Page 21 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 21
j. richards ■ a conceptual exploration of radicalisation
to gradually reduce an individual’s cognitive dissonance between feeling
embittered about an issue and considering extreme violence against oth-
er human beings as an appropriate response (Maikovich, 2005). In this
way, radical ideologues will use “dissonance-reducing mechanisms” to en-
able individuals to make the journey into violence, by offering social sup-
port (making people feel part of a wider collective); suppressing unhelp-
fully contradictory information; and developing a “just world bias” in the
worldview of the individual. Such information strategies will be broad-
ened and deepened by opportunities offered through new media. At a
level of broad conceptualisation, this is little different from how a state
may recruit an individual into an army and train them to feel comforta-
ble with using violence.
In social group theory, some of the analysis of how and why individ-
uals become drawn into radical movements suggests a more problemat-
ic lack of generalities. In a very interesting empirical study of how wom-
en became drawn into radical-right organisations in the US, for example,
Kathleen Blee observed that a move into violent extremism can often be
down to circumstantial and social developments in an individual’s life
(such as meeting a new person or group of people socially) which can offer
the promise of a new narrative that helps to “make sense” of an otherwise
seemingly disconnected and happenstance life (Blee, 2002: p. 45). This
suggests the nexus of two important processes: vulnerability and stress in
a person’s life (a need to make sense) and socialisation (meeting new peo-
ple who invite one into a particular group). This might mean that individ-
uals could be just as likely to be drawn into a church group, or hobby circle,
as into an extremist organisation, given a different set of circumstances.
Blee’s analysis also supports an apparent geographical clustering of
recruitment into extremist organisations, which may suggest that social
connections may be as important as any other structural or personal fac-
tors. In a study of the social media traffic of 99 individuals who had left
Germany to fight for violent jihadist organisations in Syria, Reynolds and
Hafez (2017) found that the “integration deficit” hypothesis appeared
to be a weak factor in this particular dataset. Meanwhile, the study ac-
corded with some of the findings of a similar study in Belgium and the
Netherlands by Bakker and de Bont (2016), noting that face-to-face peer-
group socialisation was potentially as important as any other factor, in-
cluding social media (Reynolds and Hafez, 2017: p. 24). Indeed, three cities
in the North Rhine-Westphalia region (Bonn, Solingen and Dinslaken)
appeared to have contributed more than half of all identified German “ji-
hadist foreign fighters” in the recent conflict in the Middle East. This may
explain why certain very specific districts, such as the Molenbeek region
19
to gradually reduce an individual’s cognitive dissonance between feeling
embittered about an issue and considering extreme violence against oth-
er human beings as an appropriate response (Maikovich, 2005). In this
way, radical ideologues will use “dissonance-reducing mechanisms” to en-
able individuals to make the journey into violence, by offering social sup-
port (making people feel part of a wider collective); suppressing unhelp-
fully contradictory information; and developing a “just world bias” in the
worldview of the individual. Such information strategies will be broad-
ened and deepened by opportunities offered through new media. At a
level of broad conceptualisation, this is little different from how a state
may recruit an individual into an army and train them to feel comforta-
ble with using violence.
In social group theory, some of the analysis of how and why individ-
uals become drawn into radical movements suggests a more problemat-
ic lack of generalities. In a very interesting empirical study of how wom-
en became drawn into radical-right organisations in the US, for example,
Kathleen Blee observed that a move into violent extremism can often be
down to circumstantial and social developments in an individual’s life
(such as meeting a new person or group of people socially) which can offer
the promise of a new narrative that helps to “make sense” of an otherwise
seemingly disconnected and happenstance life (Blee, 2002: p. 45). This
suggests the nexus of two important processes: vulnerability and stress in
a person’s life (a need to make sense) and socialisation (meeting new peo-
ple who invite one into a particular group). This might mean that individ-
uals could be just as likely to be drawn into a church group, or hobby circle,
as into an extremist organisation, given a different set of circumstances.
Blee’s analysis also supports an apparent geographical clustering of
recruitment into extremist organisations, which may suggest that social
connections may be as important as any other structural or personal fac-
tors. In a study of the social media traffic of 99 individuals who had left
Germany to fight for violent jihadist organisations in Syria, Reynolds and
Hafez (2017) found that the “integration deficit” hypothesis appeared
to be a weak factor in this particular dataset. Meanwhile, the study ac-
corded with some of the findings of a similar study in Belgium and the
Netherlands by Bakker and de Bont (2016), noting that face-to-face peer-
group socialisation was potentially as important as any other factor, in-
cluding social media (Reynolds and Hafez, 2017: p. 24). Indeed, three cities
in the North Rhine-Westphalia region (Bonn, Solingen and Dinslaken)
appeared to have contributed more than half of all identified German “ji-
hadist foreign fighters” in the recent conflict in the Middle East. This may
explain why certain very specific districts, such as the Molenbeek region
19
