Page 95 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
P. 95
igor ž. žagar ■ between fallacies and more fallacies?
is a good argument and, if A is arguing with B and has any notion at all
of winning, he will have to start from something B will accept. The same
point applies to the inference-procedure. One of the purposes of argu-
ment, whether we like it or not, is to convince, and our criteria would be
less than adequate if they had nothing to say about how well an argument
may meet this purpose. (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 241).
This is a kind of a corollary to the previous point (point 3): not only
do we have to rely on arguments that are acceptable by the person the ar-
gument is aimed at, we have to use these arguments (at least as our starting
points), even if we are not sure whether they are true or false, good or bad.
Rational arguments or/and rational choice of arguments?
The previous quote also openly exposes and emphasizes one of the fac-
ets of arguments that is too often timidly held in the shade by (some) ar-
gumentation theories: one of the purposes of argument is to convince, not
just to present a good, solid, valid “evidence”. And in his plea for convic-
tion, Hamblin even goes a step further, for some argumentation theories
maybe even over the edge:
5) Conviction, of course, may be secured by threat, water torture or hyp-
notism instead of by argument, and it is possible that Logic should have
nothing to say about these means; but we can hardly claim that an argu-
ment is not an argument because it proceeds ex concesso, or that such ar-
guments have no rational criteria of worth (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 241).
Threat, water torture or hypnotism (we could add more) would be,
no doubt, judged as fallacious means of securing conviction by standard,
mainstream theories of argumentation (if there is any such thing at all).
But Hamblin’s point is worth some consideration: these means of “con-
viction” are arguments nevertheless. They may not be rational arguments,
but there may be (more or less) rational criteria or reasons for using them
(at least in particular circumstances).
Troubles with fallacies
In this light, Hamblin’s claim from the beginning of his book that there
has never yet been a book on fallacies becomes more understandable:
Arthur Schopenhauer’s Art of Controversy is, in his opinion, too short,
Jeremy Bentham’s Book of Fallacies is too specialized, the medieval trea-
tises are mostly commentaries on Aristotle, and Aristotle’s Sophistical
Refutations are, in Hamblin’s view, “just the ninth book of his Topics”
(Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 11).
93
is a good argument and, if A is arguing with B and has any notion at all
of winning, he will have to start from something B will accept. The same
point applies to the inference-procedure. One of the purposes of argu-
ment, whether we like it or not, is to convince, and our criteria would be
less than adequate if they had nothing to say about how well an argument
may meet this purpose. (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 241).
This is a kind of a corollary to the previous point (point 3): not only
do we have to rely on arguments that are acceptable by the person the ar-
gument is aimed at, we have to use these arguments (at least as our starting
points), even if we are not sure whether they are true or false, good or bad.
Rational arguments or/and rational choice of arguments?
The previous quote also openly exposes and emphasizes one of the fac-
ets of arguments that is too often timidly held in the shade by (some) ar-
gumentation theories: one of the purposes of argument is to convince, not
just to present a good, solid, valid “evidence”. And in his plea for convic-
tion, Hamblin even goes a step further, for some argumentation theories
maybe even over the edge:
5) Conviction, of course, may be secured by threat, water torture or hyp-
notism instead of by argument, and it is possible that Logic should have
nothing to say about these means; but we can hardly claim that an argu-
ment is not an argument because it proceeds ex concesso, or that such ar-
guments have no rational criteria of worth (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 241).
Threat, water torture or hypnotism (we could add more) would be,
no doubt, judged as fallacious means of securing conviction by standard,
mainstream theories of argumentation (if there is any such thing at all).
But Hamblin’s point is worth some consideration: these means of “con-
viction” are arguments nevertheless. They may not be rational arguments,
but there may be (more or less) rational criteria or reasons for using them
(at least in particular circumstances).
Troubles with fallacies
In this light, Hamblin’s claim from the beginning of his book that there
has never yet been a book on fallacies becomes more understandable:
Arthur Schopenhauer’s Art of Controversy is, in his opinion, too short,
Jeremy Bentham’s Book of Fallacies is too specialized, the medieval trea-
tises are mostly commentaries on Aristotle, and Aristotle’s Sophistical
Refutations are, in Hamblin’s view, “just the ninth book of his Topics”
(Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 11).
93
