Page 64 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 64
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
meso, and macro levels of understanding, which in turn include griev-
ances, existing networks, ideologies, support structures, foreign policies,
etc. Hörnqvist and Flyghed (2012) argue that radicalisation can be un-
derstood as a consequence of the clash of civilisations, lack of integration,
dissolution of civil society, and even as the result of the counter-terrorist
measures that were intended to prevent it (Lindekilde, 2012). On the oth-
er hand, Costanza (2015: p. 14) points out that a “theoretically-grounded
discursive approach that seeks to understand individuals within their so-
ciocultural environment seems better suited to capture the changing na-
ture of behaviour within context”. This includes studying cultural narra-
tives of different social structures that include family, school, peer groups,
and local community. If we think about the Anglo-Saxon and European
approach as bringing the psychological process into the field of political
violence and terrorism, the socio-cultural frame offers a “step back” out-
side of an individual’s thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. However, it is
important to keep in mind that the socio-cultural frame is not incompat-
ible with the securitisation frame; it could be viewed as the causal back-
ground of the radicalisation phases through which an individual goes.
For example, the concept of radicalisation that the authors want to un-
derstand still includes an extremist worldview and legitimising violence
(e.g. Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012).
There are three broad issues that are present within the above-men-
tioned approaches. First, the definition of radicalisation, and its rela-
tion to close concepts is inconclusive/ambiguous. For example, is the end
point of radicalisation extremism (e.g. McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017;
Mandel, 2009), terrorism (e.g. Al-Badayneh, Alhasan, & Almawajdeh,
2016; Kruglanski et al., 2014), or is attaining extremist beliefs a step in the
radicalisation process that ends in terrorist acts (e.g. Doosje, Loseman,
& van den Bos, 2013)? Furthermore, if we accept any of these end re-
sults of radicalisation, we are left with the question – what characteris-
tics constitute a radical person? This issue is even more troubling when
authors study radicalisation without defining it (e.g. Grattan, 2008;
Quayle & Taylor, 2011; Rousseau, Hassan, & Oulhote, 2018). One can
only agree with Neumann’s (2008: p. 4) widely cited statement that “ex-
perts and officials started referring to the idea of ‘radicalisation’ when-
ever they wanted to talk about ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’.”
Still, it seems that the key outcome, or rather ingredient, of the radicali-
sation process is violence; increasing the justification of violence of rele-
vant groups and/or increasing the probability of performing violent acts
(e.g. Della Porta & LaFree, 2012; Doosje et al., 2016; Jaskoski, Wilson,
& Lazareno, 2017; Khalil, 2014; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Yet,
62
meso, and macro levels of understanding, which in turn include griev-
ances, existing networks, ideologies, support structures, foreign policies,
etc. Hörnqvist and Flyghed (2012) argue that radicalisation can be un-
derstood as a consequence of the clash of civilisations, lack of integration,
dissolution of civil society, and even as the result of the counter-terrorist
measures that were intended to prevent it (Lindekilde, 2012). On the oth-
er hand, Costanza (2015: p. 14) points out that a “theoretically-grounded
discursive approach that seeks to understand individuals within their so-
ciocultural environment seems better suited to capture the changing na-
ture of behaviour within context”. This includes studying cultural narra-
tives of different social structures that include family, school, peer groups,
and local community. If we think about the Anglo-Saxon and European
approach as bringing the psychological process into the field of political
violence and terrorism, the socio-cultural frame offers a “step back” out-
side of an individual’s thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. However, it is
important to keep in mind that the socio-cultural frame is not incompat-
ible with the securitisation frame; it could be viewed as the causal back-
ground of the radicalisation phases through which an individual goes.
For example, the concept of radicalisation that the authors want to un-
derstand still includes an extremist worldview and legitimising violence
(e.g. Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012).
There are three broad issues that are present within the above-men-
tioned approaches. First, the definition of radicalisation, and its rela-
tion to close concepts is inconclusive/ambiguous. For example, is the end
point of radicalisation extremism (e.g. McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017;
Mandel, 2009), terrorism (e.g. Al-Badayneh, Alhasan, & Almawajdeh,
2016; Kruglanski et al., 2014), or is attaining extremist beliefs a step in the
radicalisation process that ends in terrorist acts (e.g. Doosje, Loseman,
& van den Bos, 2013)? Furthermore, if we accept any of these end re-
sults of radicalisation, we are left with the question – what characteris-
tics constitute a radical person? This issue is even more troubling when
authors study radicalisation without defining it (e.g. Grattan, 2008;
Quayle & Taylor, 2011; Rousseau, Hassan, & Oulhote, 2018). One can
only agree with Neumann’s (2008: p. 4) widely cited statement that “ex-
perts and officials started referring to the idea of ‘radicalisation’ when-
ever they wanted to talk about ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’.”
Still, it seems that the key outcome, or rather ingredient, of the radicali-
sation process is violence; increasing the justification of violence of rele-
vant groups and/or increasing the probability of performing violent acts
(e.g. Della Porta & LaFree, 2012; Doosje et al., 2016; Jaskoski, Wilson,
& Lazareno, 2017; Khalil, 2014; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Yet,
62
