Page 94 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
P. 94
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 3–4
John Smith, and so on. However, the paradigm case of an argument is
that in which it is produced by one person to convince another.” (Ham-
blin, 1970/2004: p. 239).
My interpretation of the above passage would be that there is no per-
ennial and universal truth(s), and consequently, no perennial and uni-
versal truth-conditions or criteria. The truth is relative, but we shouldn’t
understand ‘relative’ as a trivial stereotype that everything changes and
everything can be different. ‘Relative’ should be understood more in its
etymological sense (relativus = having reference or relation to; from rela
tus (pp) = to refer), as a thing (concept, thought) having a relation to or be-
ing in a relation to another thing (concept, thought). In a particular rela-
tion (X vs. Y), the truth (the “truth”) is seen and represented as such and
such; in some other relation (X vs. Z), the truth (the “truth”) may be seen
and represented differently.
Arguments and acceptance: the role of the audience
3) Right or proper things to say in these circumstances, to this audience,
for these purposes and with these intentions. And Hamblin elaborates:
What good reasons various people may have for accepting various state-
ments and procedures are, no doubt, themselves sometimes relevant to
the worth of argument erected on them; but, if we are to draw the line
anywhere, acceptance by person the argument is aimed at – the person
for whom the argument is an argument – is the appropriate basis of a set
of criteria. (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 242).
According to Hamblin, there are no universal arguments or univer-
sal criteria for what an argument should look like to be (seen as) an argu-
ment. An argument should be adopted and/or constructed relative to the
(particular) circumstances and the (particular) audience, as well as to the
purposes and intentions we, as arguers, have. Consequently, there can be
no universal fallacies or universal criteria for what a fallacy is in everyday
communication (persuasion and argumentation).
Arguments and truth-conditions? Whose truth conditions?
4) Argumentation/persuasion has no necessary link with truth or falsity.
And Hamblin elaborates:
We must distinguish the different possible purposes a practical argu-
ment may have. Let us suppose, first, that A wishes to convince B of T,
and discovers that B already accepts S: A can argue ‘S, therefore T’ inde-
pendently of whether S and T are really true. Judged by B’s standards, this
92
John Smith, and so on. However, the paradigm case of an argument is
that in which it is produced by one person to convince another.” (Ham-
blin, 1970/2004: p. 239).
My interpretation of the above passage would be that there is no per-
ennial and universal truth(s), and consequently, no perennial and uni-
versal truth-conditions or criteria. The truth is relative, but we shouldn’t
understand ‘relative’ as a trivial stereotype that everything changes and
everything can be different. ‘Relative’ should be understood more in its
etymological sense (relativus = having reference or relation to; from rela
tus (pp) = to refer), as a thing (concept, thought) having a relation to or be-
ing in a relation to another thing (concept, thought). In a particular rela-
tion (X vs. Y), the truth (the “truth”) is seen and represented as such and
such; in some other relation (X vs. Z), the truth (the “truth”) may be seen
and represented differently.
Arguments and acceptance: the role of the audience
3) Right or proper things to say in these circumstances, to this audience,
for these purposes and with these intentions. And Hamblin elaborates:
What good reasons various people may have for accepting various state-
ments and procedures are, no doubt, themselves sometimes relevant to
the worth of argument erected on them; but, if we are to draw the line
anywhere, acceptance by person the argument is aimed at – the person
for whom the argument is an argument – is the appropriate basis of a set
of criteria. (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 242).
According to Hamblin, there are no universal arguments or univer-
sal criteria for what an argument should look like to be (seen as) an argu-
ment. An argument should be adopted and/or constructed relative to the
(particular) circumstances and the (particular) audience, as well as to the
purposes and intentions we, as arguers, have. Consequently, there can be
no universal fallacies or universal criteria for what a fallacy is in everyday
communication (persuasion and argumentation).
Arguments and truth-conditions? Whose truth conditions?
4) Argumentation/persuasion has no necessary link with truth or falsity.
And Hamblin elaborates:
We must distinguish the different possible purposes a practical argu-
ment may have. Let us suppose, first, that A wishes to convince B of T,
and discovers that B already accepts S: A can argue ‘S, therefore T’ inde-
pendently of whether S and T are really true. Judged by B’s standards, this
92
