Page 142 - Šolsko polje, XXXI, 2020, 5-6: Teaching Feminism, ed. Valerija Vendramin
P. 142
šolsko polje, letnik xxxi, številka 5–6
epistemological fallout of the epistemic disenfranchisement of women
and other ‘others’) proceeds in fruitful conversation with a range of ap-
proaches or directions in epistemology, and it is unique in this kind of
epistemological flexibility” (Rooney, 2010, p. 21).
This explains why feminist epistemology can sometimes also be spo-
ken about in the plural (Janack, n.d.).1 Feminist epistemologies contain
an important feature that sets them apart from other traditions (to which
they are indebted in various ways and extents) – the emphasis on the epis-
temic salience of gender and the use of gender as an analytical category in
discussions, criticisms and reconstructions of epistemic practices, norms
and ideals (ibid.).
Phyllis Rooney (2011, pp. 5–6) in this regard deals with another im-
portant issue, namely with the “persistent refrain in mainstream episte-
mology circles that feminist epistemology is not epistemology ‘proper,’
and thus not something with which epistemologists need concern them-
selves”. This attitude “has ranged from hostile to dismissive to limited
acknowledgement” (ibid). These dismissals,2 writes Rooney, “are prob-
lematic for epistemological as well as political reasons /… and/ are quite
revealing of unexamined assumptions about epistemology ‘proper’” (ibid.,
p. 6). Hence, not only is a gendered subject marginalised in a research
study or inquiry, but the very discipline dealing with being a gendered
knowing subject (and all the categories that go along with it, such as ob-
jectivity, justification, reason etc.) and researching the consequences of
this is also marginalised.
This epistemological theme appears in many articles here, sometimes
explicitly, sometimes less so. But it is there in different ways. As Nina
Lykke puts it: rather than homogenising, it is important to provide a het-
erogeneous feminist space for comparing notes (Lykke, 2010, p. 135).3 And,
as she continues:
My claim is that this particular thinking technology may make more
visible current feminist commitments to rethinkings of bodily and
transcorporeal materialities, and to the unfolding of innovative kinds of
knowledge producing practices which transgress both positivism, social
1 Feminist philosophers “have articulated three main approaches to this question – femi-
nist standpoint theory, feminist postmodernism, and feminist empiricism” (Janack, n.d.).
These three approaches are given here for information only, they often converge and no
doubt have developed over time.
2 There is talk about political correctness and agendas – about something that allegedly has
no place in science. For a little more on the “criticism” of feminist epistemology, see e.g.
Vendramin, 2009.
3 Lykke (2010) writes from a specific point of view, i.e. post-constructionism.
140
epistemological fallout of the epistemic disenfranchisement of women
and other ‘others’) proceeds in fruitful conversation with a range of ap-
proaches or directions in epistemology, and it is unique in this kind of
epistemological flexibility” (Rooney, 2010, p. 21).
This explains why feminist epistemology can sometimes also be spo-
ken about in the plural (Janack, n.d.).1 Feminist epistemologies contain
an important feature that sets them apart from other traditions (to which
they are indebted in various ways and extents) – the emphasis on the epis-
temic salience of gender and the use of gender as an analytical category in
discussions, criticisms and reconstructions of epistemic practices, norms
and ideals (ibid.).
Phyllis Rooney (2011, pp. 5–6) in this regard deals with another im-
portant issue, namely with the “persistent refrain in mainstream episte-
mology circles that feminist epistemology is not epistemology ‘proper,’
and thus not something with which epistemologists need concern them-
selves”. This attitude “has ranged from hostile to dismissive to limited
acknowledgement” (ibid). These dismissals,2 writes Rooney, “are prob-
lematic for epistemological as well as political reasons /… and/ are quite
revealing of unexamined assumptions about epistemology ‘proper’” (ibid.,
p. 6). Hence, not only is a gendered subject marginalised in a research
study or inquiry, but the very discipline dealing with being a gendered
knowing subject (and all the categories that go along with it, such as ob-
jectivity, justification, reason etc.) and researching the consequences of
this is also marginalised.
This epistemological theme appears in many articles here, sometimes
explicitly, sometimes less so. But it is there in different ways. As Nina
Lykke puts it: rather than homogenising, it is important to provide a het-
erogeneous feminist space for comparing notes (Lykke, 2010, p. 135).3 And,
as she continues:
My claim is that this particular thinking technology may make more
visible current feminist commitments to rethinkings of bodily and
transcorporeal materialities, and to the unfolding of innovative kinds of
knowledge producing practices which transgress both positivism, social
1 Feminist philosophers “have articulated three main approaches to this question – femi-
nist standpoint theory, feminist postmodernism, and feminist empiricism” (Janack, n.d.).
These three approaches are given here for information only, they often converge and no
doubt have developed over time.
2 There is talk about political correctness and agendas – about something that allegedly has
no place in science. For a little more on the “criticism” of feminist epistemology, see e.g.
Vendramin, 2009.
3 Lykke (2010) writes from a specific point of view, i.e. post-constructionism.
140
