Page 27 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 27
j. richards ■ a conceptual exploration of radicalisation
movement. The situation is almost infinitely variable, and it will be very
difficult to predict when any one individual will pass successfully through
the recruitment and deployment phases. This also helps to explain why
most individuals who experience exactly the same things and consume
the same narratives will not become violent militants.
In a wider-ranging sense, Horgan used the language of “push and
pull” factors which describe a similar situation (Horgan, 2008: p. 87).
Militant organisations and movements will be constantly trying to pull
recruits into their ranks, but they will only be successful where a set of in-
dividual factors push a particular person sufficiently far into the arms of
that organisation or movement. More significantly, from a policy point of
view, Horgan notes:
Despite the increased discussions of root causes of terrorism, we can do
little in a practical sense to change the “push” factors (i.e., the broad so-
ciopolitical conditions) that give rise to the increased likelihood of the
emergence of terrorism. In contrast, counterterrorism programs may
be more effective in concentrating on the “pull” factors (or “lures”), since
they tend to be narrower, more easily identifiable, and specific to particu-
lar groups and contexts (Horgan, 2008: p. 90).
Thus, macro-level factors are not ignored, but policy may be bet-
ter aimed at a bottom-up perspective than an exclusively top-down one.
In some ways, we can see these ideas reflected in more contempo-
rary Western counter-terrorism policy. In the post-2010 refreshed ver-
sion of the UK government’s “Prevent” Strategy document, for example,
the word “radicalisation” and its derivatives are mentioned 185 times. The
strategy notes that:
All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and
recruit people to their cause. But the percentage of people who are pre-
pared to support violent extremism in this country is very small. It is sig-
nificantly greater amongst young people. We now have more informa-
tion about the factors which encourage people to support terrorism and
then to engage in terrorist-related activity. It is important to understand
these factors if we are to prevent radicalisation and minimise the risks
it poses to our national security. We judge that radicalisation is driven
by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists
for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and
specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology
seem both attractive and compelling. There is evidence to indicate that
support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrat-
25
movement. The situation is almost infinitely variable, and it will be very
difficult to predict when any one individual will pass successfully through
the recruitment and deployment phases. This also helps to explain why
most individuals who experience exactly the same things and consume
the same narratives will not become violent militants.
In a wider-ranging sense, Horgan used the language of “push and
pull” factors which describe a similar situation (Horgan, 2008: p. 87).
Militant organisations and movements will be constantly trying to pull
recruits into their ranks, but they will only be successful where a set of in-
dividual factors push a particular person sufficiently far into the arms of
that organisation or movement. More significantly, from a policy point of
view, Horgan notes:
Despite the increased discussions of root causes of terrorism, we can do
little in a practical sense to change the “push” factors (i.e., the broad so-
ciopolitical conditions) that give rise to the increased likelihood of the
emergence of terrorism. In contrast, counterterrorism programs may
be more effective in concentrating on the “pull” factors (or “lures”), since
they tend to be narrower, more easily identifiable, and specific to particu-
lar groups and contexts (Horgan, 2008: p. 90).
Thus, macro-level factors are not ignored, but policy may be bet-
ter aimed at a bottom-up perspective than an exclusively top-down one.
In some ways, we can see these ideas reflected in more contempo-
rary Western counter-terrorism policy. In the post-2010 refreshed ver-
sion of the UK government’s “Prevent” Strategy document, for example,
the word “radicalisation” and its derivatives are mentioned 185 times. The
strategy notes that:
All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and
recruit people to their cause. But the percentage of people who are pre-
pared to support violent extremism in this country is very small. It is sig-
nificantly greater amongst young people. We now have more informa-
tion about the factors which encourage people to support terrorism and
then to engage in terrorist-related activity. It is important to understand
these factors if we are to prevent radicalisation and minimise the risks
it poses to our national security. We judge that radicalisation is driven
by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists
for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and
specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology
seem both attractive and compelling. There is evidence to indicate that
support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrat-
25
