Page 143 - Šolsko polje, XXXI, 2020, 5-6: Teaching Feminism, ed. Valerija Vendramin
P. 143
v. vendramin ■ the grammar of knowledge: a look at feminism ...
constructionism, and post-modern relativism and anti-foundationalism.
A strong commitment to ethics – and a belief in an inextricable link be-
tween epistemology, ontology, and ethics – is also a common denomina-
tor of the diversity of heterogeneous theories /…/ (ibid.).
Accordingly, these strands of thought lead us to dealing with the
taken-for-granted, which can be expanded in various directions, one of
them being meanings acquired in everyday life.4
But, in connection to delineation of what feminist epistemology (or
epistemologies) is, Elizabeth Anderson, for example, warns as following:
Feminist epistemology has often been understood as the study of femi-
nine “ways of knowing.” But feminist epistemology is better understood
as the branch of naturalized, social epistemology that studies the various
influences of norms and conceptions of gender and gendered interests
and experiences on the production of knowledge (Anderson, 1995, p. 50).
This quite general presentation (general in the sense that I chose it,
not because Elizabeth Anderson’s thinking is too general in defining it)
can be complemented, for instance, with Iris Van der Tuin’s definition
(2016):
Feminist epistemology refers to the feminist engagement with ques-
tions of truth, objectivity, method, and the knowing subject. /…/ The key
question of feminist epistemology as a field of inquiry involves the epis-
temic status of the knowledge produced by privileged and marginalized
subjects. Where to draw the line between knowledge and prejudice? In
sum, feminist epistemology pertains to the intersection of knowledge
and power.
This last sentence is particularly important here, as knowledge is al-
ways someone’s knowledge (and by “someone” in this case I mean a par-
ticular social group). Wherever there is significant social stratification,
there are likely to be epistemic effects (Grasswick, 2001, p. xv) – i.e. an in-
fluence on the concepts of knowledge, inquiry, justification and the like.
A famous phrase by Donna Haraway goes like this: “Vision is al-
ways a question of the power to see” (Haraway, 1991, p. 192), and so the as-
sertion made by the researcher that she or he watches from everywhere
and sees everything, that she or he has no desires, needs, convictions or
backgrounds, is contentious (Haraway, 1991, p. 192) and an evasion of
4 To briefly return to the sphere of education, this especially concerns both the curriculum
and the hidden curriculum. Particular attention should be paid here to the hidden curric-
ulum because a certain level of doubt and reconsideration is required in order to detect
and analyse it (see e.g. Bahovec & Bregar-Golobič, 2004).
141
constructionism, and post-modern relativism and anti-foundationalism.
A strong commitment to ethics – and a belief in an inextricable link be-
tween epistemology, ontology, and ethics – is also a common denomina-
tor of the diversity of heterogeneous theories /…/ (ibid.).
Accordingly, these strands of thought lead us to dealing with the
taken-for-granted, which can be expanded in various directions, one of
them being meanings acquired in everyday life.4
But, in connection to delineation of what feminist epistemology (or
epistemologies) is, Elizabeth Anderson, for example, warns as following:
Feminist epistemology has often been understood as the study of femi-
nine “ways of knowing.” But feminist epistemology is better understood
as the branch of naturalized, social epistemology that studies the various
influences of norms and conceptions of gender and gendered interests
and experiences on the production of knowledge (Anderson, 1995, p. 50).
This quite general presentation (general in the sense that I chose it,
not because Elizabeth Anderson’s thinking is too general in defining it)
can be complemented, for instance, with Iris Van der Tuin’s definition
(2016):
Feminist epistemology refers to the feminist engagement with ques-
tions of truth, objectivity, method, and the knowing subject. /…/ The key
question of feminist epistemology as a field of inquiry involves the epis-
temic status of the knowledge produced by privileged and marginalized
subjects. Where to draw the line between knowledge and prejudice? In
sum, feminist epistemology pertains to the intersection of knowledge
and power.
This last sentence is particularly important here, as knowledge is al-
ways someone’s knowledge (and by “someone” in this case I mean a par-
ticular social group). Wherever there is significant social stratification,
there are likely to be epistemic effects (Grasswick, 2001, p. xv) – i.e. an in-
fluence on the concepts of knowledge, inquiry, justification and the like.
A famous phrase by Donna Haraway goes like this: “Vision is al-
ways a question of the power to see” (Haraway, 1991, p. 192), and so the as-
sertion made by the researcher that she or he watches from everywhere
and sees everything, that she or he has no desires, needs, convictions or
backgrounds, is contentious (Haraway, 1991, p. 192) and an evasion of
4 To briefly return to the sphere of education, this especially concerns both the curriculum
and the hidden curriculum. Particular attention should be paid here to the hidden curric-
ulum because a certain level of doubt and reconsideration is required in order to detect
and analyse it (see e.g. Bahovec & Bregar-Golobič, 2004).
141
