Page 63 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 63
k. bovan, m. kovačić, m. vučković ■ being mainstream, being radical ...
radicalisation discourse and framework for understanding terrorist acts
(e.g. Khalil, 2014; Lindekilde, 2012b; Slootman & Tillie, 2006). In line
with the Anglo-Saxon approach the outcome of the radicalisation pro-
cess concerns violent acts. However, the difference is in the explicit sep-
aration between cognitive radicalisation (thoughts, ideas, or attitudes),
and behavioural radicalisation. In both instances violence is present, i.e.
in “increasing motivation to use violent means” (Doosje et al., 2016: p. 79),
“change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasing-
ly justify intergroup violence” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: p. 416),
“active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated
goal” (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: p. 4), or “a movement in the direction
of supporting or enacting radical behaviour” (Kruglanski et al., 2014: p.
70). Borum (2011a: p. 9) differentiates between “…developing extremist
ideologies and beliefs…” and “engaging in terrorism or violent extremist
actions”, while Busher and Macklin (2015) use the terms extreme narra-
tives and extreme forms of action. Perhaps the best known model of this
approach to radicalisation is McCauley and Moskalenko’s (McCauley &
Moskalenko, 2008; 2014; 2017) two pyramid model. They argue that “it
is necessary to separately theorise radicalisation of opinion and radicalisa-
tion of action” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017: p. 213) precisely because
they are psychologically different phenomena. According to the model, a
person goes up or down the opinion or action pyramid. On the former,
one can be neutral, believe in a cause but not justify violence, believe in a
cause and justify violence, or feel a moral obligation to act violently to pro-
mote the cause; on the latter, one can do nothing for a cause, engage le-
gally, engage illegally, or engage illegally toward civilians. Given the point
that these are two distinct pathways of radicalisation, they argue that se-
curity counter-measures must use different policies and actions to prevent
ideas and actions.
Regardless of the differences between these two approaches, both
come from a securitisation frame, i.e. they are focused on “how one be-
comes a radical”. Since the consequences of the radicalisation process
are clearly negative and can hurt the fabric of a society, understanding
how that process occurs has major security implications. But even more,
the securitisation frame creates “an atmosphere of a ‘state of emergen-
cy’ which calls for extraordinary policy measures” (Lindekilde, 2012a: p.
339). Onnerfors and Steiner (2018) juxtapose this with the socio-cultur-
al frame, within which the question is why certain individuals or groups
radicalise. The answers usually come from contexts, discourses, anthro-
pological factors, narratives, etc. For example, Hafez and Mullins (2015)
argue that the answer to the “radicalisation puzzle” must include micro,
61
radicalisation discourse and framework for understanding terrorist acts
(e.g. Khalil, 2014; Lindekilde, 2012b; Slootman & Tillie, 2006). In line
with the Anglo-Saxon approach the outcome of the radicalisation pro-
cess concerns violent acts. However, the difference is in the explicit sep-
aration between cognitive radicalisation (thoughts, ideas, or attitudes),
and behavioural radicalisation. In both instances violence is present, i.e.
in “increasing motivation to use violent means” (Doosje et al., 2016: p. 79),
“change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasing-
ly justify intergroup violence” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: p. 416),
“active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain the stated
goal” (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: p. 4), or “a movement in the direction
of supporting or enacting radical behaviour” (Kruglanski et al., 2014: p.
70). Borum (2011a: p. 9) differentiates between “…developing extremist
ideologies and beliefs…” and “engaging in terrorism or violent extremist
actions”, while Busher and Macklin (2015) use the terms extreme narra-
tives and extreme forms of action. Perhaps the best known model of this
approach to radicalisation is McCauley and Moskalenko’s (McCauley &
Moskalenko, 2008; 2014; 2017) two pyramid model. They argue that “it
is necessary to separately theorise radicalisation of opinion and radicalisa-
tion of action” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017: p. 213) precisely because
they are psychologically different phenomena. According to the model, a
person goes up or down the opinion or action pyramid. On the former,
one can be neutral, believe in a cause but not justify violence, believe in a
cause and justify violence, or feel a moral obligation to act violently to pro-
mote the cause; on the latter, one can do nothing for a cause, engage le-
gally, engage illegally, or engage illegally toward civilians. Given the point
that these are two distinct pathways of radicalisation, they argue that se-
curity counter-measures must use different policies and actions to prevent
ideas and actions.
Regardless of the differences between these two approaches, both
come from a securitisation frame, i.e. they are focused on “how one be-
comes a radical”. Since the consequences of the radicalisation process
are clearly negative and can hurt the fabric of a society, understanding
how that process occurs has major security implications. But even more,
the securitisation frame creates “an atmosphere of a ‘state of emergen-
cy’ which calls for extraordinary policy measures” (Lindekilde, 2012a: p.
339). Onnerfors and Steiner (2018) juxtapose this with the socio-cultur-
al frame, within which the question is why certain individuals or groups
radicalise. The answers usually come from contexts, discourses, anthro-
pological factors, narratives, etc. For example, Hafez and Mullins (2015)
argue that the answer to the “radicalisation puzzle” must include micro,
61
