Page 146 - Šolsko polje, XXXI, 2020, 5-6: Teaching Feminism, ed. Valerija Vendramin
P. 146
šolsko polje, letnik xxxi, številka 5–6
search for new stories, and so for a language which names a new vision of
possibilities and limits. That is, feminism, like science is /…/ a contest for
public knowledge”.
Similarly, Eva Bahovec explicitly places feminism in the framework
of epistemology and notes: the epistemological struggle of feminism is a
clash with the category of the self-evident, with everything perceived as
given, natural and unchangeable: “with everything that is only an appear-
ance and therefore misleading” (Bahovec 2007, pp. 35–36). In short, I opt
for the permanent resistance of the feminist epistemic subject towards
the taken-for-granted, including itself and its constructions (Vendramin,
2014, p. 199).
We should return here to women’s epistemic disenfranchisement.
Phyllis Rooney believes this disenfranchisement needs to be made visi-
ble as women have been dismissed as “serious reasoners and knowers in a
variety of knowledge areas and disciplines as well as in philosophy /and
it/ continues to be a defining project in feminist epistemology” (Rooney,
2010. p. 10). Thus, to remain within this line of thinking with the help
of Miranda Fricker: “The cause of testimonial injustice8 is a prejudice
through which the speaker is misjudged and perceived as epistemically
lesser (a direct discrimination). This will tend to have negative effects on
how they are perceived and treated non-epistemically too” (Fricker, 2017a,
p. 54). But let us now turn the perspective around: those that are non-epis-
temically perceived to hold less “value” cannot authorise themselves epis-
temically in society as a whole (such as currently exists). So, to “the epis-
temological question ‘Who can be legitimate knowers?’ the answer has
historically been, ‘not women’” (Bart, 1998).
In short let me conclude, that feminist inquiries have “made signifi-
cant contributions to the epistemological terrain as regards questions such
as who can be ‘knowers’, or what sorts of experience can count as justifica-
tion of knowledge claims” (Bart, 1998).
So, let us return to Nina Perger, Metka Mencin and Veronika Tašner’s
article to reflect on FE and threats posed to academia by governing neo-
liberal ideology that is “making deals with (extreme) right-wing political
movements”. Or, for example, reflect on endeavours “to create epistemo-
logical alliances with critical studies such as decolonial or antiracist re-
search studies, among others”, as writes Biljana Kašić. Or, as we can read
in Renata Šribar’s article, it is important to “transpose feminist epistemol-
ogies to class” if we want to practise feminist pedagogy. Similarly, Ana
8 Injustice as a “wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower” (Fricker,
2007b, p. 1) or a subject of knowledge (ibid., p. 5).
144
search for new stories, and so for a language which names a new vision of
possibilities and limits. That is, feminism, like science is /…/ a contest for
public knowledge”.
Similarly, Eva Bahovec explicitly places feminism in the framework
of epistemology and notes: the epistemological struggle of feminism is a
clash with the category of the self-evident, with everything perceived as
given, natural and unchangeable: “with everything that is only an appear-
ance and therefore misleading” (Bahovec 2007, pp. 35–36). In short, I opt
for the permanent resistance of the feminist epistemic subject towards
the taken-for-granted, including itself and its constructions (Vendramin,
2014, p. 199).
We should return here to women’s epistemic disenfranchisement.
Phyllis Rooney believes this disenfranchisement needs to be made visi-
ble as women have been dismissed as “serious reasoners and knowers in a
variety of knowledge areas and disciplines as well as in philosophy /and
it/ continues to be a defining project in feminist epistemology” (Rooney,
2010. p. 10). Thus, to remain within this line of thinking with the help
of Miranda Fricker: “The cause of testimonial injustice8 is a prejudice
through which the speaker is misjudged and perceived as epistemically
lesser (a direct discrimination). This will tend to have negative effects on
how they are perceived and treated non-epistemically too” (Fricker, 2017a,
p. 54). But let us now turn the perspective around: those that are non-epis-
temically perceived to hold less “value” cannot authorise themselves epis-
temically in society as a whole (such as currently exists). So, to “the epis-
temological question ‘Who can be legitimate knowers?’ the answer has
historically been, ‘not women’” (Bart, 1998).
In short let me conclude, that feminist inquiries have “made signifi-
cant contributions to the epistemological terrain as regards questions such
as who can be ‘knowers’, or what sorts of experience can count as justifica-
tion of knowledge claims” (Bart, 1998).
So, let us return to Nina Perger, Metka Mencin and Veronika Tašner’s
article to reflect on FE and threats posed to academia by governing neo-
liberal ideology that is “making deals with (extreme) right-wing political
movements”. Or, for example, reflect on endeavours “to create epistemo-
logical alliances with critical studies such as decolonial or antiracist re-
search studies, among others”, as writes Biljana Kašić. Or, as we can read
in Renata Šribar’s article, it is important to “transpose feminist epistemol-
ogies to class” if we want to practise feminist pedagogy. Similarly, Ana
8 Injustice as a “wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower” (Fricker,
2007b, p. 1) or a subject of knowledge (ibid., p. 5).
144
