Page 118 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 118
What Do We Know about the World?
By underscoring the ancient origin of “just war”, Obama is making sure
that its definition is part of the audience’s common ground. In this fash-
ion, he reinforces the hearer’s commitment to such a concept, or rath-
er he undermines the objectionability thereof. He reminds and informs
the audience that the idea that wars (and in particular the ones waged
or fought by the United States) can be justified cannot be considered as
controversial. We can represent the structure of this act of defining as
follows (Searle and Vanderveken, 2005: 129).
Table 1: Defining for reminding – Dialectical profile
By reminding the audience of a definition, the speaker can take ad-
vantage of the presumption that the definition is, or should be, already
part of the interlocutors’ commitments. The burden of proof is shifted
onto the hearers, who need to show that such a definition cannot be con-
sidered as part of the common ground.
4.2. Definitions as Standpoints
Definitions can be used to advance a new meaning for a concept,
or simply propose the existence of a new or more specific one. In this
case, the speaker is not presuming that the meaning described is shared.
On the contrary, he acknowledges that it is not part of the interlocu-
tors’ common ground, and for this reason he accepts the burden of prov-
ing it, or supporting it with arguments. A clear example can be found in
the same Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Address mentioned above. Oba-
ma splits the notion of peace into two concepts, a “true peace”, amount-
ing to a status characterized by the “inherent rights and dignity of every
individual” and a “false” one, which corresponds only to the common-
ly shared definition of “absence of visible conflict”. In order to support
his standpoint, Obama underscores that only the first one can be last-
By underscoring the ancient origin of “just war”, Obama is making sure
that its definition is part of the audience’s common ground. In this fash-
ion, he reinforces the hearer’s commitment to such a concept, or rath-
er he undermines the objectionability thereof. He reminds and informs
the audience that the idea that wars (and in particular the ones waged
or fought by the United States) can be justified cannot be considered as
controversial. We can represent the structure of this act of defining as
follows (Searle and Vanderveken, 2005: 129).
Table 1: Defining for reminding – Dialectical profile
By reminding the audience of a definition, the speaker can take ad-
vantage of the presumption that the definition is, or should be, already
part of the interlocutors’ commitments. The burden of proof is shifted
onto the hearers, who need to show that such a definition cannot be con-
sidered as part of the common ground.
4.2. Definitions as Standpoints
Definitions can be used to advance a new meaning for a concept,
or simply propose the existence of a new or more specific one. In this
case, the speaker is not presuming that the meaning described is shared.
On the contrary, he acknowledges that it is not part of the interlocu-
tors’ common ground, and for this reason he accepts the burden of prov-
ing it, or supporting it with arguments. A clear example can be found in
the same Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Address mentioned above. Oba-
ma splits the notion of peace into two concepts, a “true peace”, amount-
ing to a status characterized by the “inherent rights and dignity of every
individual” and a “false” one, which corresponds only to the common-
ly shared definition of “absence of visible conflict”. In order to support
his standpoint, Obama underscores that only the first one can be last-
