Page 106 - Šolsko polje, XXIX, 2018, št. 3-4: K paradigmam raziskovanja vzgoje in izobraževanja, ur. Valerija Vendramin
P. 106
šolsko polje, letnik xxix, številka 3–4
The pragma-dialectical view on fallacies definitely represents a big
step forward from the so called “standard treatment” (of fallacies): it is dy-
namic, not static (i.e. it doesn’t rely on fixed lists of alleged fallacies), and
it is dialectic (i.e. what is fallacious is revealed in dialogue/discussion and
through dialogue/discussion). Nevertheless, the pragma-dialectical ac-
count of fallacies is still pretty rigid:
1) not all argumentation is about “resolving a difference of opinion”
(epistemologically speaking, it is not clear why differences of opin-
ion should be resolved at all);
2) fallacies are defined as infringements of the above mentioned discus-
sion rules, necessary for and leading to the resolution of a difference
of opinion.
In other words, pragma-dialectical view on fallacies is narrowly re-
stricted to the pragma-dialectical theory itself.
Douglas Walton: illicit dialectical shifts
Douglas Walton’s approach (i.e. the transformation of his views) is much
more interesting in this respect. In Fallacies (1989), a collection of previ-
ously published articles by himself and John Woods, Walton is still pret-
ty logic oriented (though different kinds of logic are taken into consid-
eration in order to explain different kind of fallacies from the “standard
treatment”).
A considerable break is achieved by Walton’s systematic study of
dialogue and dialogue types. Here is how he defines dialogue in 1992
(Walton, 1992a: p. 133):
A dialogue is an exchange of speech acts between two speech partners in
turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal. The dialogue is coherent
to the extent that the individual speech acts fit together to contribute to
this goal. As well, each participant has an individual goal in the dialogue,
and both participants have an obligation in the dialogue, defined by the
nature of their collective and individual goal.
Walton differentiates between several kinds of dialogue (persuasion
dialogue, information-seeking dialogue, advice-solicitation dialogue, ex-
pert consultation dialogue, negotiation dialogue, inquiry dialogue, eristic
dialogue) and “argumentation needs to be judged as correct or incorrect in
relation to a multiplicity of different models of reasoned dialogue” (1992:
p.133). Even during a single discussion, interlocutors may shift from one
type of dialogue to another, and these “dialectical shifts”, writes Walton,
can be often associated with informal fallacies (1992a: p. 139):
104
The pragma-dialectical view on fallacies definitely represents a big
step forward from the so called “standard treatment” (of fallacies): it is dy-
namic, not static (i.e. it doesn’t rely on fixed lists of alleged fallacies), and
it is dialectic (i.e. what is fallacious is revealed in dialogue/discussion and
through dialogue/discussion). Nevertheless, the pragma-dialectical ac-
count of fallacies is still pretty rigid:
1) not all argumentation is about “resolving a difference of opinion”
(epistemologically speaking, it is not clear why differences of opin-
ion should be resolved at all);
2) fallacies are defined as infringements of the above mentioned discus-
sion rules, necessary for and leading to the resolution of a difference
of opinion.
In other words, pragma-dialectical view on fallacies is narrowly re-
stricted to the pragma-dialectical theory itself.
Douglas Walton: illicit dialectical shifts
Douglas Walton’s approach (i.e. the transformation of his views) is much
more interesting in this respect. In Fallacies (1989), a collection of previ-
ously published articles by himself and John Woods, Walton is still pret-
ty logic oriented (though different kinds of logic are taken into consid-
eration in order to explain different kind of fallacies from the “standard
treatment”).
A considerable break is achieved by Walton’s systematic study of
dialogue and dialogue types. Here is how he defines dialogue in 1992
(Walton, 1992a: p. 133):
A dialogue is an exchange of speech acts between two speech partners in
turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal. The dialogue is coherent
to the extent that the individual speech acts fit together to contribute to
this goal. As well, each participant has an individual goal in the dialogue,
and both participants have an obligation in the dialogue, defined by the
nature of their collective and individual goal.
Walton differentiates between several kinds of dialogue (persuasion
dialogue, information-seeking dialogue, advice-solicitation dialogue, ex-
pert consultation dialogue, negotiation dialogue, inquiry dialogue, eristic
dialogue) and “argumentation needs to be judged as correct or incorrect in
relation to a multiplicity of different models of reasoned dialogue” (1992:
p.133). Even during a single discussion, interlocutors may shift from one
type of dialogue to another, and these “dialectical shifts”, writes Walton,
can be often associated with informal fallacies (1992a: p. 139):
104
