Page 111 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 111
the acts and strategies of defining 111
The purpose of this paper is to tackle the problem of the conditions of
defining from a pragmatic perspective, starting not from the proposi-
tional aspect of the definitional logos, but from its role as a move in a dis-
course, as a speech act. If definitional statements cannot be verified, defi-
nitional acts can be assessed taking into consideration their conditions
and their limits.
2. Definitions as Argumentative Instruments
The first crucial aspect of definitions is the argumentative role of the
definiendum. Words have the power of affecting our emotions and influ-
encing our decisions. Terms such as war or terrorism are usually judged
negatively, and can be used to arouse negative emotions or elicit negative
judgments concerning the state of affairs they are used to refer to. For
this reason, the act of naming a fragment of reality can be considered as a
form of condensed argument made of two reasoning dimensions: a clas-
sification of reality and a value judgment.
Stevenson first underlined this twofold aspect of the use of a word
when he investigated the terms that he called “ethical” or emotive. He
noted that some words, such as “peace” or “war”, are not simply used
to describe reality, namely to modify the cognitive reaction of the in-
terlocutor. They have also the power of directing the interlocutors’ at-
titudes and suggesting a course of action. For this reason, they evoke a
different kind of reaction, emotive in nature. As Stevenson put it (Ste-
venson, 1937: 18–19), “Instead of merely describing people’s interests,
they change or intensify them. They recommend an interest in an object,
rather than state that the interest already exists.” These words have the
tendency to encourage future actions (Stevenson, 1937: 23; Stevenson,
1938a: 334–335; Stevenson, 1938b: 49–50), to lead the hearer towards a
decision by affecting his system of interests (Stevenson, 1944: 210). Ste-
venson distinguished these two types of correlation between the use of
a word (a stimulus) and its possible psychological effects on the address-
ee (the cognitive and the emotive reaction) by labelling them as “descrip-
tive meaning” and “emotive meaning” (Stevenson, 1944: 54). Because of
this twofold dimension, the redefinition of ethical words becomes an in-
strument of persuasion, a tool for redirecting preferences and emotions
(Stevenson, 1944: 210):
Ethical definitions involve a wedding of descriptive and emotive meaning,
and accordingly have a frequent use in redirecting and intensifying atti-
tudes. To choose a definition is to plead a cause, so long as the word defined
is strongly emotive.
The purpose of this paper is to tackle the problem of the conditions of
defining from a pragmatic perspective, starting not from the proposi-
tional aspect of the definitional logos, but from its role as a move in a dis-
course, as a speech act. If definitional statements cannot be verified, defi-
nitional acts can be assessed taking into consideration their conditions
and their limits.
2. Definitions as Argumentative Instruments
The first crucial aspect of definitions is the argumentative role of the
definiendum. Words have the power of affecting our emotions and influ-
encing our decisions. Terms such as war or terrorism are usually judged
negatively, and can be used to arouse negative emotions or elicit negative
judgments concerning the state of affairs they are used to refer to. For
this reason, the act of naming a fragment of reality can be considered as a
form of condensed argument made of two reasoning dimensions: a clas-
sification of reality and a value judgment.
Stevenson first underlined this twofold aspect of the use of a word
when he investigated the terms that he called “ethical” or emotive. He
noted that some words, such as “peace” or “war”, are not simply used
to describe reality, namely to modify the cognitive reaction of the in-
terlocutor. They have also the power of directing the interlocutors’ at-
titudes and suggesting a course of action. For this reason, they evoke a
different kind of reaction, emotive in nature. As Stevenson put it (Ste-
venson, 1937: 18–19), “Instead of merely describing people’s interests,
they change or intensify them. They recommend an interest in an object,
rather than state that the interest already exists.” These words have the
tendency to encourage future actions (Stevenson, 1937: 23; Stevenson,
1938a: 334–335; Stevenson, 1938b: 49–50), to lead the hearer towards a
decision by affecting his system of interests (Stevenson, 1944: 210). Ste-
venson distinguished these two types of correlation between the use of
a word (a stimulus) and its possible psychological effects on the address-
ee (the cognitive and the emotive reaction) by labelling them as “descrip-
tive meaning” and “emotive meaning” (Stevenson, 1944: 54). Because of
this twofold dimension, the redefinition of ethical words becomes an in-
strument of persuasion, a tool for redirecting preferences and emotions
(Stevenson, 1944: 210):
Ethical definitions involve a wedding of descriptive and emotive meaning,
and accordingly have a frequent use in redirecting and intensifying atti-
tudes. To choose a definition is to plead a cause, so long as the word defined
is strongly emotive.
