Page 92 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
P. 92
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 3–4
agonal’ is rough, so ‘Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma’ is exaggerated
and suitable to some contexts and not to others; it would be pointless to
insist on its truth or falsity. (Austin, 1962/1980: pp. 143–144).
Truth, falsity and the context
What we say can therefore not only be more or less true, true up to a point,
or true for certain intents and purposes, it can also be true only in some
contexts, but not in others. And that is not all, Austin’s relativization
continues:
Thirdly, let us consider the question whether it is true that all snow
geese migrate to Labrador, given that perhaps one maimed one some-
times fails when migrating to get quite the whole way. Faced with such
problems, many have claimed, with much justice, that utterances such
as those beginning ‘All...’ are prescriptive definitions or advice to adopt
a rule. But what rule? This idea arises partly through not understand-
ing the reference of such statements, which is limited to the known; we
cannot quite make the simple statement that the truth of statements de-
pends on facts as distinct from knowledge of facts. Suppose that before
Australia is discovered X says ‘All swans are white’. If you later find a black
swan in Australia, is X refuted? Is his statement false now? Not neces-
sarily: he will take it back but he could say ‘I wasn’t talking about swans
absolutely everywhere; for example, I was not making a statement about
possible swans on Mars’. Reference depends on knowledge at the time of
utterance. (Austin, 1962/1980: p. 144).
If we sum up all these Austin’s hedgings, we get the following:
(1) what we say can only be more or less true (i.e. true up to a point);
(3) it can only be true for certain intents and purposes;
(4) it can only be true in some contexts, and
(5) its truth (or falsity) depends on knowledge at the time of utterance.
Circumstances, audiences, purposes and intentions – not truth or
falsity
This is a real rhetorical perspective on communication (truth, logic, and
philosophy) that was very often overlooked, mostly at the expense of clas-
sificatory madness that started with J. R. Searle. What Austin is propos-
ing is that - outside logic, in the real world, in everyday communication,
where we don’t go around with propositions in our pockets and truth ta-
bles in our hands - the truth or falsity of what we say be replaced by right
or proper things to say, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these
90
agonal’ is rough, so ‘Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma’ is exaggerated
and suitable to some contexts and not to others; it would be pointless to
insist on its truth or falsity. (Austin, 1962/1980: pp. 143–144).
Truth, falsity and the context
What we say can therefore not only be more or less true, true up to a point,
or true for certain intents and purposes, it can also be true only in some
contexts, but not in others. And that is not all, Austin’s relativization
continues:
Thirdly, let us consider the question whether it is true that all snow
geese migrate to Labrador, given that perhaps one maimed one some-
times fails when migrating to get quite the whole way. Faced with such
problems, many have claimed, with much justice, that utterances such
as those beginning ‘All...’ are prescriptive definitions or advice to adopt
a rule. But what rule? This idea arises partly through not understand-
ing the reference of such statements, which is limited to the known; we
cannot quite make the simple statement that the truth of statements de-
pends on facts as distinct from knowledge of facts. Suppose that before
Australia is discovered X says ‘All swans are white’. If you later find a black
swan in Australia, is X refuted? Is his statement false now? Not neces-
sarily: he will take it back but he could say ‘I wasn’t talking about swans
absolutely everywhere; for example, I was not making a statement about
possible swans on Mars’. Reference depends on knowledge at the time of
utterance. (Austin, 1962/1980: p. 144).
If we sum up all these Austin’s hedgings, we get the following:
(1) what we say can only be more or less true (i.e. true up to a point);
(3) it can only be true for certain intents and purposes;
(4) it can only be true in some contexts, and
(5) its truth (or falsity) depends on knowledge at the time of utterance.
Circumstances, audiences, purposes and intentions – not truth or
falsity
This is a real rhetorical perspective on communication (truth, logic, and
philosophy) that was very often overlooked, mostly at the expense of clas-
sificatory madness that started with J. R. Searle. What Austin is propos-
ing is that - outside logic, in the real world, in everyday communication,
where we don’t go around with propositions in our pockets and truth ta-
bles in our hands - the truth or falsity of what we say be replaced by right
or proper things to say, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these
90
