Page 24 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 24
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
here to work in identity theory, and notably the “hierarchy of salience”
conceptualisation at the heart of ICT, whereby an individual’s struggle
with factors important to their self-identity can lead to a problematic anx-
iety and schism.
Other important studies in this period also described alleged indi-
cators of radicalisation without necessarily building these into a “path-
way” as such. Notable examples were Taylor and Horgan’s 2006 con-
ceptual framework (Taylor and Horgan, 2006); and Kruglanski and
Fishman’s 2009 study of psychological factors in terrorism (Kruglanski
and Fishman, 2009), to name but two.
The key conclusions emerging from an over-arching analysis of these
studies and models are twofold. Firstly, there is an “assumption that rad-
icalization is a transformation based on social-psychological processes”
(King and Taylor, 2011: p. 609). This reflects a primarily micro-level focus
on the identity formulation and development of the individual. Secondly,
there was also something of a consensus about the central importance of
“relative deprivation” as a driver (King and Taylor, 2011: p. 609), which
brings us back to the broader structural considerations. Here we can re-
call Stryker’s observation that self, society and social behaviour are inex-
tricably interwoven (Stryker, 2008: p. 20).
“Relative” is an important word here in a social constructivist sense.
One might imagine that many young men joining militant groups in eco-
nomically very deprived areas of the world, whether it be the Taliban,
Lord’s Resistance Army or any number of other groups, may be motivated
in part by simple factors of daily income and protection, and not necessar-
ily because of a strong ideological affiliation. In a major study looking at
Somalia, Colombia and Afghanistan, the NGO MercyCorps attempted
to understand why young men were joining insurgent and terrorist groups
in such areas. The report somewhat debunked – or at least finessed – what
they called the “economics of terrorism narrative”, noting that:
In some cases, economic inducements may compel someone to join an
armed group, but upon further analysis, this appears to be rare. While
unemployment is often emblematic of systemic sources of frustration
and marginalization, employment status alone does not appear to determine
whether a young person is likely to join an insurgency. Violence makes people
poor, but poverty doesn’t appear to make them violent (Mercy Corps,
2015: p. 17; emphasis in original).
The report concluded that “young people take up the gun not be-
cause they are poor, but because they are angry” (Mercy Corps 2015: 3).
In part, this is a comment on the corrupt and venal nature of the states in
22
here to work in identity theory, and notably the “hierarchy of salience”
conceptualisation at the heart of ICT, whereby an individual’s struggle
with factors important to their self-identity can lead to a problematic anx-
iety and schism.
Other important studies in this period also described alleged indi-
cators of radicalisation without necessarily building these into a “path-
way” as such. Notable examples were Taylor and Horgan’s 2006 con-
ceptual framework (Taylor and Horgan, 2006); and Kruglanski and
Fishman’s 2009 study of psychological factors in terrorism (Kruglanski
and Fishman, 2009), to name but two.
The key conclusions emerging from an over-arching analysis of these
studies and models are twofold. Firstly, there is an “assumption that rad-
icalization is a transformation based on social-psychological processes”
(King and Taylor, 2011: p. 609). This reflects a primarily micro-level focus
on the identity formulation and development of the individual. Secondly,
there was also something of a consensus about the central importance of
“relative deprivation” as a driver (King and Taylor, 2011: p. 609), which
brings us back to the broader structural considerations. Here we can re-
call Stryker’s observation that self, society and social behaviour are inex-
tricably interwoven (Stryker, 2008: p. 20).
“Relative” is an important word here in a social constructivist sense.
One might imagine that many young men joining militant groups in eco-
nomically very deprived areas of the world, whether it be the Taliban,
Lord’s Resistance Army or any number of other groups, may be motivated
in part by simple factors of daily income and protection, and not necessar-
ily because of a strong ideological affiliation. In a major study looking at
Somalia, Colombia and Afghanistan, the NGO MercyCorps attempted
to understand why young men were joining insurgent and terrorist groups
in such areas. The report somewhat debunked – or at least finessed – what
they called the “economics of terrorism narrative”, noting that:
In some cases, economic inducements may compel someone to join an
armed group, but upon further analysis, this appears to be rare. While
unemployment is often emblematic of systemic sources of frustration
and marginalization, employment status alone does not appear to determine
whether a young person is likely to join an insurgency. Violence makes people
poor, but poverty doesn’t appear to make them violent (Mercy Corps,
2015: p. 17; emphasis in original).
The report concluded that “young people take up the gun not be-
cause they are poor, but because they are angry” (Mercy Corps 2015: 3).
In part, this is a comment on the corrupt and venal nature of the states in
22
