Page 50 - Gabrijela Kišiček and Igor Ž. Žagar (eds.), What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative perspectives, Digital Library, Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana 2013
P. 50
What Do We Know about the World?
the argument Dinner is almost ready occurs as a weaker one, but it
supports the same conclusion as does the strongest argument on the
scale. An argumentative orientation must thus be, regardless of the
context, inherent to the very particle almost, which means that every
utterance-argument containing the particle almost represents a specif-
ic restriction affecting the continuation of the discourse (i.e. utter-
ance-conclusion): the utterance-conclusion following it (i.e. follow-
ing almost...) must argumentatively pursue and conform to the course
mapped out, or delimited by the use of the particle almost, contained
in the utterance-argument. In other words, from Dinner is almost
ready it is impossible to conclude (in the direction of) There is still
time, you don’t have to hurry (unless we preface it by a concessive but,
nevertheless...)
That explains, at least partially, why in the examples (3) and (4) we
had to adopt the conclusions we had actually adopted. But let us step
back for a moment, just to be able to see more clearly what really was the
problem (for Ducrot).
4. Posited and Presupposed
Examples (3) and (4), which we used to demonstrate the difference
between informativeness and argumentativeness may seem rather illus-
trative, but they are certainly not the most appropriate ones because they
use two (lexically and semantically) different morphemes: not … all and
some. The difference between informativeness and argumentativeness
becomes much clearer when we have to deal with (lexically and seman-
tically) synonymous morphemes, but with (very) different argumen-
tative values. Ducrot’s favourite example is the difference between the
French adverbs peu and un peu (which could be translated into English
as little and a little). Informatively/factually, there seems to be no differ-
ence between the two: both of them denote a “small quantity” of some-
thing. But argumentatively, if we use them in discourse, there is a rather
big difference: little seems to be argumentatively oriented towards noth-
ing, not at all, whereas a little seems to be argumentatively oriented to-
wards a lot. How is that?
Let us take a look at the following two examples:
(7) Janez worked little. > He may not pass the exam.
(8) Janez worked a little. > He may pass the exam.
Here we have two examples that on the “factual,” informational
level, deal with the same small quantities of something, but which argu-
the argument Dinner is almost ready occurs as a weaker one, but it
supports the same conclusion as does the strongest argument on the
scale. An argumentative orientation must thus be, regardless of the
context, inherent to the very particle almost, which means that every
utterance-argument containing the particle almost represents a specif-
ic restriction affecting the continuation of the discourse (i.e. utter-
ance-conclusion): the utterance-conclusion following it (i.e. follow-
ing almost...) must argumentatively pursue and conform to the course
mapped out, or delimited by the use of the particle almost, contained
in the utterance-argument. In other words, from Dinner is almost
ready it is impossible to conclude (in the direction of) There is still
time, you don’t have to hurry (unless we preface it by a concessive but,
nevertheless...)
That explains, at least partially, why in the examples (3) and (4) we
had to adopt the conclusions we had actually adopted. But let us step
back for a moment, just to be able to see more clearly what really was the
problem (for Ducrot).
4. Posited and Presupposed
Examples (3) and (4), which we used to demonstrate the difference
between informativeness and argumentativeness may seem rather illus-
trative, but they are certainly not the most appropriate ones because they
use two (lexically and semantically) different morphemes: not … all and
some. The difference between informativeness and argumentativeness
becomes much clearer when we have to deal with (lexically and seman-
tically) synonymous morphemes, but with (very) different argumen-
tative values. Ducrot’s favourite example is the difference between the
French adverbs peu and un peu (which could be translated into English
as little and a little). Informatively/factually, there seems to be no differ-
ence between the two: both of them denote a “small quantity” of some-
thing. But argumentatively, if we use them in discourse, there is a rather
big difference: little seems to be argumentatively oriented towards noth-
ing, not at all, whereas a little seems to be argumentatively oriented to-
wards a lot. How is that?
Let us take a look at the following two examples:
(7) Janez worked little. > He may not pass the exam.
(8) Janez worked a little. > He may pass the exam.
Here we have two examples that on the “factual,” informational
level, deal with the same small quantities of something, but which argu-
