Page 196 - Šolsko polje, XXVIII, 2017, no. 1-2: Etika in šola, ur. Marjan Šimenc in Mitja Sardoč
P. 196
šolsko polje, letnik xxviii, številka 1–2
poslovenili izraz fallacies) dobesedno vzcvetelo in ponudilo številne nove
perspektive in konceptualizacije pojavov, ki naj bi veljali za napake v skle
panju in argumentaciji (Woods & Walton 1989, van Eemeren & Grooten
dorst 1992 itd.). V pričujočem članku se ukvarjamo z dvemi vprašanji. Z
epistemološkim: ali govorci (mi vsi, politiki, diskurzivni analitiki ...) na
pake v argumentaciji (nenamerno) zagrešimo ali jih (namerno) uporabi
mo? In z metodološkim: kadar (filozofi, sociologi, diskurzivni analitiki ...)
naletimo na kaj, kar bi lahko bila napaka v argumentaciji, na katerih kon
ceptualnih temeljih (lahko) razlikujemo med zagrešenimi in uporabljeni
mi napakami v argumentaciji? Pri odgovoru na zgornji vprašanji se bomo
posvetili predvsem rabi koncepta fallacies v teoriji diskurzivno-zgodovin
skega pristopa (h kritični analizi diskurza).
Ključne besede: /.../
Fallacies: do we »employ« them or »commit« them?
The Case of Discourse-Historical Approach
After C. L. Hamblin‘s ground-breaking work Fallacies (1970), re-interpre
ting what used to be known as »mistakes in reasoning« or »bad argu
ments« since Aristotle (On Sophistical Refutations), the study of fallacies
started to bloom, coming up with ever new perspectives and conceptuali
zations of what should count as a mistake in reasoning and argumentati
on (Woods & Walton 1989, van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, etc.). This
paper will be concerned with two questions. An epistemological one: do
we (everymen, politicians, the media ...) commit (unintentionally) falla
cies, or do we (intentionally) use them? And a methodological one: when
we (philosophers, sociologists, discourse analysts ...) detect what could co
unt as a fallacy, on what conceptual grounds do we differentiate betwe
en committed and used fallacies? In answering these two questions, I will
be above all concentrating on the use of fallacies in Discourse-Historical
Approach.
Key words: Austin, argumentation, Discourse-Historical Approach, falla
cies, Hamblin, pragmatics.
194
poslovenili izraz fallacies) dobesedno vzcvetelo in ponudilo številne nove
perspektive in konceptualizacije pojavov, ki naj bi veljali za napake v skle
panju in argumentaciji (Woods & Walton 1989, van Eemeren & Grooten
dorst 1992 itd.). V pričujočem članku se ukvarjamo z dvemi vprašanji. Z
epistemološkim: ali govorci (mi vsi, politiki, diskurzivni analitiki ...) na
pake v argumentaciji (nenamerno) zagrešimo ali jih (namerno) uporabi
mo? In z metodološkim: kadar (filozofi, sociologi, diskurzivni analitiki ...)
naletimo na kaj, kar bi lahko bila napaka v argumentaciji, na katerih kon
ceptualnih temeljih (lahko) razlikujemo med zagrešenimi in uporabljeni
mi napakami v argumentaciji? Pri odgovoru na zgornji vprašanji se bomo
posvetili predvsem rabi koncepta fallacies v teoriji diskurzivno-zgodovin
skega pristopa (h kritični analizi diskurza).
Ključne besede: /.../
Fallacies: do we »employ« them or »commit« them?
The Case of Discourse-Historical Approach
After C. L. Hamblin‘s ground-breaking work Fallacies (1970), re-interpre
ting what used to be known as »mistakes in reasoning« or »bad argu
ments« since Aristotle (On Sophistical Refutations), the study of fallacies
started to bloom, coming up with ever new perspectives and conceptuali
zations of what should count as a mistake in reasoning and argumentati
on (Woods & Walton 1989, van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, etc.). This
paper will be concerned with two questions. An epistemological one: do
we (everymen, politicians, the media ...) commit (unintentionally) falla
cies, or do we (intentionally) use them? And a methodological one: when
we (philosophers, sociologists, discourse analysts ...) detect what could co
unt as a fallacy, on what conceptual grounds do we differentiate betwe
en committed and used fallacies? In answering these two questions, I will
be above all concentrating on the use of fallacies in Discourse-Historical
Approach.
Key words: Austin, argumentation, Discourse-Historical Approach, falla
cies, Hamblin, pragmatics.
194
