Page 51 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 51
argumentation as poliphony: one speaker, several voices 51
mentatively allow for very different conclusions. How can we explain
that?
In his “weak informativistic” phase Ducrot tried to solve the prob-
lem by distinguishing between the posited and the presupposed in the
utterance-argument. An utterance such as
(9) Prešeren4 was a great poet
could thus be analyzed into what is (explicitly) posited:
(p): Prešeren’s poetry was extraordinary,
and into what is (implicitly) presupposed:
(pp): Prešeren was a poet.
In linguistics, it is often taken as a test for distinguishing what is
posited from what is presupposed in a given utterance that the utter-
ance’s presupposition must not change if we
a) negate the utterance,
b) put it into an interrogative form, or
c) embed it in a subordinate clause.
If we apply these three criteria to our example (9), we can see that, in
this respect, our analysis was correct. Utterances
(9’) Prešeren wasn’t a great poet
(9’’) Was Prešeren a great poet?
(9’’’) Slovenians are convinced that Prešeren was a great poet,
in principle retain the same presupposition: Prešeren was a poet. We have
to say "in principle", because the range of the negation in (9’) could easi-
ly be the whole phrase great poet, and not only the adjective great, which
means that the presupposition (Prešeren was a poet) would be negat-
ed too. That being the case, we could easily use (9’) as an argument for
a conclusion such as: He was an impostor, namely Prešeren wasn’t a great
poet (Argument), he was an impostor (Conclusion).
That is why Ducrot introduced a new, stronger and decisive criter-
ion for distinguishing between what is posited and what is presupposed:
an utterance-conclusion can only be drawn from what is (explicitly) pos-
ited, but not from what is (implicitly) presupposed. Only after applying
this criterion can we be sure that our distinction between what is pos-
ited and what is presupposed in (9) was correct. From Prešeren was a
great poet (Prešeren’s poetry was extraordinary) we can easily conclude,
We built him a monument, whereas the presupposition Prešeren was a
poet doesn’t allow for such a conclusion (at least not in Slovenia; which
4 Prešeren is a nationally glorified poet in Slovenia.
mentatively allow for very different conclusions. How can we explain
that?
In his “weak informativistic” phase Ducrot tried to solve the prob-
lem by distinguishing between the posited and the presupposed in the
utterance-argument. An utterance such as
(9) Prešeren4 was a great poet
could thus be analyzed into what is (explicitly) posited:
(p): Prešeren’s poetry was extraordinary,
and into what is (implicitly) presupposed:
(pp): Prešeren was a poet.
In linguistics, it is often taken as a test for distinguishing what is
posited from what is presupposed in a given utterance that the utter-
ance’s presupposition must not change if we
a) negate the utterance,
b) put it into an interrogative form, or
c) embed it in a subordinate clause.
If we apply these three criteria to our example (9), we can see that, in
this respect, our analysis was correct. Utterances
(9’) Prešeren wasn’t a great poet
(9’’) Was Prešeren a great poet?
(9’’’) Slovenians are convinced that Prešeren was a great poet,
in principle retain the same presupposition: Prešeren was a poet. We have
to say "in principle", because the range of the negation in (9’) could easi-
ly be the whole phrase great poet, and not only the adjective great, which
means that the presupposition (Prešeren was a poet) would be negat-
ed too. That being the case, we could easily use (9’) as an argument for
a conclusion such as: He was an impostor, namely Prešeren wasn’t a great
poet (Argument), he was an impostor (Conclusion).
That is why Ducrot introduced a new, stronger and decisive criter-
ion for distinguishing between what is posited and what is presupposed:
an utterance-conclusion can only be drawn from what is (explicitly) pos-
ited, but not from what is (implicitly) presupposed. Only after applying
this criterion can we be sure that our distinction between what is pos-
ited and what is presupposed in (9) was correct. From Prešeren was a
great poet (Prešeren’s poetry was extraordinary) we can easily conclude,
We built him a monument, whereas the presupposition Prešeren was a
poet doesn’t allow for such a conclusion (at least not in Slovenia; which
4 Prešeren is a nationally glorified poet in Slovenia.
