Page 101 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
P. 101
igor ž. žagar ■ between fallacies and more fallacies?
From a historical perspective, macrohistory, no doubt, embraces mi-
crohistory. But from a perspective of historiography, what counts as the
basic operating principle (even basic epistemological and methodological
precept) of macrohistory could easily be seen as a fallacy by microhisto-
ry, and vice versa. If they embraced what I will call the fallacies hypothe-
sis (i.e. the assumption that there are ready made fallacies lurking at what
we say (and do)). If they don’t embrace the fallacy hypothesis, microhisto-
ry and macrohistory constructively complement each other.
Superabundance and redundance of fallacies
If we take a look at a situation 40 years after Hamblin, which is today,
what we see is an enormous interest in fallacies (and not only among argu-
mentation theorists): there are many, even too many writings on fallacies,
and many, even too many definitions of what fallacies are. But the reason
for this inflation of writings on fallacies (and even production of ever new
ones) may be the same as the one Hamblin mentioned for the shortage of ac
counts on fallacies: the impossibility to unequivocally and unambiguous-
ly classify fallacies at all.
Here is a sample of definitions we can find online? Why am I con-
centrating on fallacies we can find online? Because online would be the
first “place” people interested to know what fallacies are and how they
function would look for, not the scholarly debates among argumentation
theorists.
I highlighted the most ambiguous and vague parts of these online
definitions, and provided short (critical) glosses between square brackets:
Vagueness and ambiguity of definitions
1) “A fallacy is, very generally, [not specific enough, no informative val-
ue] an error in reasoning. This differs from a factual error, which
is simply being wrong about the facts. To be more specific, a falla-
cy is an “argument” in which the premises given for the conclusion
do not provide the needed degree of support [what kind of support?].”
(Labossiere, The Nizkor Project (http://www.nizkor.org/features/
fallacies/))
2) “In logic and rhetoric [logic and rhetoric have very different princi-
ples of functioning] a fallacy is incorrect reasoning in argumentation
[unclear; what is reasoning in argumentation?] resulting in a miscon
ception [misconception of what?]. By accident or design, fallacies may
exploit emotional triggers in the listener or interlocutor (e.g. appeal
to emotion), or take advantage of social relationships between people
99
From a historical perspective, macrohistory, no doubt, embraces mi-
crohistory. But from a perspective of historiography, what counts as the
basic operating principle (even basic epistemological and methodological
precept) of macrohistory could easily be seen as a fallacy by microhisto-
ry, and vice versa. If they embraced what I will call the fallacies hypothe-
sis (i.e. the assumption that there are ready made fallacies lurking at what
we say (and do)). If they don’t embrace the fallacy hypothesis, microhisto-
ry and macrohistory constructively complement each other.
Superabundance and redundance of fallacies
If we take a look at a situation 40 years after Hamblin, which is today,
what we see is an enormous interest in fallacies (and not only among argu-
mentation theorists): there are many, even too many writings on fallacies,
and many, even too many definitions of what fallacies are. But the reason
for this inflation of writings on fallacies (and even production of ever new
ones) may be the same as the one Hamblin mentioned for the shortage of ac
counts on fallacies: the impossibility to unequivocally and unambiguous-
ly classify fallacies at all.
Here is a sample of definitions we can find online? Why am I con-
centrating on fallacies we can find online? Because online would be the
first “place” people interested to know what fallacies are and how they
function would look for, not the scholarly debates among argumentation
theorists.
I highlighted the most ambiguous and vague parts of these online
definitions, and provided short (critical) glosses between square brackets:
Vagueness and ambiguity of definitions
1) “A fallacy is, very generally, [not specific enough, no informative val-
ue] an error in reasoning. This differs from a factual error, which
is simply being wrong about the facts. To be more specific, a falla-
cy is an “argument” in which the premises given for the conclusion
do not provide the needed degree of support [what kind of support?].”
(Labossiere, The Nizkor Project (http://www.nizkor.org/features/
fallacies/))
2) “In logic and rhetoric [logic and rhetoric have very different princi-
ples of functioning] a fallacy is incorrect reasoning in argumentation
[unclear; what is reasoning in argumentation?] resulting in a miscon
ception [misconception of what?]. By accident or design, fallacies may
exploit emotional triggers in the listener or interlocutor (e.g. appeal
to emotion), or take advantage of social relationships between people
99
