Page 28 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, no. 5-6: Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Conflicting Diversity, eds. Mitja Sardoč and Tomaž Deželan
P. 28
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 5–6
ed, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal
with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to
this country and support for our core values. Terrorist groups can take
up and exploit ideas which have been developed and sometimes popu-
larised by extremist organisations which operate legally in this country.
This has significant implications for the scope of our Prevent strategy.
Evidence also suggests that some (but by no means all) of those who
have been radicalised in the UK had previously participated in extremist
organisations (HM Government, 2011: p. 13).
The statement here is extremely interesting and indicative of more
recent thinking about the process, although it is also – as you might ex-
pect from an official pronouncement – somewhat political in nature.
From a definition point of view, the above statement reflects an un-
derstanding of the interwoven relationship between micro-level factors
(“personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors”); and macro-level
factors, in terms of the top-down effect of propagandists, recruiters and
“extremist organisations”. Thus, some people will fall prey to such actors
(those who are vulnerable to their narrative) while the majority of others
will not.
The political elements are the sense that the core problem is a rejec-
tion of the political system the government is charged with upholding.
Any government is primarily interested in winning votes and consolidat-
ing power, and a successful and proportionate discharging of security pol-
icy will help to do so. Within this process sits the sanctity of a secular and
democratic order, placing those interested in a more extreme millennial,
caliphatist vision on the wrong side of history and decency.
From a policy point of view, the thinking about radicalisation re-
flected above has helped to shape the detail of the Prevent policy: itself an
arch example of a European CVE policy. Specifically, the thinking drives
intensive work in institutions and environments where “vulnerable peo-
ple” are expected to be located, and notably prisons, or the education and
health sectors.
The potential problem with such official approaches, as McCauley
and Moskalenko (2017: p. 211) note, is that they tend to concentrate over-
ly on the importance of political ideology and thus find themselves sucked
into a “war on ideas”. This can be dangerous and problematic, since ideas
as to how a perfect system should be, are many and varied, and none more
so than in a supposedly free-thinking democracy.
This, in a sense, strikes at the heart of some of the conceptual prob-
lems around a notion of radicalisation. There are those who suggest that
26
ed, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal
with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to
this country and support for our core values. Terrorist groups can take
up and exploit ideas which have been developed and sometimes popu-
larised by extremist organisations which operate legally in this country.
This has significant implications for the scope of our Prevent strategy.
Evidence also suggests that some (but by no means all) of those who
have been radicalised in the UK had previously participated in extremist
organisations (HM Government, 2011: p. 13).
The statement here is extremely interesting and indicative of more
recent thinking about the process, although it is also – as you might ex-
pect from an official pronouncement – somewhat political in nature.
From a definition point of view, the above statement reflects an un-
derstanding of the interwoven relationship between micro-level factors
(“personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors”); and macro-level
factors, in terms of the top-down effect of propagandists, recruiters and
“extremist organisations”. Thus, some people will fall prey to such actors
(those who are vulnerable to their narrative) while the majority of others
will not.
The political elements are the sense that the core problem is a rejec-
tion of the political system the government is charged with upholding.
Any government is primarily interested in winning votes and consolidat-
ing power, and a successful and proportionate discharging of security pol-
icy will help to do so. Within this process sits the sanctity of a secular and
democratic order, placing those interested in a more extreme millennial,
caliphatist vision on the wrong side of history and decency.
From a policy point of view, the thinking about radicalisation re-
flected above has helped to shape the detail of the Prevent policy: itself an
arch example of a European CVE policy. Specifically, the thinking drives
intensive work in institutions and environments where “vulnerable peo-
ple” are expected to be located, and notably prisons, or the education and
health sectors.
The potential problem with such official approaches, as McCauley
and Moskalenko (2017: p. 211) note, is that they tend to concentrate over-
ly on the importance of political ideology and thus find themselves sucked
into a “war on ideas”. This can be dangerous and problematic, since ideas
as to how a perfect system should be, are many and varied, and none more
so than in a supposedly free-thinking democracy.
This, in a sense, strikes at the heart of some of the conceptual prob-
lems around a notion of radicalisation. There are those who suggest that
26
