Page 25 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 25
j. richards ■ a conceptual exploration of radicalisation
which such young people live, which echoes the “humiliation and despair”
narrative noted above in the context of the Middle East (Khosrokhavar,
2015: p. 22). It is also a specific comment on the importance of making
sure aid and development programmes do not make problems worse in
such environments.
But what of radicals living in Western contexts, who, by compar-
ison, are much better-off than their counterparts in war-torn and de-
prived parts of the world? This is where the “relative” nature of depriva-
tion may be important. Muslim radicals in European contexts, claims
Khosrokhavar (2015: p. 39–40) tend to be of a “lower social strata”, and
hailing from “tough neighbourhoods”. This may explain the preponder-
ance of cases of criminality amongst the recent cohort of Western ter-
rorists, since this characterises the environments in which many of the
subjects have lived. It may also increase the importance of fundamental
socio-economic struggle to the radicalisation story. Again, the notion of
a generation of indignados driving political radicalism in different ways
gains further weight.
Similarly, a factor concerning modern, information-age society is
probably of critical importance in this respect, and this concerns the ease
with which the disaffected of Western society can access and consume
narratives from other parts of the world and identify with the plight of
others. The aforementioned Muhammad Siddique Khan, who led the July
2005 terrorist cell that struck London, noted in his posthumously-aired
suicide video that he identified with a wider ummah of believers and saw
them as “my people”, for whom revenge and justice were a collective duty
(Horgan, 2008: p. 85). Similarly, the perpetrators of a brutal terrorist at-
tack in a French church in July 2016 explained to one of their hostages
that “peace” was what they wanted, and that “as long as there are bombs
on Syria, we will continue our attacks. And they will happen every day.
When you stop, we will stop” (Sky News, 2016).
From a psycho-social theory perspective, such factors may accord
with the results of Tajfel’s “minimal group paradigm” experiments of
the late 1960s, which confirmed in-group and out-group dynamics, even
when the groups were artificially designed in a laboratory setting and
there were no real-world consequences for affiliation with any particular
group (Tajfel, 1970). Wider group identification may allow for a disaffect-
ed Muslim in the West to feel a sense of shared anger and humiliation at
the suffering of co-religionists in Palestine, Kashmir or Syria. In this sense,
deprivation or injustice may not need to be experienced directly to form
a component of radicalisation, providing the narrative is developed and
promulgated skilfully. It might also explain how groups can be mobilised
23
which such young people live, which echoes the “humiliation and despair”
narrative noted above in the context of the Middle East (Khosrokhavar,
2015: p. 22). It is also a specific comment on the importance of making
sure aid and development programmes do not make problems worse in
such environments.
But what of radicals living in Western contexts, who, by compar-
ison, are much better-off than their counterparts in war-torn and de-
prived parts of the world? This is where the “relative” nature of depriva-
tion may be important. Muslim radicals in European contexts, claims
Khosrokhavar (2015: p. 39–40) tend to be of a “lower social strata”, and
hailing from “tough neighbourhoods”. This may explain the preponder-
ance of cases of criminality amongst the recent cohort of Western ter-
rorists, since this characterises the environments in which many of the
subjects have lived. It may also increase the importance of fundamental
socio-economic struggle to the radicalisation story. Again, the notion of
a generation of indignados driving political radicalism in different ways
gains further weight.
Similarly, a factor concerning modern, information-age society is
probably of critical importance in this respect, and this concerns the ease
with which the disaffected of Western society can access and consume
narratives from other parts of the world and identify with the plight of
others. The aforementioned Muhammad Siddique Khan, who led the July
2005 terrorist cell that struck London, noted in his posthumously-aired
suicide video that he identified with a wider ummah of believers and saw
them as “my people”, for whom revenge and justice were a collective duty
(Horgan, 2008: p. 85). Similarly, the perpetrators of a brutal terrorist at-
tack in a French church in July 2016 explained to one of their hostages
that “peace” was what they wanted, and that “as long as there are bombs
on Syria, we will continue our attacks. And they will happen every day.
When you stop, we will stop” (Sky News, 2016).
From a psycho-social theory perspective, such factors may accord
with the results of Tajfel’s “minimal group paradigm” experiments of
the late 1960s, which confirmed in-group and out-group dynamics, even
when the groups were artificially designed in a laboratory setting and
there were no real-world consequences for affiliation with any particular
group (Tajfel, 1970). Wider group identification may allow for a disaffect-
ed Muslim in the West to feel a sense of shared anger and humiliation at
the suffering of co-religionists in Palestine, Kashmir or Syria. In this sense,
deprivation or injustice may not need to be experienced directly to form
a component of radicalisation, providing the narrative is developed and
promulgated skilfully. It might also explain how groups can be mobilised
23
