Page 95 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 95
the sokal affair and beyond: on the strategic
use of parody in the »science wars« 95
with the rules and norms of rational argumentation. However, this ap-
proach would not work in this situation; such a step would clearly pre-
suppose the existence of a normative consensus between the intellectu-
al “war camps” involved concerning the standards that guarantee the ar-
gumentative legitimacy of their discursive practices. And yet the very
lack of such a consensus is obviously the factor which initially created
the gap between the two academic subcultures, the “scientific” and the
“postmodernist”. The “appeal to norm” strategy also seems more plausi-
ble on the micro-argumentative level, in which there is a violation of a
single argumentative rule (or several of them) that can be clearly identi-
fied and isolated from the totality of the discourse. However, the form
of subversion identified by Sokal in this case concerns rather the mac-
ro-argumentative level, for it stems from objections to the discourse as
a whole, i.e. from the integral way of thinking and communicating in
the framework of the criticised intellectual community. This is why the
most plausible way to deal with it was to mimic the totality of the target-
ed discourse by producing its parodied form, i.e. applying the “fighting
fire with fire” strategy.
As far as the other strategies are concerned, i.e., the “appeal to in-
stitutional authority” and the “ignoring the sophist” strategy, neither of
these would be adequate in Sokal’s situation. The application of the first
one would be impossible because of the fact that the controversy in ques-
tion is not placed in an institutional context, which implies that there is
no institutional authority (judge, arbiter etc.) to be invoked in order to
block the subversion according to pre-established procedural rules. The
application of the second one would be implausible because of the fact
that the ignoring of the opinions advanced by the intellectual adversar-
ies would boil down to self-exclusion from the argumentative space and
letting the subversion stay unexposed and unblocked. And that is pre-
cisely the opposite of Sokal’s intention in that case. In sum, it can be con-
cluded that his application of the “fighting fire with fire strategy” was
dictated by the specific circumstances of the concrete argumentative sit-
uation and that, in those circumstances, it could be treated as a strategi-
cally adequate choice.8
4.2. The Goal of the “Fighting Fire with Fire” Strategy
Commenting on the analysis presented in Gross and Levitt’s book,
Sokal observes that “some of the writings they examine are so silly that
8 The ethical implications of this choice will be discussed later, in section 3.4.
use of parody in the »science wars« 95
with the rules and norms of rational argumentation. However, this ap-
proach would not work in this situation; such a step would clearly pre-
suppose the existence of a normative consensus between the intellectu-
al “war camps” involved concerning the standards that guarantee the ar-
gumentative legitimacy of their discursive practices. And yet the very
lack of such a consensus is obviously the factor which initially created
the gap between the two academic subcultures, the “scientific” and the
“postmodernist”. The “appeal to norm” strategy also seems more plausi-
ble on the micro-argumentative level, in which there is a violation of a
single argumentative rule (or several of them) that can be clearly identi-
fied and isolated from the totality of the discourse. However, the form
of subversion identified by Sokal in this case concerns rather the mac-
ro-argumentative level, for it stems from objections to the discourse as
a whole, i.e. from the integral way of thinking and communicating in
the framework of the criticised intellectual community. This is why the
most plausible way to deal with it was to mimic the totality of the target-
ed discourse by producing its parodied form, i.e. applying the “fighting
fire with fire” strategy.
As far as the other strategies are concerned, i.e., the “appeal to in-
stitutional authority” and the “ignoring the sophist” strategy, neither of
these would be adequate in Sokal’s situation. The application of the first
one would be impossible because of the fact that the controversy in ques-
tion is not placed in an institutional context, which implies that there is
no institutional authority (judge, arbiter etc.) to be invoked in order to
block the subversion according to pre-established procedural rules. The
application of the second one would be implausible because of the fact
that the ignoring of the opinions advanced by the intellectual adversar-
ies would boil down to self-exclusion from the argumentative space and
letting the subversion stay unexposed and unblocked. And that is pre-
cisely the opposite of Sokal’s intention in that case. In sum, it can be con-
cluded that his application of the “fighting fire with fire strategy” was
dictated by the specific circumstances of the concrete argumentative sit-
uation and that, in those circumstances, it could be treated as a strategi-
cally adequate choice.8
4.2. The Goal of the “Fighting Fire with Fire” Strategy
Commenting on the analysis presented in Gross and Levitt’s book,
Sokal observes that “some of the writings they examine are so silly that
8 The ethical implications of this choice will be discussed later, in section 3.4.
