Page 92 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 92
What Do We Know about the World?
dience of analytical philosophers in Oxford responded to the lecture he
delivered on différance in 1967: “On that occasion the silence which fol-
lowed was obviously eloquent. Eloquently saying: ‘There is no arguing
here and there is no prospect of arguing with this man, or with this dis-
course.’.” (cited from Badarevski, 2004: 264)
The application of this kind of strategy was recommended in Aris-
totle’s writings as the ultimate resort in situations where rational com-
munication has become impossible due to the intellectual habitus of the
collocutor. In the eighth book of Topics, Aristotle thus suggests the fol-
lowing:
You ought not to discuss with everybody […] for against some people argu-
ment is sure to deteriorate; for with a man who tries every means to seem to
avoid defeat you are justified in using every means to obtain your conclu-
sion, but this is not a seemly proceeding. (Topica, 164 b 9–10)
However, this strategy also suffers certain weak points and poten-
tial risks, mainly related to the possibility of its abuse. For example, a
participant in rational interaction applying this strategy might signif-
icantly underestimate the capacity of the other party for reasoned dis-
cussion and argumentation. Moreover, one might (mis)use this strate-
gy to compensate for one’s inability to match the adversary in intellec-
tual terms by calling him or her a “sophist” and meta-subversively evad-
ing rational discussion. This is why the “ignoring the sophist” strategy
should be applied with caution and only in specific, adequately assessed
circumstances.
3.4. Fighting Fire with Fire
The fourth strategy of “fighting fire with fire” is perhaps more com-
plex than those previously elaborated as it represents an indirect way of
attacking the argumentative subversion, i.e., by imitating it with critic-
al and polemic intention. The use of parody, satire or irony in argumen-
tative contexts could be treated as instances of adopting this particular
strategy.7
The name suggested for this strategy derives from the French expres-
sion “contre-feux”, denoting a fire deliberately set in front of another fire
so as to create a vacuum and prevent its spreading. In the same sense as
this metaphor, the goal of “fighting fire with fire” is to overcome adver-
saries in argumentative encounters by using their own means. More spe-
7 The following analysis concerns only forms of critically intended parody, “parody-attack”, which of-
ten turns into satire. See below, section 3.
dience of analytical philosophers in Oxford responded to the lecture he
delivered on différance in 1967: “On that occasion the silence which fol-
lowed was obviously eloquent. Eloquently saying: ‘There is no arguing
here and there is no prospect of arguing with this man, or with this dis-
course.’.” (cited from Badarevski, 2004: 264)
The application of this kind of strategy was recommended in Aris-
totle’s writings as the ultimate resort in situations where rational com-
munication has become impossible due to the intellectual habitus of the
collocutor. In the eighth book of Topics, Aristotle thus suggests the fol-
lowing:
You ought not to discuss with everybody […] for against some people argu-
ment is sure to deteriorate; for with a man who tries every means to seem to
avoid defeat you are justified in using every means to obtain your conclu-
sion, but this is not a seemly proceeding. (Topica, 164 b 9–10)
However, this strategy also suffers certain weak points and poten-
tial risks, mainly related to the possibility of its abuse. For example, a
participant in rational interaction applying this strategy might signif-
icantly underestimate the capacity of the other party for reasoned dis-
cussion and argumentation. Moreover, one might (mis)use this strate-
gy to compensate for one’s inability to match the adversary in intellec-
tual terms by calling him or her a “sophist” and meta-subversively evad-
ing rational discussion. This is why the “ignoring the sophist” strategy
should be applied with caution and only in specific, adequately assessed
circumstances.
3.4. Fighting Fire with Fire
The fourth strategy of “fighting fire with fire” is perhaps more com-
plex than those previously elaborated as it represents an indirect way of
attacking the argumentative subversion, i.e., by imitating it with critic-
al and polemic intention. The use of parody, satire or irony in argumen-
tative contexts could be treated as instances of adopting this particular
strategy.7
The name suggested for this strategy derives from the French expres-
sion “contre-feux”, denoting a fire deliberately set in front of another fire
so as to create a vacuum and prevent its spreading. In the same sense as
this metaphor, the goal of “fighting fire with fire” is to overcome adver-
saries in argumentative encounters by using their own means. More spe-
7 The following analysis concerns only forms of critically intended parody, “parody-attack”, which of-
ten turns into satire. See below, section 3.
