Page 91 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 91
the sokal affair and beyond: on the strategic
use of parody in the »science wars« 91
the argumentative exchange. Returning to the example of filibustering,
there is also an institutional form of response to this kind of subversion:
the “cloture” procedure (used in the US senate, for example) which im-
poses restrictions on the filibuster’s unlimited right to speech and which
is also initiated and applied in accordance with strict procedural rules.
In legal contexts, especially in litigation, the institutional author-
ity to which one party can appeal in order to protect himself or herself
from the subversive intentions of the other party is represented by the
judge. Given the highly adversarial nature of paradigmatic legal litiga-
tion, in which each party is driven by his/her own interest, it is obvious
that there is a need for some form of external guarantee – or even coer-
cion – to ensure that the rules of rational argumentation are respected.
Indeed, the procedural aspect of law includes numerous rules that regu-
late the argumentative and dialogical side of legal proceedings, includ-
ing the invocation of the institutional authority of a judge in cases of
perceived argumentative subversion or abuse.6
The successful application of this strategy clearly presupposes the ex-
istence of fair procedure and the functionality of the institution whose
authority is being invoked. If the procedure in whose framework the ar-
gumentative exchange takes place is essentially unfair or biased, and/or
if the institutional authority that should guarantee procedural correct-
ness is dysfunctional or partial, then the appeal to institutional author-
ity as an anti-subversive strategy will be ineffective if not directly coun-
terproductive.
3.3. Ignoring the Sophist
Unlike the previous two strategies, both of which are intended to
restore argumentative and procedural correctness in cases when ration-
al interaction deviates from its optimal course, the strategy of “ignor-
ing the sophist” consists in strictly refraining from engagement in argu-
mentative discussion with the other party. Its application is triggered in
contexts in which it is estimated that the very possibility of rational dis-
cussion is undermined by the other party, whose profile and intellectu-
al habits render futile any effort to comply with standards of rationality
in argumentation. The goal of this strategy is obviously to disqualify the
other party as a valid participant in rational discussion.
One particularly illuminative example of the application of this
strategy can be found in Derrida’s description of the way in which an au-
6 For example, the judge can prevent a party from asking the witness a suggestive question or allow
the witness not to an answer a self-incriminating question, etc.
use of parody in the »science wars« 91
the argumentative exchange. Returning to the example of filibustering,
there is also an institutional form of response to this kind of subversion:
the “cloture” procedure (used in the US senate, for example) which im-
poses restrictions on the filibuster’s unlimited right to speech and which
is also initiated and applied in accordance with strict procedural rules.
In legal contexts, especially in litigation, the institutional author-
ity to which one party can appeal in order to protect himself or herself
from the subversive intentions of the other party is represented by the
judge. Given the highly adversarial nature of paradigmatic legal litiga-
tion, in which each party is driven by his/her own interest, it is obvious
that there is a need for some form of external guarantee – or even coer-
cion – to ensure that the rules of rational argumentation are respected.
Indeed, the procedural aspect of law includes numerous rules that regu-
late the argumentative and dialogical side of legal proceedings, includ-
ing the invocation of the institutional authority of a judge in cases of
perceived argumentative subversion or abuse.6
The successful application of this strategy clearly presupposes the ex-
istence of fair procedure and the functionality of the institution whose
authority is being invoked. If the procedure in whose framework the ar-
gumentative exchange takes place is essentially unfair or biased, and/or
if the institutional authority that should guarantee procedural correct-
ness is dysfunctional or partial, then the appeal to institutional author-
ity as an anti-subversive strategy will be ineffective if not directly coun-
terproductive.
3.3. Ignoring the Sophist
Unlike the previous two strategies, both of which are intended to
restore argumentative and procedural correctness in cases when ration-
al interaction deviates from its optimal course, the strategy of “ignor-
ing the sophist” consists in strictly refraining from engagement in argu-
mentative discussion with the other party. Its application is triggered in
contexts in which it is estimated that the very possibility of rational dis-
cussion is undermined by the other party, whose profile and intellectu-
al habits render futile any effort to comply with standards of rationality
in argumentation. The goal of this strategy is obviously to disqualify the
other party as a valid participant in rational discussion.
One particularly illuminative example of the application of this
strategy can be found in Derrida’s description of the way in which an au-
6 For example, the judge can prevent a party from asking the witness a suggestive question or allow
the witness not to an answer a self-incriminating question, etc.