Page 96 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
P. 96
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 3–4
So the state of the art would be that nobody is particularly satisfied
with this corner of logic, concludes Hamblin (and he is emphasizing log-
ic, not language).
Impossibility to classify fallacies
And, there may be a reason for that. Even if in almost every account from
Aristotle onwards we can read that a fallacious argument is one that seems
to be valid, but it is not, it is rather often argued that it is impossible to
classify fallacies at all (and I have just presented Hamblin’s own contri-
bution(s) to this impossibility). Hamblin himself quotes De Morgan
(1847/1926: p. 276, in Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 13): “There is no such thing
as a classification of the ways in which men may arrive at an error: it is
much to be doubted whether there ever can be.” And Joseph (1906/1916: p.
569, in Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 13): “Truth may have its norms, but error
is infinite in its aberrations, and cannot be digested in any classification.”
And Cohen and Nagel (1934: p. 382, in Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 13): “It
would be impossible to enumerate all the abuses of logical principles oc-
curring in the diverse matters in which men are interested.”
Impossibility to avoid fallacies
On the other hand, it seems that certain alleged fallacies are unavoidable,
which raises the question whether they are fallacies at all (and even much
more important ones: how to classify fallacies? Are there any stable cri-
teria for detecting fallacies? All the way to the obvious one: is there any-
thing like fallacies at all?).
Already Port Royal logic (Arnauld & Nicole, 1662/1964: p. 264, in
Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 46) warns about caveats:
Finally, we reason sophistically when we draw a general conclusion from
an incomplete induction. When from the examination of many par-
ticular instances we conclude to a general statement, we have made an
induction. After the waters of many seas have been found salty and the
waters of many rivers found fresh, we can conclude that sea water is salty
but river water is fresh ... It is enough to say here that imperfect inductions
– that is inductions based on examination of fewer than all instances –
often lead us to error.
While David Hume (1748/1963, in Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 29) is
quite unambiguous: every argument from particular cases to a general rule
must be fallacious.
94
So the state of the art would be that nobody is particularly satisfied
with this corner of logic, concludes Hamblin (and he is emphasizing log-
ic, not language).
Impossibility to classify fallacies
And, there may be a reason for that. Even if in almost every account from
Aristotle onwards we can read that a fallacious argument is one that seems
to be valid, but it is not, it is rather often argued that it is impossible to
classify fallacies at all (and I have just presented Hamblin’s own contri-
bution(s) to this impossibility). Hamblin himself quotes De Morgan
(1847/1926: p. 276, in Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 13): “There is no such thing
as a classification of the ways in which men may arrive at an error: it is
much to be doubted whether there ever can be.” And Joseph (1906/1916: p.
569, in Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 13): “Truth may have its norms, but error
is infinite in its aberrations, and cannot be digested in any classification.”
And Cohen and Nagel (1934: p. 382, in Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 13): “It
would be impossible to enumerate all the abuses of logical principles oc-
curring in the diverse matters in which men are interested.”
Impossibility to avoid fallacies
On the other hand, it seems that certain alleged fallacies are unavoidable,
which raises the question whether they are fallacies at all (and even much
more important ones: how to classify fallacies? Are there any stable cri-
teria for detecting fallacies? All the way to the obvious one: is there any-
thing like fallacies at all?).
Already Port Royal logic (Arnauld & Nicole, 1662/1964: p. 264, in
Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 46) warns about caveats:
Finally, we reason sophistically when we draw a general conclusion from
an incomplete induction. When from the examination of many par-
ticular instances we conclude to a general statement, we have made an
induction. After the waters of many seas have been found salty and the
waters of many rivers found fresh, we can conclude that sea water is salty
but river water is fresh ... It is enough to say here that imperfect inductions
– that is inductions based on examination of fewer than all instances –
often lead us to error.
While David Hume (1748/1963, in Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 29) is
quite unambiguous: every argument from particular cases to a general rule
must be fallacious.
94
