Page 144 - Šolsko polje, XXXI, 2020, 5-6: Teaching Feminism, ed. Valerija Vendramin
P. 144
šolsko polje, letnik xxxi, številka 5–6
responsible discourse (my italics). This is a view from a position that is
transcendent, which means that I/we/someone is speaking (better: claims
to be speaking) above the level of human activity, above politics and pow-
er – and beyond lived experience.
In contrast with more traditional definitions of objectivity, femi-
nist objectivity is achieved not through transcendence – this would be
the “god-trick” (done by the allegedly disembodied scientist, which is a
traditional positivist view of science) of being the Deity in relation to the
rest of the universe (Haraway, 1991, p. 183 ff).5 It is done through a dynam-
ic engagement with partial perspectives stemming from marginalised po-
sitions. We should not forget the ethical and moral implications here, i.e.
the challenge and responsibility to recognise power relations. Iris Van der
Tuin describes it in this way: “one of the most important methodological
innovations of feminism has been the distinction between ‘studying up’
and ‘studying down’. Studying down implies that asymmetrical power re-
lations are reconfirmed easily in research. The alternative, studying up, is
the standpoint theoretical model of researching from the lives of margin-
alized subjects” (Van der Tuin, 2016).
As already mentioned, feminist epistemology is not research into
some kind of easily and generally detectable gender-specific, i.e. feminine,
ways of knowing, styles of thinking, intuitions, methodologies and on-
tologies that govern or characterise cognitive activities (Anderson, 1995,
p. 62; Vendramin, 2018) – at least this is my understanding. As Phyllis
Rooney states:
The idea of “women’s/feminine ways of knowing” has indeed surfaced
in feminist epistemology, but the primary focus has been on how prob-
lematic the idea is. Among other things, it involves generalizations about
women (across different races, classes, and cultures, for example) that
have been the focus of significant critical scrutiny in the past three dec-
ades of feminist theorizing (Rooney, 2010, pp. 6–7).
Such understanding avoids dubious claims about feminine cogni-
tive differences and enables feminist research in various disciplines to
pose deep internal criticism of mainstream research (Anderson, 1995, p.
5 Haraway’s text entitled “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and
the Privilege of Partial Perspective” from Haraway, 1991, is one of the most important texts
on epistemological issues (I do not wish to say “in feminism” here, because it should be dis-
cussed wider). See above about feminist epistemology and “epistemology proper”. Hara-
way points out that feminists are interested in science projects “that offer a more adequate,
richer, better account of a world, in order to live in it well and in critical, reflexive relation
to our own as well as others’ practices of domination and unequal parts of privilege and
oppression” (Haraway, 1991, p. 187).
142
responsible discourse (my italics). This is a view from a position that is
transcendent, which means that I/we/someone is speaking (better: claims
to be speaking) above the level of human activity, above politics and pow-
er – and beyond lived experience.
In contrast with more traditional definitions of objectivity, femi-
nist objectivity is achieved not through transcendence – this would be
the “god-trick” (done by the allegedly disembodied scientist, which is a
traditional positivist view of science) of being the Deity in relation to the
rest of the universe (Haraway, 1991, p. 183 ff).5 It is done through a dynam-
ic engagement with partial perspectives stemming from marginalised po-
sitions. We should not forget the ethical and moral implications here, i.e.
the challenge and responsibility to recognise power relations. Iris Van der
Tuin describes it in this way: “one of the most important methodological
innovations of feminism has been the distinction between ‘studying up’
and ‘studying down’. Studying down implies that asymmetrical power re-
lations are reconfirmed easily in research. The alternative, studying up, is
the standpoint theoretical model of researching from the lives of margin-
alized subjects” (Van der Tuin, 2016).
As already mentioned, feminist epistemology is not research into
some kind of easily and generally detectable gender-specific, i.e. feminine,
ways of knowing, styles of thinking, intuitions, methodologies and on-
tologies that govern or characterise cognitive activities (Anderson, 1995,
p. 62; Vendramin, 2018) – at least this is my understanding. As Phyllis
Rooney states:
The idea of “women’s/feminine ways of knowing” has indeed surfaced
in feminist epistemology, but the primary focus has been on how prob-
lematic the idea is. Among other things, it involves generalizations about
women (across different races, classes, and cultures, for example) that
have been the focus of significant critical scrutiny in the past three dec-
ades of feminist theorizing (Rooney, 2010, pp. 6–7).
Such understanding avoids dubious claims about feminine cogni-
tive differences and enables feminist research in various disciplines to
pose deep internal criticism of mainstream research (Anderson, 1995, p.
5 Haraway’s text entitled “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and
the Privilege of Partial Perspective” from Haraway, 1991, is one of the most important texts
on epistemological issues (I do not wish to say “in feminism” here, because it should be dis-
cussed wider). See above about feminist epistemology and “epistemology proper”. Hara-
way points out that feminists are interested in science projects “that offer a more adequate,
richer, better account of a world, in order to live in it well and in critical, reflexive relation
to our own as well as others’ practices of domination and unequal parts of privilege and
oppression” (Haraway, 1991, p. 187).
142
