Page 114 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 114
What Do We Know about the World?
As pointed out by Aristotle, the concept of definitional discourse in-
cludes different types of equivalences, of which the strongest and most
famous is the definition by genus and difference. However, the same
concept can be defined using other definitory statements. For instance,
“peace” can be defined by its absolute or relative properties (“the state of
well-being that is characterized by trust, compassion, and justice”), by
parts (“the union of hot peace and cold peace”), or by its cause (“a pattern
of cooperation and integration between major human groups”). There
are also other types of definition that are not used to explain the mean-
ing of the concept defined, but especially to communicate a judgment on
it, such as the definition by metaphor (“peace is a gentle breeze”).
Argument from classification and the different types of definitions
that can be used for different purposes can provide an explanation from
an argumentative perspective to the phenomenon of descriptive mean-
ing. The other dimension of meaning, the emotive one, can be account-
ed for by considering another form of classification, not aimed at nam-
ing reality, but rather at evaluating it. This pattern of reasoning proceeds
from a different type of classificatory principles: values.
3.2. Argumentation from Values
According to Stevenson, emotive meaning is the propensity of a
word to encourage actions. However, this type of “meaning” is connect-
ed with a specific form of reasoning that is based on propositions form-
ing the grounds of our value judgments. This relationship emerges when
it is attacked through the use of quasi-definitions. Using a quasi-defini-
tion, the speaker can undermine the implicit and automatic association
between a concept and its evaluation. He needs to provide an argument
rejecting the grounds of a shared value judgment; for this reason, he de-
scribes the referent appealing to values contrary to the ones commonly
associated with such a concept. For instance, we can consider the follow-
ing quasi-definition taken from Casanova’s Fuga dai Piombi. The speak-
er, Mr. Soradaci, tries to convince his interlocutor (Casanova) that being
a sneak is an honorable behaviour (Casanova, 1911: 112):1
I have always despised the prejudice that attaches to the name “spy” a hate-
ful meaning: this name sounds bad only to the ears of who hates the Gov-
ernment. A sneak is just a friend of the good of the State, the plague of the
crooks, the faithful servant of his Prince.
1 “Ho sempre disprezzato il pregiudizio che conferisce un odioso significato al nome di spia: questo
nome non suona male che alle orecchie di chi non ama il Governo: uno spione non è altro che un am-
ico del bene dello stato, il flagello dei delinquenti, il fedel suddito del suo Principe.”
As pointed out by Aristotle, the concept of definitional discourse in-
cludes different types of equivalences, of which the strongest and most
famous is the definition by genus and difference. However, the same
concept can be defined using other definitory statements. For instance,
“peace” can be defined by its absolute or relative properties (“the state of
well-being that is characterized by trust, compassion, and justice”), by
parts (“the union of hot peace and cold peace”), or by its cause (“a pattern
of cooperation and integration between major human groups”). There
are also other types of definition that are not used to explain the mean-
ing of the concept defined, but especially to communicate a judgment on
it, such as the definition by metaphor (“peace is a gentle breeze”).
Argument from classification and the different types of definitions
that can be used for different purposes can provide an explanation from
an argumentative perspective to the phenomenon of descriptive mean-
ing. The other dimension of meaning, the emotive one, can be account-
ed for by considering another form of classification, not aimed at nam-
ing reality, but rather at evaluating it. This pattern of reasoning proceeds
from a different type of classificatory principles: values.
3.2. Argumentation from Values
According to Stevenson, emotive meaning is the propensity of a
word to encourage actions. However, this type of “meaning” is connect-
ed with a specific form of reasoning that is based on propositions form-
ing the grounds of our value judgments. This relationship emerges when
it is attacked through the use of quasi-definitions. Using a quasi-defini-
tion, the speaker can undermine the implicit and automatic association
between a concept and its evaluation. He needs to provide an argument
rejecting the grounds of a shared value judgment; for this reason, he de-
scribes the referent appealing to values contrary to the ones commonly
associated with such a concept. For instance, we can consider the follow-
ing quasi-definition taken from Casanova’s Fuga dai Piombi. The speak-
er, Mr. Soradaci, tries to convince his interlocutor (Casanova) that being
a sneak is an honorable behaviour (Casanova, 1911: 112):1
I have always despised the prejudice that attaches to the name “spy” a hate-
ful meaning: this name sounds bad only to the ears of who hates the Gov-
ernment. A sneak is just a friend of the good of the State, the plague of the
crooks, the faithful servant of his Prince.
1 “Ho sempre disprezzato il pregiudizio che conferisce un odioso significato al nome di spia: questo
nome non suona male che alle orecchie di chi non ama il Governo: uno spione non è altro che un am-
ico del bene dello stato, il flagello dei delinquenti, il fedel suddito del suo Principe.”
