Page 66 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 66
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
p. 4) argues that “the radicalisation discourse was, from the beginning,
circumscribed by the demands of counter-terrorist policy-makers rath-
er than an attempt to objectively study how terrorism comes into being”.
The de-radicalisation efforts have been portrayed as “industries” (Kühle
& Lindekilde, 2010), while Githens-Mazer & Lambert (2010: p. 901) ar-
gue that academics, politicians, and the media use conventional wisdom
on radicalisation to ensure that the public feels safe – “Deviation from
conventional wisdom requires one group of participants to break this cy-
cle—at the tangible risk, variously, of livelihood, of not being re-elected,
of losing sales, and of losing research funding”.
After this brief overview of radicalisation studies, we can conclude
that most of them use non-empirical methodology and are based on con-
tested models of radicalisation to violent extremism of Muslim youth
in Western democracies. Furthermore, they are mostly embedded with-
in the securitisation frame, and as such have been under the influence of
public policy agendas and needs. At the same time, there are several voices
that argue that a different approach to radicalisation is not only possible,
but theoretically clearer and analytically more useful.
Radicalisation – An Alternative Approach
It should be clear that radicalisation is a term that has “terminological
‘baggage’” (Khalil, 2014: p. 199). It has a negative connotation, usually
connected with extremist positions and political violence. At the same
time, several authors have pointed out that the radicalisation process is
highly context dependent (e.g. Lub, 2013; Mandel, 2009; Onnerfors &
Steiner, 2018). Neumann (2013) points out that the term “radical” has no
meaning on its own, and what gives it meaning is its position to the main-
stream, to the status quo. Bartlett and Miller (2012: p. 2) also state clearly
that “to be a radical is to reject the status quo”. This means that there is no
single ideology or position that is universally radical, and one can be a rad-
ical democrat in an authoritarian regime or a radical anti-democrat in a
democratic regime; an extremist, a terrorist, or a defender of human rights
(Schmid, 2013). In this sense, mainstream and radical positions are mutu-
ally co-determined and can shift, which means that today’s “radicals” can
be tomorrow’s “regulars” (Onnerfors & Steiner, 2018). It’s important to
note that based on this approach extremism is only a specific type of rad-
icalism – it includes anti-democratic tendencies and values within a dem-
ocratic setting (mainstream).
But it is not only the relative (o)position to the mainstream that de-
fines radicals, it is also the desire for a fundamental and immediate change
of society’s dominant values and/or political regime (Mclaughlin, 2012).
64
p. 4) argues that “the radicalisation discourse was, from the beginning,
circumscribed by the demands of counter-terrorist policy-makers rath-
er than an attempt to objectively study how terrorism comes into being”.
The de-radicalisation efforts have been portrayed as “industries” (Kühle
& Lindekilde, 2010), while Githens-Mazer & Lambert (2010: p. 901) ar-
gue that academics, politicians, and the media use conventional wisdom
on radicalisation to ensure that the public feels safe – “Deviation from
conventional wisdom requires one group of participants to break this cy-
cle—at the tangible risk, variously, of livelihood, of not being re-elected,
of losing sales, and of losing research funding”.
After this brief overview of radicalisation studies, we can conclude
that most of them use non-empirical methodology and are based on con-
tested models of radicalisation to violent extremism of Muslim youth
in Western democracies. Furthermore, they are mostly embedded with-
in the securitisation frame, and as such have been under the influence of
public policy agendas and needs. At the same time, there are several voices
that argue that a different approach to radicalisation is not only possible,
but theoretically clearer and analytically more useful.
Radicalisation – An Alternative Approach
It should be clear that radicalisation is a term that has “terminological
‘baggage’” (Khalil, 2014: p. 199). It has a negative connotation, usually
connected with extremist positions and political violence. At the same
time, several authors have pointed out that the radicalisation process is
highly context dependent (e.g. Lub, 2013; Mandel, 2009; Onnerfors &
Steiner, 2018). Neumann (2013) points out that the term “radical” has no
meaning on its own, and what gives it meaning is its position to the main-
stream, to the status quo. Bartlett and Miller (2012: p. 2) also state clearly
that “to be a radical is to reject the status quo”. This means that there is no
single ideology or position that is universally radical, and one can be a rad-
ical democrat in an authoritarian regime or a radical anti-democrat in a
democratic regime; an extremist, a terrorist, or a defender of human rights
(Schmid, 2013). In this sense, mainstream and radical positions are mutu-
ally co-determined and can shift, which means that today’s “radicals” can
be tomorrow’s “regulars” (Onnerfors & Steiner, 2018). It’s important to
note that based on this approach extremism is only a specific type of rad-
icalism – it includes anti-democratic tendencies and values within a dem-
ocratic setting (mainstream).
But it is not only the relative (o)position to the mainstream that de-
fines radicals, it is also the desire for a fundamental and immediate change
of society’s dominant values and/or political regime (Mclaughlin, 2012).
64
