Page 113 - Šolsko polje, XXXI, 2020, 3-4: Convention on the Rights of the Child: Educational Opportunities and Social Justice, eds. Zdenko Kodelja and Urška Štremfel
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. kodelja ■ instead of a conclusion: some othe problems with children’s rights
own choice”, as was anticipated in the draft version of the Convention? If
so, then why did this explicit definition disappear from the final version?
If not, this right loses its raison d’ être. Still, although we do not know an-
swers to these questions, it is clear that parents’ right to provide direction
to their child in the exercise of his or her right to freedom of religion is
not identical to the parents’ right to ensure the religious and moral educa-
tion of the child in conformity with the parents’ religious or philosophi-
cal convictions. Otherwise, the child’s right to freedom of religion would
be violated.
On one hand, this right of the child is limited by the parents’ right
to direct children in exercise of this right. This limitation probably pre-
supposes that children are unable to exercise the right to freedom of re-
ligion for themselves because they lack reason and therefore cannot act
freely. That is why, as John Locke said, parents have the right to direct
them to the point when they are able to make rational, autonomous deci-
sions for themselves. In this context, we can then say that the aim of such
parents’ educational guidance should be the child’s self-determination of
their religion.
On the other hand, this right of parents is also limited. As we have
seen, parents ought to direct their children “in a manner consistent with
the evolving capacities of the child”. This means parents’ influence on the
child should be decreased in proportion to the increasing capacities of the
child. Although the Convention on the Rights of the Child does not de-
fine the capacities of children, it seems plausible, considering Locke’s and
many other contemporary arguments about children’s rights, to believe
that these capacities are essentially related to their rationality and conse-
quentially, in the moment the child becomes a rational being, the parents’
right to direct him/her comes to an end.
Therefore, it seems obvious that parents would no longer be permit-
ted to make decisions only on the grounds of their own religious or phil-
osophical viewpoints. Especially in the case of children older than 12 or
13 years who are, in principle, recognised as having the ability to make ra-
tionale choices. If parents, despite this, make decisions without consider-
ing the child’s opinion and wishes, the child’s right to freedom of religion
is violated. Even the child’s support for such a parental decision which
emerges at some future date does not justify it because it itself might be
the product of the process of the parents’ intervention. Bob Franklin
gives us the following example: “a child who is forced by parents to attend
church, pray and read the Bible may indeed concur, if asked at some fu-
ture date, that they now consent to the earlier parental wish” (Franklin,
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Article 14.3).
111
own choice”, as was anticipated in the draft version of the Convention? If
so, then why did this explicit definition disappear from the final version?
If not, this right loses its raison d’ être. Still, although we do not know an-
swers to these questions, it is clear that parents’ right to provide direction
to their child in the exercise of his or her right to freedom of religion is
not identical to the parents’ right to ensure the religious and moral educa-
tion of the child in conformity with the parents’ religious or philosophi-
cal convictions. Otherwise, the child’s right to freedom of religion would
be violated.
On one hand, this right of the child is limited by the parents’ right
to direct children in exercise of this right. This limitation probably pre-
supposes that children are unable to exercise the right to freedom of re-
ligion for themselves because they lack reason and therefore cannot act
freely. That is why, as John Locke said, parents have the right to direct
them to the point when they are able to make rational, autonomous deci-
sions for themselves. In this context, we can then say that the aim of such
parents’ educational guidance should be the child’s self-determination of
their religion.
On the other hand, this right of parents is also limited. As we have
seen, parents ought to direct their children “in a manner consistent with
the evolving capacities of the child”. This means parents’ influence on the
child should be decreased in proportion to the increasing capacities of the
child. Although the Convention on the Rights of the Child does not de-
fine the capacities of children, it seems plausible, considering Locke’s and
many other contemporary arguments about children’s rights, to believe
that these capacities are essentially related to their rationality and conse-
quentially, in the moment the child becomes a rational being, the parents’
right to direct him/her comes to an end.
Therefore, it seems obvious that parents would no longer be permit-
ted to make decisions only on the grounds of their own religious or phil-
osophical viewpoints. Especially in the case of children older than 12 or
13 years who are, in principle, recognised as having the ability to make ra-
tionale choices. If parents, despite this, make decisions without consider-
ing the child’s opinion and wishes, the child’s right to freedom of religion
is violated. Even the child’s support for such a parental decision which
emerges at some future date does not justify it because it itself might be
the product of the process of the parents’ intervention. Bob Franklin
gives us the following example: “a child who is forced by parents to attend
church, pray and read the Bible may indeed concur, if asked at some fu-
ture date, that they now consent to the earlier parental wish” (Franklin,
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Article 14.3).
111
