Page 97 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 97
the sokal affair and beyond: on the strategic
use of parody in the »science wars« 97
ic rigour, implying that these standards are either inadequate or, worse,
non-existent (Rio, 1997). In both cases, Sokal’s point about the necessi-
ty of adequate, rigorous standards of acceptability of scientific and phil-
osophical discourses and their implications would be made in a convinc-
ing way.
In order to understand the goal of using the “fighting fire with fire”
strategy in the argumentative situation created by the Sokal affair, it may
be useful to explore Sokal’s own opinion of the probative force and range
of his “experiment”. Thus, distancing himself from his “over-enthusiastic
supporters” who “have claimed too much” in his text “What the Social
Text affair proves and does not prove”, Sokal writes:
From the mere publication of my parody I think that not much can be de-
duced. It doesn’t prove that the whole field of cultural studies or cultural
studies of science – much less sociology of science – is nonsense. Nor does
it prove that the intellectual standards in these fields are generally lax. [...] It
proves only that the editors of one rather marginal journal were derelict in
their intellectual duty [...] (Sokal, 2010: 152–153; see also http://www.physics.
nyu.edu/sokal/noretta.html).
According to Sokal, much more important than the conclusions
which can be deduced from the fact of the publication of the parodic ar-
ticle are the conclusions that can be deduced from its content. Thus he
points to the fact that “the most hilarious parts” of his “screamingly fun-
ny” article were not written by himself but were “direct quotes from the
postmodern Masters” (ibid.).
The real targets of Sokal’s critique are the “sloppy thinking” and
“glib relativism” allegedly prevailing “in many parts of Science Studies
(albeit not, by and large, among serious philosophers of science)” (Sokal,
2010: 155–156). Consequently, the main goal of applying the “fighting
fire with fire” strategy in this case consisted not in ridiculing a hand-
ful of trendy intellectuals or intellectually lazy editors but in undermin-
ing the epistemological credibility of the criticised form of discourse by
practically demonstrating (what Sokal perceives as) its absurdity9 and
unsoundness.
9 Perhaps, as Leo Groarke suggested in an informal discussion during the “Days of Ivo Škarić” confer-
ence, Sokal’s approach could be treated as an instance of reductio ad absurdum proof of the unsound-
ness of the criticised form of discourse. However, my choice to describe it with the metaphorical
expression “fighting fire with fire” is motivated by the need to take into consideration not only the
logical but also the rhetorical and ethical aspects of the controversy, which are not explicitly empha-
sized in standard reductio ad absurdum procedure.
use of parody in the »science wars« 97
ic rigour, implying that these standards are either inadequate or, worse,
non-existent (Rio, 1997). In both cases, Sokal’s point about the necessi-
ty of adequate, rigorous standards of acceptability of scientific and phil-
osophical discourses and their implications would be made in a convinc-
ing way.
In order to understand the goal of using the “fighting fire with fire”
strategy in the argumentative situation created by the Sokal affair, it may
be useful to explore Sokal’s own opinion of the probative force and range
of his “experiment”. Thus, distancing himself from his “over-enthusiastic
supporters” who “have claimed too much” in his text “What the Social
Text affair proves and does not prove”, Sokal writes:
From the mere publication of my parody I think that not much can be de-
duced. It doesn’t prove that the whole field of cultural studies or cultural
studies of science – much less sociology of science – is nonsense. Nor does
it prove that the intellectual standards in these fields are generally lax. [...] It
proves only that the editors of one rather marginal journal were derelict in
their intellectual duty [...] (Sokal, 2010: 152–153; see also http://www.physics.
nyu.edu/sokal/noretta.html).
According to Sokal, much more important than the conclusions
which can be deduced from the fact of the publication of the parodic ar-
ticle are the conclusions that can be deduced from its content. Thus he
points to the fact that “the most hilarious parts” of his “screamingly fun-
ny” article were not written by himself but were “direct quotes from the
postmodern Masters” (ibid.).
The real targets of Sokal’s critique are the “sloppy thinking” and
“glib relativism” allegedly prevailing “in many parts of Science Studies
(albeit not, by and large, among serious philosophers of science)” (Sokal,
2010: 155–156). Consequently, the main goal of applying the “fighting
fire with fire” strategy in this case consisted not in ridiculing a hand-
ful of trendy intellectuals or intellectually lazy editors but in undermin-
ing the epistemological credibility of the criticised form of discourse by
practically demonstrating (what Sokal perceives as) its absurdity9 and
unsoundness.
9 Perhaps, as Leo Groarke suggested in an informal discussion during the “Days of Ivo Škarić” confer-
ence, Sokal’s approach could be treated as an instance of reductio ad absurdum proof of the unsound-
ness of the criticised form of discourse. However, my choice to describe it with the metaphorical
expression “fighting fire with fire” is motivated by the need to take into consideration not only the
logical but also the rhetorical and ethical aspects of the controversy, which are not explicitly empha-
sized in standard reductio ad absurdum procedure.
