Page 90 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
P. 90
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 3–4
which we can only describe what is already “out there” (and can be either
true or false). After a careful consideration of what could be the criteria of
performativity in the first part of his lectures (that later became a book),
in the second part Austin comes to a conclusion that not only performa-
tives do something (with words), but that every utterance does something
(with words). ‘Something’ implying: not just describing reality. But be-
tween the two poles of the lectures, the performative one and the speech
acts one, there is an important (I’ll call it rhetorical) transitional passage
that is usually overlooked, and I would like to start my humble examina-
tion of fallacies here, with this passage.
Can we be sure that stating truly is a different class of assessment from
arguing soundly, advising well, judging fairly, and blaming justifiably?
Do these not have something to do in complicated way with facts? ...
Facts come in as well as our knowledge or opinion about facts. (Austin,
1962/1980: p. 142).
There are two important epistemological innovations in this
paragraph:
(1) Statements (stating truly) are given the same status (not the privileged
one) as all other utterances we may produce;
(2) Facts are given the same status as (our, your, their ...) knowledge of
facts.
And here is Austin’s rationale for this:
... consider also for a moment whether the question of truth or falsity is so
very objective. We ask: ‘Is it a fair statement?’, and are the good reasons
and good evidence for stating and saying so very different from the good
reasons and evidence for performative acts like arguing, warning, and
judging? Is the constative, then, always true or false? When a constative
is confronted with the facts, we in fact appraise it in ways involving the
employment of a vast array of terms, which overlap with those that we
use in the appraisal of performatives. In real life, as opposed to the simple
situations envisaged in logical theory, one cannot always answer in a sim-
ple manner whether it is true or false.1 (Austin, 1962/1980: pp. 142–143)
What is true and what is false?
Truth and falsity therefore don’t have objective criteria, but depend on
“good reasons and good evidence” we have for stating something. And
even then, we assess constatives employing “a vast array of terms”, which
1 All emphases throughout the text are mine – I. Ž. Ž.
88
which we can only describe what is already “out there” (and can be either
true or false). After a careful consideration of what could be the criteria of
performativity in the first part of his lectures (that later became a book),
in the second part Austin comes to a conclusion that not only performa-
tives do something (with words), but that every utterance does something
(with words). ‘Something’ implying: not just describing reality. But be-
tween the two poles of the lectures, the performative one and the speech
acts one, there is an important (I’ll call it rhetorical) transitional passage
that is usually overlooked, and I would like to start my humble examina-
tion of fallacies here, with this passage.
Can we be sure that stating truly is a different class of assessment from
arguing soundly, advising well, judging fairly, and blaming justifiably?
Do these not have something to do in complicated way with facts? ...
Facts come in as well as our knowledge or opinion about facts. (Austin,
1962/1980: p. 142).
There are two important epistemological innovations in this
paragraph:
(1) Statements (stating truly) are given the same status (not the privileged
one) as all other utterances we may produce;
(2) Facts are given the same status as (our, your, their ...) knowledge of
facts.
And here is Austin’s rationale for this:
... consider also for a moment whether the question of truth or falsity is so
very objective. We ask: ‘Is it a fair statement?’, and are the good reasons
and good evidence for stating and saying so very different from the good
reasons and evidence for performative acts like arguing, warning, and
judging? Is the constative, then, always true or false? When a constative
is confronted with the facts, we in fact appraise it in ways involving the
employment of a vast array of terms, which overlap with those that we
use in the appraisal of performatives. In real life, as opposed to the simple
situations envisaged in logical theory, one cannot always answer in a sim-
ple manner whether it is true or false.1 (Austin, 1962/1980: pp. 142–143)
What is true and what is false?
Truth and falsity therefore don’t have objective criteria, but depend on
“good reasons and good evidence” we have for stating something. And
even then, we assess constatives employing “a vast array of terms”, which
1 All emphases throughout the text are mine – I. Ž. Ž.
88
