Page 123 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 123
the acts and strategies of defining 123
of affairs. For instance, the omission to report a crime does not prevent
the authorities from being informed of prosecuting it. However, such a
non-action leaves this possibility open by a deliberate choice.
Definitions can represent the propositional content of two different
types of non-acts: the act of omitting a definition and the act of taking
it for granted. While in the first case the speaker fails to provide a need-
ed definition, in the second case he uses a word with a specific meaning,
but omits the act of putting it forward. By deciding not to advance or to
impose the definition he is using, he takes it for granted, performing a
specific tacit act.
5.1. Omitted Definitions
Definitions set out the conditions for the classification of a concept.
The crucial importance of a definition emerges especially in the case in
which it is lacking. The speaker may decide not to define a concept, so
that he is not committed to any specific account of its meaning. For in-
stance, with the amendment 1034 to the US Code, a new meaning of
“armed conflict” was stipulated, in which the boundaries of this concept
set out by the Geneva Conventions (Article 1 of Additional Protocol II
– Geneva Convention 1949) were extended to include also operations
against terrorists and the supporters thereof. However, this amendment
mentions two concepts whose meaning cannot be the same as the ordin-
ary one (emphasis added):
Omitting definitions: “Belligerent and Hostilities”
(4) the President’s authority pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Mili-
tary Force (Public Law 107–140; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority
to detain belligerents, including persons described in paragraph (3), until the
termination of hostilities.
In this definition the words “belligerent” and “hostilities” are not
defined, even though their meaning cannot correspond to the ordinary
one after the extended definition of “armed conflict”. In 2009 “hostil-
ities” was first defined as “any conflict subject to the laws of war.” (10
U.S.C. § 948a 9). However, in the aforementioned stipulative redefini-
tion of “armed conflict” the idea of “hostilities” could not be governed
by the laws of war, as armed conflicts against terrorists cannot fall with-
in the definition that is shared all over the world. Similarly, “belliger-
ents” cannot be simply limited to soldiers, as the new category of “war”
encompasses also terrorism and non-ordinary conflicts. The legislators
omitted to define such terms, and the result was that a classificatory free-
of affairs. For instance, the omission to report a crime does not prevent
the authorities from being informed of prosecuting it. However, such a
non-action leaves this possibility open by a deliberate choice.
Definitions can represent the propositional content of two different
types of non-acts: the act of omitting a definition and the act of taking
it for granted. While in the first case the speaker fails to provide a need-
ed definition, in the second case he uses a word with a specific meaning,
but omits the act of putting it forward. By deciding not to advance or to
impose the definition he is using, he takes it for granted, performing a
specific tacit act.
5.1. Omitted Definitions
Definitions set out the conditions for the classification of a concept.
The crucial importance of a definition emerges especially in the case in
which it is lacking. The speaker may decide not to define a concept, so
that he is not committed to any specific account of its meaning. For in-
stance, with the amendment 1034 to the US Code, a new meaning of
“armed conflict” was stipulated, in which the boundaries of this concept
set out by the Geneva Conventions (Article 1 of Additional Protocol II
– Geneva Convention 1949) were extended to include also operations
against terrorists and the supporters thereof. However, this amendment
mentions two concepts whose meaning cannot be the same as the ordin-
ary one (emphasis added):
Omitting definitions: “Belligerent and Hostilities”
(4) the President’s authority pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Mili-
tary Force (Public Law 107–140; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority
to detain belligerents, including persons described in paragraph (3), until the
termination of hostilities.
In this definition the words “belligerent” and “hostilities” are not
defined, even though their meaning cannot correspond to the ordinary
one after the extended definition of “armed conflict”. In 2009 “hostil-
ities” was first defined as “any conflict subject to the laws of war.” (10
U.S.C. § 948a 9). However, in the aforementioned stipulative redefini-
tion of “armed conflict” the idea of “hostilities” could not be governed
by the laws of war, as armed conflicts against terrorists cannot fall with-
in the definition that is shared all over the world. Similarly, “belliger-
ents” cannot be simply limited to soldiers, as the new category of “war”
encompasses also terrorism and non-ordinary conflicts. The legislators
omitted to define such terms, and the result was that a classificatory free-
