Page 29 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 29
j. richards ■ a conceptual exploration of radicalisation
the inherent relativity of terms such as “radical” is dangerous, in the
Orwellian sense of a state outlawing any thoughts or ideas it considers
non-mainstream; and unhelpful, as there have been good and bad radi-
cals in history and radicalism itself is not necessarily a bad thing per se
(Githens-Mazer, 2012; Sedgwick 2010). Latterly, like the word “terrorist”,
it could be argued that radicalisation has “become part of the rhetorical
structure of the waging of the ‘War on Terror’” as an inherently danger-
ous and negative concept (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2009: p. 82).
A suitable response to such thinking does not necessarily mean
ditching the term “radicalisation” altogether, since it would probably only
result in another term being inserted in its place with similar problems of
definition (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017: p. 211). Clearly something is
happening repeatedly whereby individuals move from being law-abiding
members of society to violent and dangerous individuals, and we should
not bury our heads in the sand in response.
McCauley and Moskalenko’s prescription has been to develop a
“two pyramid” model, whereby “radical thought” is separated from “radi-
cal action”, with the former being not necessarily problematic (McCauley
and Moskalenko, 2017: p. 211). To be fair to governments, this has been
recognised variously across the Western world as a suitable approach, not
least since becoming embroiled in ideological and counter-extremism bat-
tles and debates is an extraordinarily resource-hungry and controversial
business. Indeed, the “VE” element of Countering Violent Extremism re-
flects such thinking in essence.
Peter Neumann outlines some of the issues in his appropriate-
ly-named paper, “The trouble with radicalization” (Neumann, 2013). He
outlines two important positions taken on the concept of radicalization,
which he characterises as the Anglo-Saxon, and European approaches.
The former tends to be fairly reductionist, focusing almost entirely on the
rule of law and not generally on the wider hinterland of radical views or
beliefs. (With this said, the official statement by the British government
above shows there has been some degree of ambiguity about whether and
how ideology should be part of the picture.) By contrast, the European
model is defined by a clear connectivity between terrorist operations and
the ideological activities of those who might be on the track of violent
extremism, or who might be facilitating others on that pathway. In this
way, holding views defined as radical can be a cause of state attention. It is
thus no surprise that countries such as France and Denmark have gener-
ated controversy over their approach towards such issues as Islamic dress
in public spaces, when “banning the burqa” would be much more complex
in an Anglo-Saxon country. Conversely, recent thinking by the British
27
the inherent relativity of terms such as “radical” is dangerous, in the
Orwellian sense of a state outlawing any thoughts or ideas it considers
non-mainstream; and unhelpful, as there have been good and bad radi-
cals in history and radicalism itself is not necessarily a bad thing per se
(Githens-Mazer, 2012; Sedgwick 2010). Latterly, like the word “terrorist”,
it could be argued that radicalisation has “become part of the rhetorical
structure of the waging of the ‘War on Terror’” as an inherently danger-
ous and negative concept (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2009: p. 82).
A suitable response to such thinking does not necessarily mean
ditching the term “radicalisation” altogether, since it would probably only
result in another term being inserted in its place with similar problems of
definition (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017: p. 211). Clearly something is
happening repeatedly whereby individuals move from being law-abiding
members of society to violent and dangerous individuals, and we should
not bury our heads in the sand in response.
McCauley and Moskalenko’s prescription has been to develop a
“two pyramid” model, whereby “radical thought” is separated from “radi-
cal action”, with the former being not necessarily problematic (McCauley
and Moskalenko, 2017: p. 211). To be fair to governments, this has been
recognised variously across the Western world as a suitable approach, not
least since becoming embroiled in ideological and counter-extremism bat-
tles and debates is an extraordinarily resource-hungry and controversial
business. Indeed, the “VE” element of Countering Violent Extremism re-
flects such thinking in essence.
Peter Neumann outlines some of the issues in his appropriate-
ly-named paper, “The trouble with radicalization” (Neumann, 2013). He
outlines two important positions taken on the concept of radicalization,
which he characterises as the Anglo-Saxon, and European approaches.
The former tends to be fairly reductionist, focusing almost entirely on the
rule of law and not generally on the wider hinterland of radical views or
beliefs. (With this said, the official statement by the British government
above shows there has been some degree of ambiguity about whether and
how ideology should be part of the picture.) By contrast, the European
model is defined by a clear connectivity between terrorist operations and
the ideological activities of those who might be on the track of violent
extremism, or who might be facilitating others on that pathway. In this
way, holding views defined as radical can be a cause of state attention. It is
thus no surprise that countries such as France and Denmark have gener-
ated controversy over their approach towards such issues as Islamic dress
in public spaces, when “banning the burqa” would be much more complex
in an Anglo-Saxon country. Conversely, recent thinking by the British
27
