Page 119 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
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the acts and strategies of defining 119
ing (Barack Obama, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Address, Oslo, Nor-
way December 10, 2009):
Definition as a standpoint: “peace”
For peace is not merely the absence of visible conflict. Only a just peace
based upon the inherent rights and dignity of every individual can truly be
lasting. […]
This type of move can be described as a kind of a speech act of as-
sertion, which commits the speaker to defending it if requested to do so
(Houtlosser, 2001: 32). This condition can be shown in the following
dialectical profile, pointing out its different components and require-
ments.
Table 2: Definitions as standpoints – Dialectical profile
In his discourse, Obama encourages his audience to replace the defi-
nition they are committed to with the new one. He provides reasons to
believe that the ordinary account of peace is not sufficient, and propos-
es a different view whose positivity he highlights by marking it as the
“true” one.
4.3. Definitions as Commitments
As seen above, the definition-reminder represents a previous or pre-
sumptive commitment of the interlocutor, while a definition advanced
as a standpoint presupposes that such an account of meaning is, or can
be, not shared. Definitions can be also used to bind the speaker to a
commitment, playing the role of a commissive, a type of promise that he
makes to his interlocutor. A clear example can be found in Obama’s In-
ing (Barack Obama, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Address, Oslo, Nor-
way December 10, 2009):
Definition as a standpoint: “peace”
For peace is not merely the absence of visible conflict. Only a just peace
based upon the inherent rights and dignity of every individual can truly be
lasting. […]
This type of move can be described as a kind of a speech act of as-
sertion, which commits the speaker to defending it if requested to do so
(Houtlosser, 2001: 32). This condition can be shown in the following
dialectical profile, pointing out its different components and require-
ments.
Table 2: Definitions as standpoints – Dialectical profile
In his discourse, Obama encourages his audience to replace the defi-
nition they are committed to with the new one. He provides reasons to
believe that the ordinary account of peace is not sufficient, and propos-
es a different view whose positivity he highlights by marking it as the
“true” one.
4.3. Definitions as Commitments
As seen above, the definition-reminder represents a previous or pre-
sumptive commitment of the interlocutor, while a definition advanced
as a standpoint presupposes that such an account of meaning is, or can
be, not shared. Definitions can be also used to bind the speaker to a
commitment, playing the role of a commissive, a type of promise that he
makes to his interlocutor. A clear example can be found in Obama’s In-