Page 142 - Marjan Šimenc, Prispevki k didaktiki filozofije/etike. Ljubljana: Pedagoški inštitut, 2018. Digitalna knjižnica, Dissertationes 36
P. 142
prispevki k didaktiki filozofije/etike
mentioned. The monograph develops a conception of the reading of phil-
osophical writings as the creation of one’s own text or a dialoguisation of
the original text. This dialogue focuses on the structure of questions and
answers, stances and arguments, which are crucial in a philosophical text.
The study of primary sources invites the reader to enter into a debate with
the author but also with him- or herself, his or her own stances and capaci-
ties. The safe distance of a mere observer is therefore lost in the reading: the
book requires the reader to become fully immersed in the text, to get lost in
it and to find themself again. Any analysis of the author of the text is also an
analysis of oneself. Practicing and reading philosophy thereby become two
sides of the same coin, the only particularity being that this coin also has a
third side – i.e. writing philosophy.
The second part of the monograph addresses certain issues of principle
in the field of moral education, focusing on the transfer of values, critical
thinking and the personification of morality. The traditional reproduction
of values took place in an undifferentiated society, but even in the complex
contemporary society some form of reproduction of values occurs, unfold-
ing at several levels. Firstly, the clarification of values presupposes that a
reproduction of values has already taken place and has led to an accumu-
lation of heterogeneous values within the subject of which the subject him-
self has no awareness. The clarification of values therefore aims at the sub-
ject’s becoming aware of these values, appropriating them and organising
them. The right of a subject to freely choose his or her values presuppos-
es that a fundamental value framework has already been reproduced. The
right to choose one’s values derives from the value of human dignity which
is at the core of this framework. Moreover, the selection of values is also
part of a more comprehensive process, namely the development of an in-
dividual’s autonomy, which is the goal of any democratic pluralist society.
There is a pitfall, however, since autonomy cannot be reproduced because
reproduction violates the subject’s freedom. But what can be reproduced
is a space where autonomy can emerge; what can be reproduced are intel-
lectual skills required for autonomy. Hence, the reproduction of autonomy
can only mean a reproduction of the conditions of autonomy.
One of the constitutive gestures of contemporary moral education
is ensuring the space for the freedom of the individual. This freedom ap-
pears to be incompatible with the position of a passive student to whom the
school is conveying societal values. Many reflections on moral education
therefore start with a rejection: moral education is a rejection of the moral
142
mentioned. The monograph develops a conception of the reading of phil-
osophical writings as the creation of one’s own text or a dialoguisation of
the original text. This dialogue focuses on the structure of questions and
answers, stances and arguments, which are crucial in a philosophical text.
The study of primary sources invites the reader to enter into a debate with
the author but also with him- or herself, his or her own stances and capaci-
ties. The safe distance of a mere observer is therefore lost in the reading: the
book requires the reader to become fully immersed in the text, to get lost in
it and to find themself again. Any analysis of the author of the text is also an
analysis of oneself. Practicing and reading philosophy thereby become two
sides of the same coin, the only particularity being that this coin also has a
third side – i.e. writing philosophy.
The second part of the monograph addresses certain issues of principle
in the field of moral education, focusing on the transfer of values, critical
thinking and the personification of morality. The traditional reproduction
of values took place in an undifferentiated society, but even in the complex
contemporary society some form of reproduction of values occurs, unfold-
ing at several levels. Firstly, the clarification of values presupposes that a
reproduction of values has already taken place and has led to an accumu-
lation of heterogeneous values within the subject of which the subject him-
self has no awareness. The clarification of values therefore aims at the sub-
ject’s becoming aware of these values, appropriating them and organising
them. The right of a subject to freely choose his or her values presuppos-
es that a fundamental value framework has already been reproduced. The
right to choose one’s values derives from the value of human dignity which
is at the core of this framework. Moreover, the selection of values is also
part of a more comprehensive process, namely the development of an in-
dividual’s autonomy, which is the goal of any democratic pluralist society.
There is a pitfall, however, since autonomy cannot be reproduced because
reproduction violates the subject’s freedom. But what can be reproduced
is a space where autonomy can emerge; what can be reproduced are intel-
lectual skills required for autonomy. Hence, the reproduction of autonomy
can only mean a reproduction of the conditions of autonomy.
One of the constitutive gestures of contemporary moral education
is ensuring the space for the freedom of the individual. This freedom ap-
pears to be incompatible with the position of a passive student to whom the
school is conveying societal values. Many reflections on moral education
therefore start with a rejection: moral education is a rejection of the moral
142
