Page 113 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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the acts and strategies of defining 113
3. Arguments in Words
The relationship between descriptive and emotive meaning and the
role of definition in redirecting attitudes can be analyzed from an argu-
mentative perspective. The concept of meaning can be accounted for as
a form of reasoning that proceeds from a definition to a classification of
an entity, or from values and properties to a value judgment. The emotive
and the descriptive meaning can be seen as two different steps of reason-
ing, aimed at attributing to objects, individuals or state of affairs a name
or an evaluation.
3.1. Describing Reality
Descriptive meaning was investigated by Stevenson in terms of ef-
fects on the hearer. The cognitive effect, or rather the information that
the interlocutor can obtain from the use of a word, can be explained in
terms of reasoning, and in particular through the process of attribut-
ing a predicate to a subject. The most generic form of reasoning describ-
ing this mechanism is an abstract structure of argument combining the
semantic relation of “classification” (Crothers, 1979; Hobbs, 1979: 68;
Hobbs, 1985) with the logical rule of defeasible modus ponens (Walton,
1996: 54):
MAJOR PREMISE: For all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having prop-
erty G.
MINOR PREMISE: a has property F.
CONCLUSION: a has property G.
The generic semantic relation needs to be specified by taking into
consideration some of the ancient maxims related to the topics of defin-
ition (Green-Pedersen, 1984; Stump, 1989). The passage from the predi-
cate stated in the antecedent to the one attributed in the consequent
needs to be grounded on a definitional semantic relation (Walton and
Macagno, 2008), which concerns any issue of identity and difference be-
tween two predicates (Aristotle, Topics, 102a, 5–9). This type of argu-
ment can be represented as follows (Walton and Macagno, 2010: 39):
MAJOR PREMISE: For all x, if x fits definition D, and D is the definition of G, then x
can be classified as G.
MINOR PREMISE: a fits definition D.
CONCLUSION: a has property G.
3. Arguments in Words
The relationship between descriptive and emotive meaning and the
role of definition in redirecting attitudes can be analyzed from an argu-
mentative perspective. The concept of meaning can be accounted for as
a form of reasoning that proceeds from a definition to a classification of
an entity, or from values and properties to a value judgment. The emotive
and the descriptive meaning can be seen as two different steps of reason-
ing, aimed at attributing to objects, individuals or state of affairs a name
or an evaluation.
3.1. Describing Reality
Descriptive meaning was investigated by Stevenson in terms of ef-
fects on the hearer. The cognitive effect, or rather the information that
the interlocutor can obtain from the use of a word, can be explained in
terms of reasoning, and in particular through the process of attribut-
ing a predicate to a subject. The most generic form of reasoning describ-
ing this mechanism is an abstract structure of argument combining the
semantic relation of “classification” (Crothers, 1979; Hobbs, 1979: 68;
Hobbs, 1985) with the logical rule of defeasible modus ponens (Walton,
1996: 54):
MAJOR PREMISE: For all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having prop-
erty G.
MINOR PREMISE: a has property F.
CONCLUSION: a has property G.
The generic semantic relation needs to be specified by taking into
consideration some of the ancient maxims related to the topics of defin-
ition (Green-Pedersen, 1984; Stump, 1989). The passage from the predi-
cate stated in the antecedent to the one attributed in the consequent
needs to be grounded on a definitional semantic relation (Walton and
Macagno, 2008), which concerns any issue of identity and difference be-
tween two predicates (Aristotle, Topics, 102a, 5–9). This type of argu-
ment can be represented as follows (Walton and Macagno, 2010: 39):
MAJOR PREMISE: For all x, if x fits definition D, and D is the definition of G, then x
can be classified as G.
MINOR PREMISE: a fits definition D.
CONCLUSION: a has property G.
