Page 110 - Šolsko polje, XXXI, 2020, 3-4: Convention on the Rights of the Child: Educational Opportunities and Social Justice, eds. Zdenko Kodelja and Urška Štremfel
P. 110
šolsko polje, letnik xxxi, številka 3–4
the Declaration to every human being, “without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other status” (ibid.). This conclu-
sion seems unacceptable for members of the child’s liberation movement,
who defend children’s rights as derived from human rights based on the
following syllogism:
(1). All children are human beings.
(2). All human beings have all human rights.
(3). Therefore: all children have all human rights. (Apostel,
1989, p. 49)
Although this syllogism (called Barbara in the context of Aristotelian
logic) is valid, some believe the conclusion is false because the first premise
is not true. They agree that children are human beings, but for them chil-
dren are human beings only “in those respects in which they do not dif-
fer from adult human beings in general” (ibid., p. 51). Since children are
children in virtue of “those respects which they differ from human beings
that are not children”, the conclusion is not derivable. According to them,
it is not derivable for the same reason as it is not derivable in the following
case where based on the premises that all birds fly, and that the ostrich is a
bird, we cannot conclude that the ostrich flies (ibid.).
The children’s rights stated in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child are usually interpreted as human rights which protect the child as a
human being. However, this Convention “gives the rights to children only
and in so far as they are children” (Archard, 2004, p. 60). It seems that it
does so because the child – as is written in the Preamble: “by reason of
his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, in-
cluding appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth”. Hence,
it is not surprising that the Convention provides them with “protection
rights”, which protect children from violent, abusive, cruel or exploitative
treatment; and “welfare rights”, which “protect important interests (such
as health, bodily integrity, and privacy)” (ibid.). What is surprising is that
it gives them liberty rights as well.
Liberty rights
The second problem may be expressed in the question of whether children
can or should have liberty rights, that is, the rights to freedom of speech,
religion, association, and so on. These rights present a serious problem be-
cause they presuppose the autonomy and responsibility of the subjects of
rights. Since children – at least when they are very young – are neither
autonomous nor responsible, it is absurd, as say some philosophers (cf.
108
the Declaration to every human being, “without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other status” (ibid.). This conclu-
sion seems unacceptable for members of the child’s liberation movement,
who defend children’s rights as derived from human rights based on the
following syllogism:
(1). All children are human beings.
(2). All human beings have all human rights.
(3). Therefore: all children have all human rights. (Apostel,
1989, p. 49)
Although this syllogism (called Barbara in the context of Aristotelian
logic) is valid, some believe the conclusion is false because the first premise
is not true. They agree that children are human beings, but for them chil-
dren are human beings only “in those respects in which they do not dif-
fer from adult human beings in general” (ibid., p. 51). Since children are
children in virtue of “those respects which they differ from human beings
that are not children”, the conclusion is not derivable. According to them,
it is not derivable for the same reason as it is not derivable in the following
case where based on the premises that all birds fly, and that the ostrich is a
bird, we cannot conclude that the ostrich flies (ibid.).
The children’s rights stated in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child are usually interpreted as human rights which protect the child as a
human being. However, this Convention “gives the rights to children only
and in so far as they are children” (Archard, 2004, p. 60). It seems that it
does so because the child – as is written in the Preamble: “by reason of
his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, in-
cluding appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth”. Hence,
it is not surprising that the Convention provides them with “protection
rights”, which protect children from violent, abusive, cruel or exploitative
treatment; and “welfare rights”, which “protect important interests (such
as health, bodily integrity, and privacy)” (ibid.). What is surprising is that
it gives them liberty rights as well.
Liberty rights
The second problem may be expressed in the question of whether children
can or should have liberty rights, that is, the rights to freedom of speech,
religion, association, and so on. These rights present a serious problem be-
cause they presuppose the autonomy and responsibility of the subjects of
rights. Since children – at least when they are very young – are neither
autonomous nor responsible, it is absurd, as say some philosophers (cf.
108
