Page 93 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
P. 93
igor ž. žagar ■ between fallacies and more fallacies?
purposes and with these intentions. Such a proposal is very Protagorean in
nature and does justice to the first three canons of rhetoric, or more ap-
propriately to the officia oratoris, placing emphasis on inventio and espe-
cially on elocutio.
I will claim that Hamblin followed the same enterprise 15 years later
with his Fallacies. These two ground-breaking works follow the same pat-
tern, run parallel, and I will (hopefully) show why.
C. L. Hamblin’s pragmatic perspective
Formal language vs. natural language
1) In real life, as opposed to the simple situations envisaged in logical the-
ory, one cannot always answer in a simple manner whether something is
true or false. And Hamblin elaborates:
Within a formal language it is generally clear enough which arguments
are formally valid; but an ordinary-language argument cannot be de-
clared ‘formally valid’ or ‘formally fallacious’ until the language within
which it is expressed is brought into relation with that of some logical
system. (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 193).
The message of this passage is very clear: we can speak of formal va-
lidity (which includes truth and falsity, and, consequently, fallacies) only
in formal systems (but Hamblin relativizes even that by saying “it is gene
rally clear enough”), but not in “natural languages”. If we want any kind
of formal validity in natural languages, which wouldn’t involve only la
langue (language) in de Saussure’s conceptualization, but also his la pa
role (speech, (everyday) communication) - we need to bring it into rela-
tion with a formal language of a formal (logical) system. This “bringing
into relation” usually means: translating the very vast vocabulary (lexi-
con) of ordinary language, with its extremely ramified semantics and
pragmatics, into a very limited vocabulary of logic with its even more lim-
ited semantics.
And we can do so, Hamblin argues, “only at the expense of features
essential to natural language.” (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 213).
Arguments are meant to interpret, not describe “reality”
2) Reference depending on knowledge at the time of utterance. And
Hamblin elaborates:
If the arguments we are discussing are arguments that John Smith pro-
duces within his own head and for his own edification, the appraisal-cri-
teria will refer exclusively to what is known to John Smith, in doubt to
91
purposes and with these intentions. Such a proposal is very Protagorean in
nature and does justice to the first three canons of rhetoric, or more ap-
propriately to the officia oratoris, placing emphasis on inventio and espe-
cially on elocutio.
I will claim that Hamblin followed the same enterprise 15 years later
with his Fallacies. These two ground-breaking works follow the same pat-
tern, run parallel, and I will (hopefully) show why.
C. L. Hamblin’s pragmatic perspective
Formal language vs. natural language
1) In real life, as opposed to the simple situations envisaged in logical the-
ory, one cannot always answer in a simple manner whether something is
true or false. And Hamblin elaborates:
Within a formal language it is generally clear enough which arguments
are formally valid; but an ordinary-language argument cannot be de-
clared ‘formally valid’ or ‘formally fallacious’ until the language within
which it is expressed is brought into relation with that of some logical
system. (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 193).
The message of this passage is very clear: we can speak of formal va-
lidity (which includes truth and falsity, and, consequently, fallacies) only
in formal systems (but Hamblin relativizes even that by saying “it is gene
rally clear enough”), but not in “natural languages”. If we want any kind
of formal validity in natural languages, which wouldn’t involve only la
langue (language) in de Saussure’s conceptualization, but also his la pa
role (speech, (everyday) communication) - we need to bring it into rela-
tion with a formal language of a formal (logical) system. This “bringing
into relation” usually means: translating the very vast vocabulary (lexi-
con) of ordinary language, with its extremely ramified semantics and
pragmatics, into a very limited vocabulary of logic with its even more lim-
ited semantics.
And we can do so, Hamblin argues, “only at the expense of features
essential to natural language.” (Hamblin, 1970/2004: p. 213).
Arguments are meant to interpret, not describe “reality”
2) Reference depending on knowledge at the time of utterance. And
Hamblin elaborates:
If the arguments we are discussing are arguments that John Smith pro-
duces within his own head and for his own edification, the appraisal-cri-
teria will refer exclusively to what is known to John Smith, in doubt to
91
