Page 91 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
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igor ž. žagar ■ between fallacies and more fallacies?
should be understood as “not just whether they correspond to facts or
not”. And Austin’s conclusion concurs with Hamblin’s (as we will see lat-
er): it is easy to say what is true or false in logic (as a formally constructed
system), it is much more complicated and less evident in everyday life and
everyday language use.
Here are Austin’ arguments for this ‘relativization’:
Suppose that we confront ‘France is hexagonal’ with the facts, in this case,
I suppose, with France, is it true or false? Well, if you like, up to a point;
of course I can see what you mean by saying that it is true for certain in-
tents and purposes. It is good enough for a top-ranking general, perhaps,
but not for a geographer. ‘Naturally it is pretty rough’, we should say, ‘and
pretty good as a pretty rough statement’. But then someone says: ‘But is
it true or is it false? I don’t mind whether it is rough or not; of course it’s
rough, but it has to be true or false, it’s a statement, isn’t it?’ How can one
answer this question, whether it is true or false that France is hexagonal?
It is just rough, and that is the right and final answer to the question of the
relation of ‘France is hexagonal’ to France. It is a rough description; it is
not a true or a false one. (Austin, 1962/1980: p. 143).
True, false or (just) rough
Statements/utterances can therefore not just be either true or false, there
is (or at least should be) a gradation between what is false and what is true,
between 0 and 1. What we say in everyday communication can be more or
less true, true up to a (certain) point, or more precisely: true for certain in-
tents and purposes. As ‘France is hexagonal’ is a rough description, so are
‘France is a country of good wines’, or ‘France is a country of ripe cheeses”,
for example. But these utterances are not true (or false) in any formal (i.e.
logical) sense of the term: One must have good (specific) reasons and spe-
cific (appropriately oriented) intentions for uttering them.
This brings us to an important part of this discussion, the question
of framing.
What is judged true in a schoolbook may not be so judged in a work of
historical research. Consider the constative, ‘Lord Raglan won the battle
of Alma’, remembering that Alma was a soldier’s battle if ever there was
one, and that Lord Raglan’s orders were never transmitted to some of his
subordinates. Did Lord Raglan then win the battle of Alma or did he
not? Of course in some contexts, perhaps in a schoolbook, it is perfectly
justifiable to say so--it is something of an exaggeration, maybe, and there
would be no question of giving Raglan a medal for it. As ‘France is hex-
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should be understood as “not just whether they correspond to facts or
not”. And Austin’s conclusion concurs with Hamblin’s (as we will see lat-
er): it is easy to say what is true or false in logic (as a formally constructed
system), it is much more complicated and less evident in everyday life and
everyday language use.
Here are Austin’ arguments for this ‘relativization’:
Suppose that we confront ‘France is hexagonal’ with the facts, in this case,
I suppose, with France, is it true or false? Well, if you like, up to a point;
of course I can see what you mean by saying that it is true for certain in-
tents and purposes. It is good enough for a top-ranking general, perhaps,
but not for a geographer. ‘Naturally it is pretty rough’, we should say, ‘and
pretty good as a pretty rough statement’. But then someone says: ‘But is
it true or is it false? I don’t mind whether it is rough or not; of course it’s
rough, but it has to be true or false, it’s a statement, isn’t it?’ How can one
answer this question, whether it is true or false that France is hexagonal?
It is just rough, and that is the right and final answer to the question of the
relation of ‘France is hexagonal’ to France. It is a rough description; it is
not a true or a false one. (Austin, 1962/1980: p. 143).
True, false or (just) rough
Statements/utterances can therefore not just be either true or false, there
is (or at least should be) a gradation between what is false and what is true,
between 0 and 1. What we say in everyday communication can be more or
less true, true up to a (certain) point, or more precisely: true for certain in-
tents and purposes. As ‘France is hexagonal’ is a rough description, so are
‘France is a country of good wines’, or ‘France is a country of ripe cheeses”,
for example. But these utterances are not true (or false) in any formal (i.e.
logical) sense of the term: One must have good (specific) reasons and spe-
cific (appropriately oriented) intentions for uttering them.
This brings us to an important part of this discussion, the question
of framing.
What is judged true in a schoolbook may not be so judged in a work of
historical research. Consider the constative, ‘Lord Raglan won the battle
of Alma’, remembering that Alma was a soldier’s battle if ever there was
one, and that Lord Raglan’s orders were never transmitted to some of his
subordinates. Did Lord Raglan then win the battle of Alma or did he
not? Of course in some contexts, perhaps in a schoolbook, it is perfectly
justifiable to say so--it is something of an exaggeration, maybe, and there
would be no question of giving Raglan a medal for it. As ‘France is hex-
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