Page 30 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 30
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
government has suggested some degree of convergence with policy against
radicalisers and recruiters as well as actual terrorists.
Conclusions
Martha Crenshaw showed remarkable foresight by writing some years be-
fore 9/11 that an analysis of who becomes a terrorist and why, should sen-
sibly focus on the three interlocking dimensions of person, group and so-
ciety (Crenshaw, 1981). This was all the more noteworthy when much of
the post-war analysis of radical movements in Europe, such as the Red
Brigades or Baader-Meinhof gang, had been imbued with a “pathology
aura” in seeking to suggest that terrorist behaviour must surely reflect
mental instability (Silke, 1998: p. 67).
After 9/11, Sageman further undermined the pathology thesis in his
study of 172 militants associated with Al Qaeda, which, he found, showed
unusually high indicators of income, education and mental health when
compared to the population at large (Sageman, 2004). While this study
was admittedly based on a relatively small number of individuals associ-
ated with one particular movement, it did suggest a more general finding
that radicalisation is not necessarily as simple as it first seems.
Sageman was writing in a period when studies of terrorism and rad-
icalisation were flowering at a remarkable rate following the shock of the
9/11 attacks. The results generated a great deal of heat but not necessarily
light, in the sense that a considerable range of top-down and bottom-up
theories delivered a panoply of possible explanations, united only in the
fact that none of them worked against statistically significant samples of
subjects; and none offered strong replication across environments and
circumstances.
As with most areas of social science, the most important conclu-
sion is that much further research will be needed before the science can
be substantially moved forward. In the meantime, notions of radicalisa-
tion seem to be settling on the understanding that a combination of top-
down and bottom-up drivers will cause any one individual to move into
violent extremism, but when and whether this happens will be almost en-
tirely case-specific. It does seem to be the case that frustration and despair
(both immediate in a personal sense and concerning wider developments
in society) can act as some of the most important drivers, as can personal
struggles over identity, but when these will cause one person to become vi-
olently extreme and his or her neighbour not to do so, are matters of con-
tinual debate and examination.
In some ways therefore, the challenge is akin to that of mental health
in society, in that the drivers that push any one person into difficulties are
28
government has suggested some degree of convergence with policy against
radicalisers and recruiters as well as actual terrorists.
Conclusions
Martha Crenshaw showed remarkable foresight by writing some years be-
fore 9/11 that an analysis of who becomes a terrorist and why, should sen-
sibly focus on the three interlocking dimensions of person, group and so-
ciety (Crenshaw, 1981). This was all the more noteworthy when much of
the post-war analysis of radical movements in Europe, such as the Red
Brigades or Baader-Meinhof gang, had been imbued with a “pathology
aura” in seeking to suggest that terrorist behaviour must surely reflect
mental instability (Silke, 1998: p. 67).
After 9/11, Sageman further undermined the pathology thesis in his
study of 172 militants associated with Al Qaeda, which, he found, showed
unusually high indicators of income, education and mental health when
compared to the population at large (Sageman, 2004). While this study
was admittedly based on a relatively small number of individuals associ-
ated with one particular movement, it did suggest a more general finding
that radicalisation is not necessarily as simple as it first seems.
Sageman was writing in a period when studies of terrorism and rad-
icalisation were flowering at a remarkable rate following the shock of the
9/11 attacks. The results generated a great deal of heat but not necessarily
light, in the sense that a considerable range of top-down and bottom-up
theories delivered a panoply of possible explanations, united only in the
fact that none of them worked against statistically significant samples of
subjects; and none offered strong replication across environments and
circumstances.
As with most areas of social science, the most important conclu-
sion is that much further research will be needed before the science can
be substantially moved forward. In the meantime, notions of radicalisa-
tion seem to be settling on the understanding that a combination of top-
down and bottom-up drivers will cause any one individual to move into
violent extremism, but when and whether this happens will be almost en-
tirely case-specific. It does seem to be the case that frustration and despair
(both immediate in a personal sense and concerning wider developments
in society) can act as some of the most important drivers, as can personal
struggles over identity, but when these will cause one person to become vi-
olently extreme and his or her neighbour not to do so, are matters of con-
tinual debate and examination.
In some ways therefore, the challenge is akin to that of mental health
in society, in that the drivers that push any one person into difficulties are
28
