Page 90 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 90
What Do We Know about the World?
other participant(s) in the discussion. This vulnerability consists main-
ly in the fact that the normative force of these models is seriously af-
fected by the still open problem of their justification. If the objection
is raised that an opponent in a discussion is violating Alexy’s rules of
general practical discourse, for example, or Eemeren and Grootendorst’s
rules for critical discussion, the opponent could legitimately question
the normative status of these rules. This is because such rules obviously
do not have the same logical and argumentative power as, say, the norm
of the formal validity of conditional arguments. As a matter of fact, be-
cause of the lack of a single comprehensive and canonical theory of argu-
mentative discourse comparable to the theory of formal deductive log-
ic, the justification for those rules usually takes the pragmatic form of a
consensus among the participants of the discussion.5
There is therefore a need to elaborate different kinds of norms and
criteria, besides the criterion of formal logical validity, with which to de-
termine the rational acceptability of argumentation – especially in di-
alogically structured rational interactions. However, the justificatory
force of these argumentative norms will still depend upon the particu-
lar system in which they are formulated and on the shared acceptance of
their normative authority.
3.2. Appeal to Institutional Authority
While the “appeal to norm” strategy concerned violations of the
rules for constructing arguments, the “appeal to institutional author-
ity” strategy is applied in cases of violation or abuse of established pro-
cedural rules of discussion (although the possibility is not excluded that
such cases may also include violations of the rules for the construction
of arguments). For example, a kind of argumentative practice that mis-
uses the established procedural rules of discussion is the practice of fili-
bustering which occurs in the framework of parliamentary procedures.
This consists in using the unlimited right of speech to delay or prevent
the making of a decision on a legislative or other type of proposal.
The “appeal to institutional authority” strategy consists in invok-
ing the institutionally given role and authority to block the argumenta-
tive subversion. It is obvious that this is applicable within institutional-
ly structured and defined argumentative contexts such as the legal con-
text of adjudication and the context of parliamentary debates. The goal
of employing this strategy is to restore the procedural correctness of
5 For a discussion on the problems related to the concept of the conventional, intersubjective validi-
ty of pragma-dialectical discussion rules, see Zenker, 2011.
other participant(s) in the discussion. This vulnerability consists main-
ly in the fact that the normative force of these models is seriously af-
fected by the still open problem of their justification. If the objection
is raised that an opponent in a discussion is violating Alexy’s rules of
general practical discourse, for example, or Eemeren and Grootendorst’s
rules for critical discussion, the opponent could legitimately question
the normative status of these rules. This is because such rules obviously
do not have the same logical and argumentative power as, say, the norm
of the formal validity of conditional arguments. As a matter of fact, be-
cause of the lack of a single comprehensive and canonical theory of argu-
mentative discourse comparable to the theory of formal deductive log-
ic, the justification for those rules usually takes the pragmatic form of a
consensus among the participants of the discussion.5
There is therefore a need to elaborate different kinds of norms and
criteria, besides the criterion of formal logical validity, with which to de-
termine the rational acceptability of argumentation – especially in di-
alogically structured rational interactions. However, the justificatory
force of these argumentative norms will still depend upon the particu-
lar system in which they are formulated and on the shared acceptance of
their normative authority.
3.2. Appeal to Institutional Authority
While the “appeal to norm” strategy concerned violations of the
rules for constructing arguments, the “appeal to institutional author-
ity” strategy is applied in cases of violation or abuse of established pro-
cedural rules of discussion (although the possibility is not excluded that
such cases may also include violations of the rules for the construction
of arguments). For example, a kind of argumentative practice that mis-
uses the established procedural rules of discussion is the practice of fili-
bustering which occurs in the framework of parliamentary procedures.
This consists in using the unlimited right of speech to delay or prevent
the making of a decision on a legislative or other type of proposal.
The “appeal to institutional authority” strategy consists in invok-
ing the institutionally given role and authority to block the argumenta-
tive subversion. It is obvious that this is applicable within institutional-
ly structured and defined argumentative contexts such as the legal con-
text of adjudication and the context of parliamentary debates. The goal
of employing this strategy is to restore the procedural correctness of
5 For a discussion on the problems related to the concept of the conventional, intersubjective validi-
ty of pragma-dialectical discussion rules, see Zenker, 2011.
