Page 23 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 23
j. richards ■ a conceptual exploration of radicalisation
Despite these identified difficulties in establishing generalities about
the radicalisation “process”, however, the bureaucratic drivers described
above in the post-9/11 period have been key factors in the development
of a range of radicalisation process models. These can be collectively con-
ceptualised as “step” or “pathway” models (following Moghaddam’s influ-
ential “staircase” model (Moghaddam, 2005)), in that they generally de-
scribe a phased transitional process whereby an individual moves from
being a law-abiding and peaceful member of society to a dangerous radi-
cal with violent intent. (In Moghaddam’s analysis, the process is likened
to ascending an ever-narrowing staircase in which distracting influences
and opportunities are increasingly expunged.)
King and Taylor looked at five of the more quoted and discussed
models of radicalization that emerged in this period (King and Taylor,
2011). These are: Randy Borum’s four-stage progressive model of psycho-
logical development towards extremism (Borum, 2003); Wiktorowicz’s
four-stage model of joining extremist organizations, with the now-pro-
scribed British group Al-Muhajiroun (the Emigrants) as the case study
(Wiktorowicz, 2004); Moghaddam’s aforementioned six-stage staircase
model of radicalization into terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005); Silber and
Bhatt’s four-stage radicalization model, developed in conjunction with
the New York Police Department (Silber and Bhatt, 2007); and Marc
Sageman’s “four-prong” heuristic, published in 2008. In all cases apart
from Sageman, these are linear models, whereby the individual under
analysis moves progressively along a pathway towards problematic extrem-
ism. In Sageman’s model, the four prongs are not linear, in that they can
be present and affect an individual in simultaneous ways and in different
combinations (King and Taylor, 2011).
One of the defining characteristics of these models was the cleanly
identified linear sequence of processes through which target individuals
may progress (with the exception of Sageman’s study in which several iden-
tifiers could appear simultaneously). There was clear utility in these linear
models for counter-terrorism bureaucracies, in that these models could be
used institutionally to train analysts and security practitioners to “watch
for the signs” and tick off the identifiers of radicalisation as they were ob-
served. Much of Randy Borum’s work has been conducted in conjunction
with the FBI, and Silber and Bhatt’s model was produced in conjunction
with the NYPD. Others in this field, such as Elaine Pressman, have also
developed multiple indicator models (Pressman 2006). Pressman’s ten-in-
dicator model, for example, identifies a set of personal indicators, weight-
ed according to their importance, which combine to describe an eventu-
al pathway towards dangerous radicalisation. There are clear connections
21
Despite these identified difficulties in establishing generalities about
the radicalisation “process”, however, the bureaucratic drivers described
above in the post-9/11 period have been key factors in the development
of a range of radicalisation process models. These can be collectively con-
ceptualised as “step” or “pathway” models (following Moghaddam’s influ-
ential “staircase” model (Moghaddam, 2005)), in that they generally de-
scribe a phased transitional process whereby an individual moves from
being a law-abiding and peaceful member of society to a dangerous radi-
cal with violent intent. (In Moghaddam’s analysis, the process is likened
to ascending an ever-narrowing staircase in which distracting influences
and opportunities are increasingly expunged.)
King and Taylor looked at five of the more quoted and discussed
models of radicalization that emerged in this period (King and Taylor,
2011). These are: Randy Borum’s four-stage progressive model of psycho-
logical development towards extremism (Borum, 2003); Wiktorowicz’s
four-stage model of joining extremist organizations, with the now-pro-
scribed British group Al-Muhajiroun (the Emigrants) as the case study
(Wiktorowicz, 2004); Moghaddam’s aforementioned six-stage staircase
model of radicalization into terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005); Silber and
Bhatt’s four-stage radicalization model, developed in conjunction with
the New York Police Department (Silber and Bhatt, 2007); and Marc
Sageman’s “four-prong” heuristic, published in 2008. In all cases apart
from Sageman, these are linear models, whereby the individual under
analysis moves progressively along a pathway towards problematic extrem-
ism. In Sageman’s model, the four prongs are not linear, in that they can
be present and affect an individual in simultaneous ways and in different
combinations (King and Taylor, 2011).
One of the defining characteristics of these models was the cleanly
identified linear sequence of processes through which target individuals
may progress (with the exception of Sageman’s study in which several iden-
tifiers could appear simultaneously). There was clear utility in these linear
models for counter-terrorism bureaucracies, in that these models could be
used institutionally to train analysts and security practitioners to “watch
for the signs” and tick off the identifiers of radicalisation as they were ob-
served. Much of Randy Borum’s work has been conducted in conjunction
with the FBI, and Silber and Bhatt’s model was produced in conjunction
with the NYPD. Others in this field, such as Elaine Pressman, have also
developed multiple indicator models (Pressman 2006). Pressman’s ten-in-
dicator model, for example, identifies a set of personal indicators, weight-
ed according to their importance, which combine to describe an eventu-
al pathway towards dangerous radicalisation. There are clear connections
21
