Page 107 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
P. 107
igor ž. žagar ■ between fallacies and more fallacies?
Some dialectical shifts, however, are illicit, and these illicit shifts are often
associated with informal fallacies. To judge whether a shift was licit or
illicit in a particular case of argumentation, you first have to ask what the
original context of dialogue was supposed to be. Then you have to identi-
fy the new context, and ask whether the shift was licit or illicit by looking
backwards, and judging by the goals and standards of the original con-
text. Is the new dialogue supporting those old goals, or at least allowing
their fulfilment to be carried forward, or is blocking them? Was the shift
agreed to by the original speech partners, or was the shift unilateral, or
even forced by one party? These are the kinds of questions that need to
be asked.
Following this procedure, appealing to interlocutor’s emotions can
thus be legitimate in persuasion dialogue, but not (necessarily) in other
kinds of dialogue. “Not necessarily” meaning that one (i.e. the analyst) has
to examine each and every dialogue within its context individually, before
passing the verdict about possible fallacious moves. And that is what dif-
ferentiates Walton’s approach from pragma-dialectical approach where
every dialectical exchange has to be evaluated against the same set of crite-
ria (“ten commandments”). What they have in common is that those dia-
lectical exchanges are evaluated from the outside, by a “neutral” observer
(i.e. analyst), not from within, by the parties taking part in the dialecti-
cal exchange (at least not necessarily). And in relation to this (problem), I
would like to point once more to Austin and Hamblin.
Conclusion
After pointing out that the reference depends on the knowledge at the
time of utterance, Austin emphasizes:
It is essential to realize that ‘true’ and ‘false’, like ‘free’ and ‘unfree’, do not
stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a
right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circum
stances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these inten
tions. In general we may say this: with both statements (and, for example,
descriptions) and warnings, &c., the question can arise, granting that you
had the right to warn and did warn, did state, or did advise, whether you
were right to state or warn or advise -not in the sense of whether it was op-
portune or expedient, but whether, on the facts and your knowledge
of the facts and the purposes for which you were speaking, and so
on, this was the proper thing to say. (Austin, 1962/1980: pp. 144–145)
105
Some dialectical shifts, however, are illicit, and these illicit shifts are often
associated with informal fallacies. To judge whether a shift was licit or
illicit in a particular case of argumentation, you first have to ask what the
original context of dialogue was supposed to be. Then you have to identi-
fy the new context, and ask whether the shift was licit or illicit by looking
backwards, and judging by the goals and standards of the original con-
text. Is the new dialogue supporting those old goals, or at least allowing
their fulfilment to be carried forward, or is blocking them? Was the shift
agreed to by the original speech partners, or was the shift unilateral, or
even forced by one party? These are the kinds of questions that need to
be asked.
Following this procedure, appealing to interlocutor’s emotions can
thus be legitimate in persuasion dialogue, but not (necessarily) in other
kinds of dialogue. “Not necessarily” meaning that one (i.e. the analyst) has
to examine each and every dialogue within its context individually, before
passing the verdict about possible fallacious moves. And that is what dif-
ferentiates Walton’s approach from pragma-dialectical approach where
every dialectical exchange has to be evaluated against the same set of crite-
ria (“ten commandments”). What they have in common is that those dia-
lectical exchanges are evaluated from the outside, by a “neutral” observer
(i.e. analyst), not from within, by the parties taking part in the dialecti-
cal exchange (at least not necessarily). And in relation to this (problem), I
would like to point once more to Austin and Hamblin.
Conclusion
After pointing out that the reference depends on the knowledge at the
time of utterance, Austin emphasizes:
It is essential to realize that ‘true’ and ‘false’, like ‘free’ and ‘unfree’, do not
stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a
right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circum
stances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these inten
tions. In general we may say this: with both statements (and, for example,
descriptions) and warnings, &c., the question can arise, granting that you
had the right to warn and did warn, did state, or did advise, whether you
were right to state or warn or advise -not in the sense of whether it was op-
portune or expedient, but whether, on the facts and your knowledge
of the facts and the purposes for which you were speaking, and so
on, this was the proper thing to say. (Austin, 1962/1980: pp. 144–145)
105
