Page 97 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
P. 97
igor ž. žagar ■ between fallacies and more fallacies?
Are all fallacies fallacious?
Hamblin, 200 years after Hume, opens a new perspective on this prob-
lem: if some fallacies seem to be omnipresent and unavoidable, maybe we
shouldn’t treat them as fallacies at all: “Fallacy of Secundum Quid [hasty
generalization] is an ever-present and unavoidable possibility in practical
situations, and any formal system that avoids it can do so only at the ex-
pense of features essential to natural language.” (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p.
213) Ignoratio Elenchi [ignoring the issue, irrelevant conclusion] is anoth-
er fallacy of this unavoidable kind. Hamblin (1970/2004: p. 31) argues:
This category can be stretched to cover virtually every kind of fallacy. If
an arguer argues for a certain conclusion while falsely believing or sug-
gesting that a different conclusion is established, one for which the first
conclusion is irrelevant, then the arguer commits the fallacy of irrelevant
conclusion. The premises miss the point.
Secundum Quid, for example, could thus be easily interpreted just as
an instance of Ignoratio Elenchi.
Begging the question [petitio principii, circular reasoning] fits in the
same category; already J. S. Mill (in his System of Logic, 1843) claims that
all valid reasoning commits this fallacy. While Cohen & Nagel’s (1934:
p. 379, in Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 35) affirm (and this passage is absolute-
ly crucial):
There is a sense in which all science is circular, for all proof rests upon
assumptions which are not derived from others but are justified by the
set of consequences which are deduced from them... But there is a differ-
ence between a circle consisting of a small number of propositions, from
which we can escape by denying them all, or setting up their contradicto-
ries, and the circle of theoretical science and human observation, which
is so wide that we cannot set up any alternative to it.
A possible conclusion we could draw from these observations: on
the micro level, we can fuss about small things, everyday conversation
and everyday reasoning, and pass our time in inventing numerous falla-
cies, but when it comes to the macro level, to big things (the big picture),
fallacies are not objectionable any more – because there is no alternative.
A problem that is very similar to Gödel’s (first) incompleteness theorem
(Kleene, 1967: p. 250):
Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary
arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for
any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain
95
Are all fallacies fallacious?
Hamblin, 200 years after Hume, opens a new perspective on this prob-
lem: if some fallacies seem to be omnipresent and unavoidable, maybe we
shouldn’t treat them as fallacies at all: “Fallacy of Secundum Quid [hasty
generalization] is an ever-present and unavoidable possibility in practical
situations, and any formal system that avoids it can do so only at the ex-
pense of features essential to natural language.” (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p.
213) Ignoratio Elenchi [ignoring the issue, irrelevant conclusion] is anoth-
er fallacy of this unavoidable kind. Hamblin (1970/2004: p. 31) argues:
This category can be stretched to cover virtually every kind of fallacy. If
an arguer argues for a certain conclusion while falsely believing or sug-
gesting that a different conclusion is established, one for which the first
conclusion is irrelevant, then the arguer commits the fallacy of irrelevant
conclusion. The premises miss the point.
Secundum Quid, for example, could thus be easily interpreted just as
an instance of Ignoratio Elenchi.
Begging the question [petitio principii, circular reasoning] fits in the
same category; already J. S. Mill (in his System of Logic, 1843) claims that
all valid reasoning commits this fallacy. While Cohen & Nagel’s (1934:
p. 379, in Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 35) affirm (and this passage is absolute-
ly crucial):
There is a sense in which all science is circular, for all proof rests upon
assumptions which are not derived from others but are justified by the
set of consequences which are deduced from them... But there is a differ-
ence between a circle consisting of a small number of propositions, from
which we can escape by denying them all, or setting up their contradicto-
ries, and the circle of theoretical science and human observation, which
is so wide that we cannot set up any alternative to it.
A possible conclusion we could draw from these observations: on
the micro level, we can fuss about small things, everyday conversation
and everyday reasoning, and pass our time in inventing numerous falla-
cies, but when it comes to the macro level, to big things (the big picture),
fallacies are not objectionable any more – because there is no alternative.
A problem that is very similar to Gödel’s (first) incompleteness theorem
(Kleene, 1967: p. 250):
Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary
arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for
any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain
95
