Page 143 - Marjan Šimenc, Prispevki k didaktiki filozofije/etike. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut, 2018. Digitalna knjižnica, Dissertationes 36
P. 143
summary
education that subdues the subject in order to transfer societal values onto
him. This initial disassociation from society sets the tone for the discus-
sion, giving the impression that the rejection of the inculcation of values
also means a rejection of the transmission of societal values. But morality
is not a matter of any individual person; morality extends beyond the indi-
vidual and is not simply a matter of the individual’s choice because it reg-
ulates relations between persons. A gesture characteristic of contemporary
reflections on moral education is hence the self-restraint that sets moral ed-
ucation apart from imposition. Contemporary moral education is marked
by great sensitivity for issues relating to indoctrination, that is why setting
limitations that prevent the state and society from exerting violence over an
individual is so significant.
Morality is also not simply a matter of society, if society is considered
as something external to the individual; morality is also “ours”. This intro-
duces a new realm: the sphere of the common. Given that morality is some-
thing everyone has in common, it needs to re-establish itself again and
again through the debate on the content of this common sphere. At this
minimum level relating to the common sphere, moral education is linked
to the transmission of traditions. Thus, the risk of indoctrination is averted
through the distinction between minimum and maximum morality. Even
though some authors appear to suggest that the transmission of values is an
act of manipulation, the issue can be resolved through a differentiation be-
tween two meanings of the term “transmission”. The first sense of “trans-
mission” refers to a long-term outlook on the development and preserva-
tion of society. In order to ensure its survival, a society will transmit its
knowledge and values, language and culture. The controversy around in-
doctrination and the opposition against the traditional transmission of so-
cietal values seem to obscure the fact that sociality cannot be negotiated;
that independent thinking is only possible on the basis of sociality; that
some basic transmission of sociality is a prerequisite for the constitution of
a subject. In this sense, what is essential for the constitution of a subject is
not only activity but also a fundamental passivity. This means that the at-
titude towards morality is performative. The essential idea behind moral
education is that what is required is a change of attitude, thanks to which
societal morality is no longer perceived as an alien force but rather as every-
one’s common cause. The aim of moral education is therefore not to impose
the existing societal morality, but rather to establish (or transfer) a specific
attitude towards morality. Once this attitude has changed, the societal role
143
education that subdues the subject in order to transfer societal values onto
him. This initial disassociation from society sets the tone for the discus-
sion, giving the impression that the rejection of the inculcation of values
also means a rejection of the transmission of societal values. But morality
is not a matter of any individual person; morality extends beyond the indi-
vidual and is not simply a matter of the individual’s choice because it reg-
ulates relations between persons. A gesture characteristic of contemporary
reflections on moral education is hence the self-restraint that sets moral ed-
ucation apart from imposition. Contemporary moral education is marked
by great sensitivity for issues relating to indoctrination, that is why setting
limitations that prevent the state and society from exerting violence over an
individual is so significant.
Morality is also not simply a matter of society, if society is considered
as something external to the individual; morality is also “ours”. This intro-
duces a new realm: the sphere of the common. Given that morality is some-
thing everyone has in common, it needs to re-establish itself again and
again through the debate on the content of this common sphere. At this
minimum level relating to the common sphere, moral education is linked
to the transmission of traditions. Thus, the risk of indoctrination is averted
through the distinction between minimum and maximum morality. Even
though some authors appear to suggest that the transmission of values is an
act of manipulation, the issue can be resolved through a differentiation be-
tween two meanings of the term “transmission”. The first sense of “trans-
mission” refers to a long-term outlook on the development and preserva-
tion of society. In order to ensure its survival, a society will transmit its
knowledge and values, language and culture. The controversy around in-
doctrination and the opposition against the traditional transmission of so-
cietal values seem to obscure the fact that sociality cannot be negotiated;
that independent thinking is only possible on the basis of sociality; that
some basic transmission of sociality is a prerequisite for the constitution of
a subject. In this sense, what is essential for the constitution of a subject is
not only activity but also a fundamental passivity. This means that the at-
titude towards morality is performative. The essential idea behind moral
education is that what is required is a change of attitude, thanks to which
societal morality is no longer perceived as an alien force but rather as every-
one’s common cause. The aim of moral education is therefore not to impose
the existing societal morality, but rather to establish (or transfer) a specific
attitude towards morality. Once this attitude has changed, the societal role
143
