Page 110 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 110
What Do We Know about the World?
der the same branch of inquiry as definitions, as they are aimed at tack-
ling questions of sameness and difference, and they can be referred to as
“definitory”. Such expressions describe the concept by setting out some
of its accidents or properties that can uniquely (absolutely or in a given
context) identify the definiendum.
In addition to their role as propositions that can establish a true
or false (or rather an acceptable or unacceptable) equivalence between
definiens and definiendum, the definitory expressions have a pragmatic
and dialogical dimension. Definitions are moves in a dialogue, aimed at
achieving specific dialogical purposes. We can use definitions to inform
the interlocutor of what a word means, or to stipulate or impose a new
meaning of a term. We can propose a definition and support it with ar-
guments, or we can commit ourselves to use a word with a specific sig-
nification. We can also omit definitions, and use words with different,
unaccepted or unacceptable meanings. When we define we perform an
action. The semantic equivalence that we express is always directed to a
pragmatic goal. Defining is always a form of action.
This pragmatic dimension is strictly related with a strategic, or rath-
er argumentative one. Words can be extremely powerful instruments.
Terms like “war” or “peace”, “security” or “terrorism” can trigger evalua-
tive conclusions, support implicit or explicit decisions, and arouse emo-
tions (Stevenson, 1937). These words are implicit arguments and tacit
rhetorical strategies. However, they have a potentially fallacious dimen-
sion, essentially connected with their definition, or rather their com-
monly accepted meaning. When wars become “acts of freedom” (Doyle
and Sambanis, 2006: 1) and bombings pacific operations, when dicta-
torships are named “democracies” and torture is referred to as a civil of-
fense, the boundaries of semantic vagueness and definitional freedom
are somehow exceeded, and words are used not to describe reality, but
to distort it. The distinction between a reasonable and acceptable use of
a word and manipulation lies in the notion of definition and the condi-
tions of defining or redefining.
If the idea of an essential, immutable definition cannot be embraced
(Sager, 2000: 217; Walton, 2005: 169–173), the alternative seems to be a
relativistic approach (Schiappa, 2003). The impossibility of determining
an immutable meaning leads to the impossibility of verifying any defini-
tory discourse, and therefore to the equivalence between any definition.
How is it possible to identify when words are used as weapons of deceit?
Is it always possible to define any word, anyhow?
der the same branch of inquiry as definitions, as they are aimed at tack-
ling questions of sameness and difference, and they can be referred to as
“definitory”. Such expressions describe the concept by setting out some
of its accidents or properties that can uniquely (absolutely or in a given
context) identify the definiendum.
In addition to their role as propositions that can establish a true
or false (or rather an acceptable or unacceptable) equivalence between
definiens and definiendum, the definitory expressions have a pragmatic
and dialogical dimension. Definitions are moves in a dialogue, aimed at
achieving specific dialogical purposes. We can use definitions to inform
the interlocutor of what a word means, or to stipulate or impose a new
meaning of a term. We can propose a definition and support it with ar-
guments, or we can commit ourselves to use a word with a specific sig-
nification. We can also omit definitions, and use words with different,
unaccepted or unacceptable meanings. When we define we perform an
action. The semantic equivalence that we express is always directed to a
pragmatic goal. Defining is always a form of action.
This pragmatic dimension is strictly related with a strategic, or rath-
er argumentative one. Words can be extremely powerful instruments.
Terms like “war” or “peace”, “security” or “terrorism” can trigger evalua-
tive conclusions, support implicit or explicit decisions, and arouse emo-
tions (Stevenson, 1937). These words are implicit arguments and tacit
rhetorical strategies. However, they have a potentially fallacious dimen-
sion, essentially connected with their definition, or rather their com-
monly accepted meaning. When wars become “acts of freedom” (Doyle
and Sambanis, 2006: 1) and bombings pacific operations, when dicta-
torships are named “democracies” and torture is referred to as a civil of-
fense, the boundaries of semantic vagueness and definitional freedom
are somehow exceeded, and words are used not to describe reality, but
to distort it. The distinction between a reasonable and acceptable use of
a word and manipulation lies in the notion of definition and the condi-
tions of defining or redefining.
If the idea of an essential, immutable definition cannot be embraced
(Sager, 2000: 217; Walton, 2005: 169–173), the alternative seems to be a
relativistic approach (Schiappa, 2003). The impossibility of determining
an immutable meaning leads to the impossibility of verifying any defini-
tory discourse, and therefore to the equivalence between any definition.
How is it possible to identify when words are used as weapons of deceit?
Is it always possible to define any word, anyhow?
