Page 116 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 116
What Do We Know about the World?
ed as negative, and naming an operation as such can become a reason for
criticizing it. On the other hand, an “act of peace”, or a humanitarian in-
tervention leads to an opposite judgment, and suggests a different course
of action. Similarly, in the case above, a “sneak” is not only despised, but
cannot be trusted. Despite Soradaci’s strenuous defence of the spies, Cas-
anova cannot ignore his previous hierarchy of values, and for this reason
he cannot trust him. On the contrary, he lies to him all the time.
The decision-making process can be thought of as a pattern of rea-
soning connecting an action, or rather a “declaration of intention” or
commitment (von Wright, 1972: 41) with its grounds (Anscombe, 1998:
11). The grounds can be provided by the simple positivity or negativity
of a course of action, or the presumption of continuity of a person’s neg-
ative or positive behaviour (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1951). De-
pending on whether the speaker is assessing a specific course of action or
considering a goal, the type of reasoning can have different forms. The
first and simpler form of argument is the argument from consequences
(Walton et al., 2008: 332)
PREMISE 1: If A is brought about, good (bad) consequences will plausibly occur.
PREMISE 2: What leads to good (bad) consequences shall be (not) brought about.
CONCLUSION: Therefore A should be brought about.
For instance, if a sneak usually betrays friends, trusting a sneak can
probably lead to betrayal. Since betrayal is a negative outcome, a sneak
should not be trusted. Similarly, the classification of an operation as hu-
manitarian or an act of peace underscores its peaceful consequences,
suggesting to the interlocutor to support it.
The other form of reasoning, called practical reasoning, is more
complex, as it proceeds from a value to the means that can possibly bring
it about (Walton et al., 2008: 323):
PREMISE 1: I (an agent) have a goal G.
PREMISE 2: Carrying out this action A is a means to realize G.
CONCLUSION: Therefore, I ought to (practically speaking) carry out this action A.
This argument is frequently used to justify a potentially objection-
able decision by highlighting a hierarchy of values. For instance, war is
despicable, but when it is the only means to free people from a dictator-
ship it can be seen as positive. Similarly, lying is contemptible, but if it
is the only way to avoid betrayal, it becomes a justified course of action.
ed as negative, and naming an operation as such can become a reason for
criticizing it. On the other hand, an “act of peace”, or a humanitarian in-
tervention leads to an opposite judgment, and suggests a different course
of action. Similarly, in the case above, a “sneak” is not only despised, but
cannot be trusted. Despite Soradaci’s strenuous defence of the spies, Cas-
anova cannot ignore his previous hierarchy of values, and for this reason
he cannot trust him. On the contrary, he lies to him all the time.
The decision-making process can be thought of as a pattern of rea-
soning connecting an action, or rather a “declaration of intention” or
commitment (von Wright, 1972: 41) with its grounds (Anscombe, 1998:
11). The grounds can be provided by the simple positivity or negativity
of a course of action, or the presumption of continuity of a person’s neg-
ative or positive behaviour (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1951). De-
pending on whether the speaker is assessing a specific course of action or
considering a goal, the type of reasoning can have different forms. The
first and simpler form of argument is the argument from consequences
(Walton et al., 2008: 332)
PREMISE 1: If A is brought about, good (bad) consequences will plausibly occur.
PREMISE 2: What leads to good (bad) consequences shall be (not) brought about.
CONCLUSION: Therefore A should be brought about.
For instance, if a sneak usually betrays friends, trusting a sneak can
probably lead to betrayal. Since betrayal is a negative outcome, a sneak
should not be trusted. Similarly, the classification of an operation as hu-
manitarian or an act of peace underscores its peaceful consequences,
suggesting to the interlocutor to support it.
The other form of reasoning, called practical reasoning, is more
complex, as it proceeds from a value to the means that can possibly bring
it about (Walton et al., 2008: 323):
PREMISE 1: I (an agent) have a goal G.
PREMISE 2: Carrying out this action A is a means to realize G.
CONCLUSION: Therefore, I ought to (practically speaking) carry out this action A.
This argument is frequently used to justify a potentially objection-
able decision by highlighting a hierarchy of values. For instance, war is
despicable, but when it is the only means to free people from a dictator-
ship it can be seen as positive. Similarly, lying is contemptible, but if it
is the only way to avoid betrayal, it becomes a justified course of action.
