Islam
that leads to violence?”
Finally, several authors have been critical of what could be dubbed
“the sociological background” of radicalisation studies. Since the begin-
ning of the surge in radicalisation studies, academia has been closely con-
nected with security and public policy experts. From one point of view
this is expected – the former can gain data, the latter insights that can be
used for de-radicalisation policies. On the other hand, Kundnani (2012:
2 Studies dealing with the processes use post-hoc accounts of radicals (mostly terrorists) or
close acquaintances which is of course subject to major rationalisation processes (see Pi-
soiu, 2013).
3 This is clear in the “symbolic purging of the NYPD radicalisation report” (Jenkins &
Daddario, 2016).
63
