Page 115 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 115
the acts and strategies of defining 115
This quasi-definition underscores a fundamental dimension of the “emo-
tive” meaning of a word, its relationship with the shared values, which
are attacked as “prejudices”. This account given by the spy shows how the
emotive meaning can be modified by describing the referent based on a
different hierarchy of values. The value of trust is not denied, but simply
placed in a hierarchy where the highest worth is given to the State.
The relationship between the use of a word, its meaning and the hi-
erarchies of values (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1951) can provide
an explanation from a rhetorical perspective of the reason why words
can lead to value judgments and decisions. Values can be thought of as
the reasons for classifying something as desirable or not, and, therefore,
for judging the action aimed at achieving it as worthy or not. By describ-
ing an entity or a state of affairs as valuable, namely indicating the val-
ues that can be used to assess it, the speaker can provide the interlocu-
tor with a reason to act in a specific fashion. Values represent the criteri-
on for establishing the desirability of a course of action, and the generic
form of reasoning based on them can be represented as follows (Walton,
Reed and Macagno, 2008: 321):
PREMISE 1: Value V is positive (negative) as judged by agent A (judgment value).
PREMISE 2: The fact that value V is positive (negative) affects the interpretation
and therefore the evaluation of goal G of agent A (If value V is good
(bad), it supports (does not support) commitment to goal G).
CONCLUSION: V is a reason for retaining commitment to goal G.
For instance, the action of spying, or the quality of being a “sneak”
can be classified as contemptible or hateful based on the classifying prin-
ciple (value) that can be expressed as follows: “Who betrays the trust of
another is a bad (contemptible…) person.” On the contrary, Soradaci re-
jects such a principle and advances a different hierarchy of values: sup-
porting the good of the State is the supreme good; therefore, whoever
betrays another for the good of the State is a good person.
This type of reasoning is grounded on a judgment, which becomes a
reason to carry out a specific action. Values represent the different ways
and principles that are used to establish what is good or bad. In its turn,
the moral judgment becomes a reason to act. The relationship between
will, and desire, and action is underscored in Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics. What is good, or appear as such, is maintained to be the goal of a
decision to act (Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a, 15), as “everything aims at the
good” (Topics, 116a, 18). For instance, an “act of war” is usually regard-
This quasi-definition underscores a fundamental dimension of the “emo-
tive” meaning of a word, its relationship with the shared values, which
are attacked as “prejudices”. This account given by the spy shows how the
emotive meaning can be modified by describing the referent based on a
different hierarchy of values. The value of trust is not denied, but simply
placed in a hierarchy where the highest worth is given to the State.
The relationship between the use of a word, its meaning and the hi-
erarchies of values (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1951) can provide
an explanation from a rhetorical perspective of the reason why words
can lead to value judgments and decisions. Values can be thought of as
the reasons for classifying something as desirable or not, and, therefore,
for judging the action aimed at achieving it as worthy or not. By describ-
ing an entity or a state of affairs as valuable, namely indicating the val-
ues that can be used to assess it, the speaker can provide the interlocu-
tor with a reason to act in a specific fashion. Values represent the criteri-
on for establishing the desirability of a course of action, and the generic
form of reasoning based on them can be represented as follows (Walton,
Reed and Macagno, 2008: 321):
PREMISE 1: Value V is positive (negative) as judged by agent A (judgment value).
PREMISE 2: The fact that value V is positive (negative) affects the interpretation
and therefore the evaluation of goal G of agent A (If value V is good
(bad), it supports (does not support) commitment to goal G).
CONCLUSION: V is a reason for retaining commitment to goal G.
For instance, the action of spying, or the quality of being a “sneak”
can be classified as contemptible or hateful based on the classifying prin-
ciple (value) that can be expressed as follows: “Who betrays the trust of
another is a bad (contemptible…) person.” On the contrary, Soradaci re-
jects such a principle and advances a different hierarchy of values: sup-
porting the good of the State is the supreme good; therefore, whoever
betrays another for the good of the State is a good person.
This type of reasoning is grounded on a judgment, which becomes a
reason to carry out a specific action. Values represent the different ways
and principles that are used to establish what is good or bad. In its turn,
the moral judgment becomes a reason to act. The relationship between
will, and desire, and action is underscored in Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics. What is good, or appear as such, is maintained to be the goal of a
decision to act (Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a, 15), as “everything aims at the
good” (Topics, 116a, 18). For instance, an “act of war” is usually regard-
