Page 89 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 89
the sokal affair and beyond: on the strategic
use of parody in the »science wars« 89
fire” strategy. An attempt is made in this section to formulate criteria
for identifying each of these anti-subversive strategies, the conditions of
their successful use and the potential risks involved in their application.
3.1. Appeal to Norm
The “appeal to norm” strategy consists in showing that the other
party in the argumentative interaction is employing an argument that
violates one or more norms of logical and argumentative discourse and is
consequently fallacious. The goal of employing this strategy is to restore
the argumentative correctness of the dialogue by forcing the other party
to retract or modify the contested argument and all the propositions or
arguments that depend on that argument.
Successful application of this “appeal to norm” strategy is depend-
ent, however, on there being a consensus amongst the participants in
the rational interaction as to the regulative status of the norm being in-
voked. In this sense, the formal logical validity of an argument is one of
the strongest and most unquestionable criteria for its rational accept-
ance. For example, if the contested argument is shown to be logically in-
valid, withdrawing from it should follow immediately since the formal
invalidity of an argument eliminates the necessity of accepting the con-
clusion even in cases when its premises are accepted.
It may be argued, however, that the norm of formal deductive valid-
ity is not the one and only norm to be taken into consideration when as-
sessing the rational acceptability of argumentation. A number of sup-
plementary criteria of argumentative correctness have been formulated
in many contemporary approaches that address the dialogical aspects
of rational communication and argumentation (Alexy, 1989; Barth
and Krabbe, 1982; Grice, 1975/1989; Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984;
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1995; Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2009; Re-
scher, 1977; Walton, 1992; Walton and Krabbe, 1995, etc.; cf. Eemeren
and Grootendorst’s rules for a critical discussion, Alexy’s rules for gen-
eral practical discourse, Grice’s cooperative principle and conversational
maxims, etc.). Despite many differences between these approaches, they
all share a fundamental common feature, i.e., an attempt to elaborate
wider complexes of norms and rules – besides strictly logical ones– that
must be observed to bring the verbal interaction as close as possible to
the ideal of rational and critical dialogue.
The models developed in the aforementioned approaches reveal
their potential vulnerability, however, when they are adopted in a stra-
tegic manner to detect a possible violation of an argumentative norm by
use of parody in the »science wars« 89
fire” strategy. An attempt is made in this section to formulate criteria
for identifying each of these anti-subversive strategies, the conditions of
their successful use and the potential risks involved in their application.
3.1. Appeal to Norm
The “appeal to norm” strategy consists in showing that the other
party in the argumentative interaction is employing an argument that
violates one or more norms of logical and argumentative discourse and is
consequently fallacious. The goal of employing this strategy is to restore
the argumentative correctness of the dialogue by forcing the other party
to retract or modify the contested argument and all the propositions or
arguments that depend on that argument.
Successful application of this “appeal to norm” strategy is depend-
ent, however, on there being a consensus amongst the participants in
the rational interaction as to the regulative status of the norm being in-
voked. In this sense, the formal logical validity of an argument is one of
the strongest and most unquestionable criteria for its rational accept-
ance. For example, if the contested argument is shown to be logically in-
valid, withdrawing from it should follow immediately since the formal
invalidity of an argument eliminates the necessity of accepting the con-
clusion even in cases when its premises are accepted.
It may be argued, however, that the norm of formal deductive valid-
ity is not the one and only norm to be taken into consideration when as-
sessing the rational acceptability of argumentation. A number of sup-
plementary criteria of argumentative correctness have been formulated
in many contemporary approaches that address the dialogical aspects
of rational communication and argumentation (Alexy, 1989; Barth
and Krabbe, 1982; Grice, 1975/1989; Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984;
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1995; Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2009; Re-
scher, 1977; Walton, 1992; Walton and Krabbe, 1995, etc.; cf. Eemeren
and Grootendorst’s rules for a critical discussion, Alexy’s rules for gen-
eral practical discourse, Grice’s cooperative principle and conversational
maxims, etc.). Despite many differences between these approaches, they
all share a fundamental common feature, i.e., an attempt to elaborate
wider complexes of norms and rules – besides strictly logical ones– that
must be observed to bring the verbal interaction as close as possible to
the ideal of rational and critical dialogue.
The models developed in the aforementioned approaches reveal
their potential vulnerability, however, when they are adopted in a stra-
tegic manner to detect a possible violation of an argumentative norm by
